|
Haitian inspiration: On the bicentenary of Haiti’s
independence
Peter Hallward
Two hundred years ago this month (January 2004), the French colony of
Saint-Domingue on the island of Hispaniola became the independent nation of
Haiti. Few transformations in world history have been more momentous, few
required more sacrifice or promised more hope. And few have been more thoroughly
forgotten by those who would have us believe that this history has since
come to a desirable end with the eclipse of struggles for socialism, national
liberation and meaningful independence in the developing world.
Of the three great revolutions that began in the final decades of the
eighteenth century – American, French and Haitian – only the third forced the
unconditional application of the principle that inspired each one: affirmation of
the natural, inalienable rights of all human beings. Only in Haiti was the
declaration of human freedom universally consistent. Only in Haiti was this
declaration sustained at all costs, in direct opposition to the social order and
economic logic of the day. Only in Haiti were the consequences of this
declaration – the end of slavery, of colonialism, of racial inequality – upheld
in terms that directly embraced the world as a whole. And of these three
revolutions, it is Haiti’s that has the most to teach those seeking to uphold
these consequences in the world today.
Recognized as a French territory from the late seventeenth century, by
the 1780s Saint-Domingue had become far and away the most profitable colony in
the world, the jewel in the French imperial crown and the basis for much of the
new prosperity of its growing commercial bourgeoisie. ‘On the eve of the
American Revolution’, Paul Farmer notes, ‘Saint-Domingue – roughly the size of
the modern state of Maryland – generated more revenue than all thirteen North
American colonies combined’; on the eve of the French Revolution it had become
the world’s single largest producer of coffee and the source for around 75 prer
cent of its sugar.1 This exceptional productivity was the result of an
exceptionally cruel plantation economy, one built on the labour of slaves who
were worked to death so quickly that even rapid expansion of the slave trade
over these same years was unable to keep up with demand. Mortality levels were
such that during the 1780s the colony absorbed around 40,000 new slaves a year.
By 1789, Eric Williams suggests, this ‘pearl of the Caribbean’ had become, for
the vast majority of its inhabitants, ‘the worst hell on earth’.2
Rapid growth put significant strains on the colony’s social structure.
Coercive power was divided between three increasingly antagonistic groups – the
white plantation-owning elite, the representatives of French imperial power on
the island, and an ever more prosperous but politically powerless group of
mulattos and former slaves. With the outbreak of the French Revolution tensions
between these factions of the colonial ruling class broke out in open conflict,
and when a massive slave rebellion began in August 1791 the regime was unable to
cope. Sent to restore order, the French commissioner Sonthonax was soon
confronted by a rebellion of the white planters seeking greater independence
from republican France and withdrawal of the civic rights recently granted to
the island’s mulattos. Sonthonax only managed to suppress this rebellion by
offering permanent freedom to the slave armies who still controlled the
countryside, in exchange for their support. Over the next few years, the army of
emancipated slaves led by Toussaint L’Ouverture slowly gained control of the
colony. In a series of brilliant military campaigns, Toussaint defeated the
planters, the Spanish, the British and his own rivals among the black and
mulatto armies. By the turn of the century he had become the effective ruler of
Saint-Domingue. Unwilling to break with France itself, however, Toussaint
allowed himself to be taken prisoner by the expeditionary force that Napoleon
sent in 1801 to restore colonial slavery. Napoleon’s troops were successful in
Guadeloupe but failed in Saint-Domingue. Toussaint’s army reassembled under
Jean-Jacques Dessalines and by the time the war of independence was over
Napoleon, like Pitt before him, had lost 50,000 troops. The last of the French
were expelled in November 1803.
