Craig Brandist

Many have seen in Bakhtin's theory of the novel something relevant for a wide variety of disciplines, from literary studies, narrowly defined, to political theory and anthropology. Accordingly, it has been noted that the theory incorporates an ideal history of literary forms, a philosophy of culture, a typology of discursive relations, and a theory of conflicting social forces. The sources of such a wide-ranging theory seem to be diverse: from Marburg Neo-Kantianism to Russian Formalism, Marxist political theory and classical aeshetics. However, there seems a wealth of evidence to suggest that behind the eclecticism of Bakhtin's theory lies a unifying feature: Hegelian philosophy as modified by the work of Ernst Cassirer. I believe there are many areas in which the influence of Cassirer on Bakhtin's group can be traced, including the concept of the sign and the way such periods as the Renaissance and the Enlightenment are conceived, but here I shall limit my attention to the influence of Cassirer's work on Bakhtin's theory of the novel. As we shall see, while Bakhtin's own terminology differs significantly from that of Hegel and Cassirer, the structural features common to their works are too pervasive to be passed off as one influence among many.

Revised Hegelianism

If the structural parallels between these thinkers' works are as pervasive as I suggest, it would be reasonable to ask why, when such a huge amount of critical material about Bakhtin has been produced in recent years, no systematic analysis of Cassirer's influence on Bakhtin has appeared. One reason is the lack of a definitive, chronologically organized edition of Bakhtin's work, which is itself a product of the vicissitudes of intellectual life in the Soviet Union. Another reason derives from the way Cassirer's work has been understood until quite recently. As John Krois notes, Anglo-American writers have tended to present Cassirer as `a scholarly investigator and historian of ideas, a representative of historicism without a position of his own', while in Germany he has been seen to represent Marburg Neo-Kantian epistemology. Thus, while many have noted the importance of Neo-Kantianism in Bakhtin's work, though with little or no archival evidence, Cassirer has remained simply one among many thinkers. Recently published interviews with Bakhtin shortly before his death make it very clear, however, that Cassirer's 1923-29 three-volume The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms was one of the most important influences on Bakhtin's mature work, while Brian Poole's forthcoming archival research has uncovered notebooks in which Bakhtin made copious notes from Cassirer's work. At a deeper level, researchers have tended to take Bakhtin's negatively tinged overt references to Hegel's philosophy at face value, assuming that they implied a rejection of Hegelianism in its totality. This is based on Bakhtin's objection to interpretations of Dostoevsky's novels which confuse the way Hegel treats different perspectives on reality as stages in a single, linear development with Dostoevsky's presentation of `a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses' which unfold in the course of the novel without each `becom[ing] a simple object of the author's consciousness'. There is no doubt that Bakhtin is with Dostoyevsky and against Hegel here. However, Bakhtin's comment is almost identical to a remark by Cassirer, whose central work is profoundly Hegelian, that the main problem with Hegel is that philosophy deprives `various cultural forms ... of their autonomous and independent value and subordinates them to its own systematic purpose. Here is the point of contrast with Kant.' Despite this reservation, there seems little doubt that Bakhtin's account of the emergence and development of the novel is profoundly Hegelian, and that the novel itself takes over many of the functions of Hegel's philosophy, but now cleansed of its monologic inclinations.

For Hegel, phenomenology studies the way Geist `appears' - that is, objectifiestoricism without a position of his own', while in Germany he has been seen to represent Marburg Neo-Kantian epistemology. Thus, while many have noted the importance of Neo-Kantianism in Bakhtin's work, though with little or no archival evidence, Cassirer has remained simply one among many thinkers. Recently published interviews with Bakhtin shortly before his death make it very clear, however, that Cassirer's 1923-29 three-volume The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms was one of the most important influences on Bakhtin's mature work, while Brian Poole's forthcoming archival research has uncovered notebooks in which Bakhtin made copious notes from Cassirer's work. At a deeper level, researchers have tended to take Bakhtin's negatively tinged overt references to Hegel's philosophy at face value, assuming that they implied a rejection of Hegelianism in its totality. This is based on Bakhtin's objection to interpretations of Dostoevsky's novels which confuse the way Hegel treats different perspectives on reality as stages in a single, linear development with Dostoevsky's presentation of `a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses' which unfold in the course of the novel without each `becom[ing] a simple object of the author's consciousness'. There is no doubt that Bakhtin is with Dostoyevsky and against Hegel here. However, Bakhtin's comment is almost identical to a remark by Cassirer, whose central work is profoundly Hegelian, that the main problem with Hegel is that philosophy deprives `various cultural forms ... of their autonomous and independent value and subordinates them to its own systematic purpose. Here is the point of contrast with Kant.

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