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  Articles - May/June 2005 Click here for a print frienly version of this article
 Issue 131
May/June 2005


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Refiguring the multitude

From exodus to the production of norms

Timothy Rayner

 

The fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is the faith in antithetical values.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §2

Hardt and Negri describe Multitude (2004) as a ‘sequel’ to Empire (2000). But for many this book will seem a strange successor. Empire, for all its radicalism, is a studiously academic, resolutely interdisciplinary work, and accordingly it has found critics and adherents in a variety of academic disciplines (law, politics, philosophy, sociology, postcolonial studies). The sequel Multitude, by contrast, is a less academic and more obviously politically motivated work. It remains to be seen how well Multitude is received in the academy – it is clearly written with a more general audience in mind. The tone is less theoretical and the language less technical than Empire. Whereas the first book proceeded with brazen decisiveness and theoretical inventiveness, Multitude, by comparison, is almost apologetic about its innovations; no sooner has it declared itself to be ‘a philosophical book’ than it is making concessions to the reader. All in all, one has less the sense of being told about a new network power and society currently transforming the globe than of being invited to participate in this transformation in whichever way possible. Such a shift in rhetorical strategy undoubtedly reflects, in part, Hardt and Negri’s attempt to regain their footing after the unanticipated blow to the ontogeny of Empire that took place on 11 September 2001. One does not have to be a political theorist to know that in a situation of violence and uncertainty, the first thing to do is to build a community.

Multitude is manifestly a call to arms. Having established the premisses of their argument in Empire, Hardt and Negri are able to hone their perspective on the present, squarely targeting the ‘war on terror’ that the United States, along with various other coalition nations, has prosecuted in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Hardt and Negri argue that in the age of Empire, war has become the norm. But this is a new kind of war, with new objectives: ‘War has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all forms of life.’1 To this statement, Hardt and Negri add an important twist: biopower, in its management of life, both presupposes and produces biopolitical networks that are immanent to the social field – rhizomatic processes of collaboration and collective innovation, ‘multitudes’.2 In Hardt and Negri’s view, everything hinges on how the struggle between biopower and biopolitics unfolds. In the age of Empire, they claim, we are faced with a simple dichotomy and decision: imperial biopolitical control or a new possibility for democracy currently emerging on our horizon – the ‘absolute’ democracy of the multitude.

This article stages a confrontation with Hardt and Negri’s account of absolute democracy. While the discussion of this concept in Multitude is wide-ranging and provocative, Hardt and Negri’s theoretical exposition leaves much to be desired. I fear that the ‘general audience’ approach that is taken by the authors has also been taken as licence to bury much of the funda­mental conceptual content of this argument. Rather than unpack for us the theoretical nuts and bolts of the multitude (as we might have hoped after the equivocal final part of Empire), Hardt and Negri are content freely to apply their theoretical vocabulary – including ‘biopolitical production’, ‘exodus’ and ‘the common’ – as if the reader were already familiar with the terms. This does little to clarify the mechanics of the multitude. Worse, it works to conceal a number of contentious theoretical propositions with important implications for the democracy of the multitude. Chief among these is the distinction between ‘constituted’ and ‘constituent’ power – a distinction that animates all of Negri’s work from the 1980s on, alone and together with Hardt.

The constituted–constituent power binary first assumes a central place in Negri’s work in his book on Spinoza.3 Highlighting Spinoza’s ambiguous use of the terms potestas and potentia, Negri argues for a distinction between two modes of power. On the one hand, there is constituted power: the centralized, transcendental force of command that characterizes established forms of political order. On the other hand, there is constituent power: the localized, immanent force of socio-political constitution that underpins modes of order and maintains them in their being. In a subsequent work, Insurgencies, Negri locates the constituted–constituent power binary at the heart of a new political ontology. Citing a range of historical examples, Negri presents constituent power as the distributed, collective force of desire that drives ontological emergence and social innovation – a minoritarian power perpetually opposed to the ‘totalitarian’ sedimentations of the modern state.4

As Hardt points out, the distinction between potestas and potentia is readily made ‘in most European languages (potere and potenza in Italian, pouvoir and puissance in French, Macht and Vermögern in German)’ – though not in English, which has only the one word, power.5 Perhaps this explains Hardt and Negri’s decision to allow this conceptual binary to fade into the background in Multitude, which was written in English, presumably with an anglophone audience in mind. Despite its exclusion, however, the constituted–constituent power distinction remains central to Hardt and Negri’s thought, having particular relevance for the concept of absolute democracy. Ultimately, all that the omission of this distinction from Multitude achieves is to conceal the limits of the radical praxis that is proposed in the work. As in their previous book, Hardt and Negri argue that Empire cannot be overthrown, yet it can be contested and ultimately surpassed through the withdrawal of constituent power. Their radical proposition is that the multitude counterpose the power of exodus to the machinations of imperial governance: ‘Democracy today takes the form of a subtraction, a flight, an exodus from sovereignty.’6

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