Apart from the extraordinary impact of the historical sequence itself,
why should anyone with an interest in radical philosophy take an interest,
today, in the making of Haitian independence? Haiti is invariably described as
the ‘poorest country in the Western hemisphere’. It routinely features as an
object lesson in failed economic development and unfinished ‘modernization’, as
deprived of the benefits associated with representative democracy, modern civil
society and stable foreign investment. Almost as regularly, it is presented as
the referent of explicitly racist hogwash about Voodoo or AIDS. Why take an
interest in the revolution which led to the creation of such a country? Here are
some of the more obvious reasons.
1. If the French Revolution stands as the great political event of modern
times, the Haitian revolution must figure as the single most decisive sequence of
this event. The French colonies were the one place in which the ‘universal’
principles of liberty and equality affirmed by 1789 were truly tested: they were
that exceptional place in which these principles might fail to apply. No
question served to clarify political differences within the Revolutionary
Assemblies as sharply as the colonial question, and, as Florence Gauthier has
shown, no question played a more important role in the reactionary transition
from the Jacobin prescription of natural rights to the Thermidorian affirmation
of social rights – the prescriptions of order, property and prosperity. The
Haitian revolution continued, moreover, where the French Revolution left off:
just before Napoleon tried to restore slavery in the western half of Hispaniola,
Toussaint abolished it in the eastern half. And in so far as our political
present retains an essentially Thermidorian configuration, the logic used by the
French colonial lobby to justify the preservation of slavery says something
about the logic at issue in today’s global division of labour as well. Pierre
Victor Malouet, speaking on behalf of the planters in the Assembly’s 1791
debate, knew that the universal declaration of human rights was incompatible
with the existence of colonies, and so urged his patriotic countrymen to
preserve the exceptional status of their colonies. ‘It’s not a matter of
pondering whether the institution of slavery can be defended in terms of
principle and right’, said Malouet; ‘no man endowed with sense and morality
would profess such a doctrine. It’s a matter, instead, of knowing whether it
is possible to change this institution in our colonies, without a terrifying
accumulation of crimes and calamities.’3 The basic principle persists to this
day. The rules that apply to ‘us’ cannot reasonably be made to apply to ‘them’
without jeopardizing the stability of our investments, without risking global
recession, terror or worse.
2. The achievement of Haitian independence reminds us that politics need
not always proceed as ‘the art of the possible’. Haitian independence brought to
an end one of the most profoundly improbable sequences in all of world history.
Contemporary observers were uniformly astounded. As Robin Blackburn
observes, Toussaint’s forces broke the chain of colonial slavery at ‘what had
been, in 1789, its strongest link’.4 They overcame the most crushing form of
ideological prejudice ever faced by a resistance movement and defeated in turn
the armies of the most powerful imperialist nations on earth. Their example
further provided perhaps the single greatest inspiration for subsequent African
and Latin American liberation movements: Haiti provided crucial support to (a
notably ungrateful) Simón Bolívar in his struggle against Spain, and in the first
decades of the nineteenth century helped motivate rebellions against slavery in
Cuba, Jamaica, Brazil and the USA, just as it would later inspire those working
for an end to colonialism in Africa.
3. The Haitian revolution is a particularly dramatic example of the way
in which historical ‘necessity’ emerges only retrospectively. Those who refrain
from action until the full strategic import of the moment becomes clear will
never act. With hindsight, it is obvious that in the circumstances of the
late eighteenth century only the achievement of national independence could ever
guarantee the lasting abolition of slavery in Haiti. Nevertheless, it took
Dessalines ten years to reach this conclusion, and it is one that Toussaint
himself was apparently never willing to accept. Toussaint’s eventual
determination to placate the French, to preserve the essential structure of the
plantation economy, to accommodate the white planters, cost him much of his
popular support in the final campaign against France: the man who did most to
achieve liberation of the slaves was unable to do what was required to preserve
this achievement. Similarly, although the slave uprising that sparked the whole
sequence was carefully planned and thoroughly prepared by the structural
conditions of the plantation economy itself, its full consequences remained
obscure long after the event. None of the leaders involved in the uprising
deliberately set out to achieve the abolition of slavery. Pursuit of abolition
was virtually imposed upon them by the planters’ refusal to accept anything
other than the quasi-suicidal surrender of their armies. The actual decision to
abolish slavery was then forced on a reluctant Sonthonax as a result of
intractable divisions among the Saint-Domingue elite.
4. Although the process was contingent and unpredictable, the achievement
of Haitian freedom and independence was forced through direct action, without
mediation of ‘recognition’, ‘negotiation’ or ‘communication’. Enlightened
arguments against slavery were hardly uncommon in the eighteenth century.
Montesquieu poured scorn on its racial and religious ‘justifications’, the
Encyclopédie labelled the colonial slave trade a crime against humanity,
Rousseau identified slavery with a denial of humanity pure and simple. The mostly
Girondin Société des Amis des Noirs supported a ‘carefully prepared freedom for
the slaves’ within a reformed colonial system. There’s a world of difference,
however, between the assertion of such fine principles and active solidarity with
an actual slave uprising. Brissot, founder of the Société, called for the
repression of the slaves’ uprising as soon as it began. As C.L.R. James points
out, impassioned moral outbursts about the evils of exploitation ‘neither then
nor now have carried weight’, for when the basis of their authority is in
question those in power yield only to irresistible pressure.5 The moderates who
worked to improve conditions in Saint-Domingue through official legislative
channels achieved virtually nothing during three years of indecisive wrangling,
and the Jacobins’ eventual acceptance of an end to slavery came a full two and a
half years after the 1791 revolt. Unlike the slaves, who lacked any official
representation, the island’s mulattos were weakened as much by their futile
efforts to solicit recognition from France as they were by their reckless
determination to pursue their claims in isolation, without black support. (As
for Tocqueville, the darling of those reactionary historians of the French
Revolution who have recently gone to some trouble to erase the question of
slavery and the colonies from this history altogether6 – for all his well-known
aversion to slavery, he was to echo the colonial lobby almost to the letter when
in the 1830s and 1840s he came to advocate the ‘total domination’ of Algeria
through ‘devastation of the country’ and the enforcement of apartheid-style
forms of social control.) Among the French philosophes, only Diderot and Raynal,
after Mercier, were willing to tell the nations of Europe, in words that may
have inspired Toussaint himself, that ‘your slaves are not in need of your
generosity or of your councils, in order to break the sacrilegious yoke which
oppresses them.… A courageous chief only is wanted [who] will come forth and
raise the sacred standard of liberty.’
5. The Haitian revolution is a powerful illustration of the way in which
any actively universal prescription is simultaneously an exceptional and
divisive revaluation of a hitherto unrepresentable or ‘untouchable’ aspect of
its situation. Every truly universal principle, as Alain Badiou suggests,
‘appears at first as the decision of an undecidable or the valorization of
something without value’ and its consequent application will ensure that the
group or capacity that has so far been ‘minimally existent’ in the situation
comes to acquire a maximal intensity.7 On the eve of 1791, what virtually
all the participants in the debate over slavery accepted, including the future
slave leaders themselves, was the impossibility of an independent nation peopled
by free citizens of African descent. The achievement of this independence must
stand as one of the most categorical blows against racism that has ever been
struck. Rarely has race been so clearly understood for what it is – in no sense
a source of conflict or difference, but merely an empty signifier harnessed to an
economy of plunder and exploitation. Early Haitian writers understood perfectly
well the point made more recently by Wallerstein and Balibar, among others, that
theories of racial inequality were concocted by white colonists so as to
legitimate slavery and the pursuit of European interests. The first constitution
of Haiti (1805) broke abruptly with the whole question of race by identifying
all Haitians, regardless of the colour of their skin, as black – a
characterization that included, among others, a substantial number of German
and Polish troops who had joined in the fight against Napoleon. David Nicholls
demonstrates that throughout the nineteenth century, though they showed little
interest in the contemporary state of African culture per se, ‘Haitian writers,
mulatto and black, conservative and Marxist, were practically unanimous in
portraying Haiti as a symbol of African regeneration and of racial equality.
Mulatto intellectuals from the elite, who in appearance could well have been
taken for Europeans, proudly regarded themselves as Africans, as members of the
black race.’8 And, as Nicholls goes on to show, nothing has undercut Haitian
independence in the post-revolutionary period more than the resurgence of colour
prejudice and the re-differentiation of Haitians in terms of either coloured or
black.
6. Haiti’s revolution is a reminder that such divisive universality can
only be sustained by a revolutionary subject. Haitian independence was the
conclusion of the only successful slave uprising that has ever taken place. It
isn’t difficult to list the various conjunctural reasons for this success,
including the large numbers and concentration of slaves in the colony, the
economic and cultural factors which tied them together, the brutality with which
most of them were treated, the relative freedom of movement enjoyed by the
slaves’ ‘managerial’ elite, the intensity of economic and political
divisions among the ruling class, rivalries among the imperialist powers, the
inspiration provided by the revolutions in America and France, the quality of
Toussaint’s leadership, and so on. One factor above all, however, accounts for
the outcome of what became one of the first modern instances of total war:
the people’s determination to resist a return to slavery under any
circumstances. This is the great constant of the entire revolutionary sequence,
and it is this that lends an overall direction to the otherwise convoluted
series of its leaders’ tactical manoeuvrings. As Carolyn Fick has established,
when Dessalines, Christophe and the other black generals finally broke with the
French in 1802, it was the constancy of their troops that enabled their eventual
decision. ‘The masses had resisted the French from the very beginning, in spite
of, and not because of, their leadership. They had shouldered the whole burden
and paid the price of resistance all along, and it was they who had now made
possible the political and military reintegration of the leaders in the
collective struggle.’9 Haiti’s revolutionaries thereby refused today’s logic of
‘democratic intervention’ avant la lettre. The recent introduction of democracy
to Iraq is only the latest of a long sequence of international attempts to
impose self-serving political arrangements upon a people whose participation
in the process is only tolerable if it remains utterly passive and obedient; the
people of Haiti, by contrast, were determined to remain the subjects rather than
the objects of their own liberation. And by doing so, they likewise challenged
that category of absolute passivity, that quasi-human ‘remainder’ revived, in a
certain sense, by Giorgio Agamben’s recent work on bare life and the
Muselmänner. Whereas ‘before the revolution many a slave had to be whipped
before he could be got to move from where he sat’, James notes, these same
‘subhumans’ then went on to fight ‘one of the greatest revolutionary battles in
history’.10
7. In stark contrast to today’s democratic consensus, Haitian history
from Toussaint and Dessalines to Préval and Aristide features the consistent
articulation of popular political mobilization and authoritarian leadership.
Needless to say, the fortunes of the former have often suffered from the
excesses of the latter. It is no less obvious, however, that arguments in favour
of ‘democratic reform’ and a judicious ‘separation of powers’ have very largely
been made by members of Haiti’s tiny propertied elite, along with their
international sponsors. Precisely these kinds of argument have served to
paralyse Aristide’s presidency from the moment he first took office. The basic
pattern was already set with the reaction to Dessalines’ own brief rule: in his
several years as (an undeniably bloodthirsty and autocratic) emperor, Dessalines
introduced taxes on trade that were unpopular with the elite, took steps to
dissolve prejudice between coloureds and blacks, and began to move towards a
more equitable distribution of land. ‘Negroes and mulattos’, he announced, ‘we
have ll fought against the whites; the properties which we have conquered by
the spilling of our blood belong to us all; I intend that they be divided with
equity.’11 Soon afterwards, in October 1806, the mulatto elite had Dessalines
assassinated, and were subsequently careful to protect their commercial
privileges by imposing strict limits on presidential power. Dessalines’ true
successor, as James implies, is Fidel Castro. On the other hand, repeated
attempts (begun by Toussaint himself) to restore the old plantation economy by
authoritarian means foundered on the resolve of the emancipated slaves never to
return to their former life. The main goal of most participants in the war of
independence was direct control over their own livelihood and land. Haiti’s first
constitution was careful to block foreign ownership of Haitian property, and
by the 1820s many of Haiti’s ex-slaves had succeeded in becoming peasant
proprietors. The ongoing effort to retain at least some degree of economic
autonomy is one of several factors that help explain the exceptionally
aggressive economic policies subsequently imposed on the island, first by
American occupation (1915–34) and later by the IMF-brokered structural
adjustment plans which have effectively continued that occupation by other
means.Much of the power of James’s celebrated account of the Haitian
revolution stems from the fact that it is oriented squarely towards what
were, for him, the ongoing struggles for African liberation and global
socialism. Today, things may not seem quite so clear-cut. Today’s variants on
slavery are somewhat less stark than those of 1788, and their justification
usually involves arguments more subtle than reference to the colour of one’s
skin. Some things haven’t changed, however. Haiti’s revolution proceeded in
direct opposition to the great colonial powers of the day, and when after
Thermidor even revolutionary France returned to the colonial fold, Haiti alone
carried on the struggle to affirm the rights of universal humanity against the
predatory imperatives of property. Aristide’s greatest crime in the eyes of the
‘international community’ was surely to have continued this struggle.
Thermidorians of every age have tried to present an orderly, pacified picture of
historical change as the consolidation of property, prosperity and security.
Haiti’s revolution testifies to the power of another conception of history and
the possibility of a different political future.
Notes 1. Paul Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, Common Courage
Press, Monroe ME, 1994, p. 63. 2. Eric Williams, From Columbus to
Castro: The History of the Caribbean 1492–1969, André Deutsch, London, 1970, p.
245. The standard account of the Haitian revolution remains, with good reason,
C.L.R. James’s The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo
Revolution, Penguin, London, 2001; originally published
1938. 3. Florence Gauthier, Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en
Révolution 1789–1795–1802, PUF, Paris, 2000, pp. 174–7. 4. Robin
Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, Verso, London, 1989, p.
258. 5. James, The Black Jacobins, p.
19. 6. Saint-Domingue isn’t even mentioned in Simon Schama’s
bestselling Citizens (Knopf, 1989) or Keith Baker’s Inventing the French
Revolution (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990), while François Furet
and Mona Ozouf were unable to find room in their 1,100-page Critical Dictionary
of the French Revolution (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1989) for an
entry on Toussaint L’Ouverture; the entry on ‘Slavery’ in their index refers
only to America’s revolution, not Haiti’s. 7. Alain Badiou, ‘Huit
Thèses sur l’universel’, in Jelica Sumic, ed., Universel, singulier, sujet,
Kimé, Paris, 2000, pp. 14–15; Badiou, La Commune de Paris: Une déclaration
politique sur la politique, Les Conférences du Rouge-Gorge, Paris, 2003, pp.
27–8. 8. Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, Rutgers University
Press, New Brunswick, 1996, p. 5. As Nicholls points out, the term blanc in
Haitian creole connotes a foreigner of any colour, and can be applied to black
Haitians themselves if they look and sound like people from
France. 9. Carolyn Fick, The Making of Haiti: The Saint
Domingue Revolution from Below, University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville, 1990,
p. 228. 10. James, ‘Revolution and the Negro’ (1939), in Scott
McLemee and Paul Le Blanc, eds, C.L.R. James and Revolutionary Marxism: Selected
Writings of C.L.R. James 1939–1949, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands NJ,
1994, p. 79. 11. Dessalines, quoted in Nicholls, From Dessalines
to Duvalier, p. 38.I am grateful to Bob Corbett for his trenchant response to an
earlier version of this article.
back |