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Dominique Janicaud, 1937-2002
The philosopher Dominique Janicaud died on 18 August 2002 at Eze on the
Cote d'Azur from a cardiac arrest after swimming in the Mediterranean. He was
sixty-four years old. Eze is just along the coast from his beloved Nice, where
Dominique had been teaching philosophy since 1966, refusing many invitations to
leave for Paris and elsewhere. He lived and worked in a wonderful house high on
the slopes of the arriere-pays, close to the valley of the Var.
Born in Paris on 14 November 1937, Dominique studied philosophy with Andre
Jacob at the Lycee Lakanal, and was first drawn to Bergson and the tradition of
French spiritualism, particularly the important but little-known (in the
English-speaking world) work of Felix Ravaisson. Dominique's doctoral thesis on
this topic was published in 1969 as Une genealogie du spiritualisme francais,
reissued in 1997 as Ravaisson et la metaphysique. His crucial philosophical
encounter was with Jean Beaufret, the most prominent of Heidegger's French
interlocutors, to whom Heidegger addressed his Letter on Humanism. Beaufret was
a cousin of the Janicaud family and Dominique was deeply impressed with
Beaufret's influential translation and presentation of Parmenides' Poem.
Dominique began to read Heidegger and was taught by Beaufret when he entered the
ecole Normale Superieure in 1958. It was with Beaufret's encouragement that
Dominique studied in Germany and met with Heidegger on several occasions in the
1960s. Dominique's other teachers were Louis Althusser and Jean Hyppolite, and
although the former left little impression on him, it was from the latter that
he developed his interest in Hegel, who was the topic of Dominique's These
d'etat, published in 1975 as Hegel et le destin de la Grece.
Dominique belonged to a small group of Heidegger readers very much
contre-courant to the overwhelming Freudo-Marxist hegemony of the early 1960s in
Paris. An informal discussion group met in 1965 at the Fondation Thiers in
Paris, and included Dominique's lifelong friend Michel Haar, as well as Hubert
Dreyfus, Henri Birault and Jacques Derrida. Yet Dominique was no orthodox
Heideggerian. Although captivated by the later Heidegger's analysis of the
completion or closure of metaphysics and his thinking of the age of technology
in terms of the Gestell, his work adopted a significant and growing critical
distance from Heidegger. Evidence of this appears in four stunning studies of
Heidegger in the 1983 book La Metaphysique ˆ la limite, of which I would
strongly recommend the essay 'Heideggeriana', which is a meditation on
Heidegger's too little known text †berwindung der Metaphysik.
This critical distance from Heidegger is more obliquely but powerfully at
work in Dominique's major philosophical work, La Puissance du rationnel of 1985,
published in Peg Birmingham's excellent translation as The Powers of the
Rational (1994). Refusing to follow Heidegger's division between rational
thinking and the thinking of Being, the book attempts an ambitious genealogy of
rationality which gives a detailed phenomenology of the effects of
techno-scientific power. The Hegelian pedigree of this concern with rationality
leads into proximity with both Foucault and Habermas, but also Anglo-American
philosophy of science. Far from abandoning rationality, Dominique was led
towards an alternative notion of reason that he called partage. This term has
many shades of meaning in French, of which Dominique liked to emphasize the idea
of rationality as our human lot or portion. What he was after was a
non-dominating, non-instrumental and dialogic experience of rationality as that
which is shared by mortals in their everyday being with one another. In many
ways, Dominique's critique of Heidegger's sharp division between meditative
thinking and technologized reason echoes Habermas's critique of Adorno's
univocal notion of instrumental rationality opposed to aesthetic experience. The
concern with partage led into an original account of temporality in the 1997
book Chronos.
In an autobiographical text, Dominique wrote of his sharp disagreement with
Heidegger: I could no longer accept either the schema of history or that of
Being, or the secret, destinal correspondence of the originary and the Ereignis.
And I do not think that meditative thought can preserve a resource against
technicist nihilism if it refuses all specific understanding of new realities,
which always resound with ambiguity.
One of the most impressive features of La Puissance du rationnel was its
detailed engagement with those new realities, and Dominique had an impressive
knowledge of both the history and the philosophy of science and much
contemporary scientific research. The critique of Heidegger was extended to the
latter's Ôunconditional destinal historicism' in a 1990 engagement with the
effects of Heidegger's politics in French philosophy, L'Ombre de cette pensee,
which also includes a powerful critique of Lacoue-Labarthe's work.
La Puissance du rationnel did not get the reception it deserved. As is often
the case with philosophers, Dominique was better known for more occasional
works, in particular two books that appeared in 1991: Ë nouveau la philosophie,
a collection of essays, widely and favourably reviewed; and Le Tournant
theologique de la phenomenologie francaise, which initiated a whole series of
debates and polemics among French philosophers. Essentially, the book was a
polemic against the theologizing tendency towards a phenomenology of the
inapparent or the invisible that can be found in the work of Jean-Luc Marion,
Jean-Louis Chretien and Michel Henry, but whose ancestry can be traced to the
influence of Levinas's Totality and Infinity. Phenomenologically speaking,
Dominique's sympathies were always more Merleau-Pontian and committed to the
idea that philosophy should attend to the concrete world and nothing besides.
These debates were continued in a 1998 collection, La Phenomenologie eclatee.
Dominique spent the last years of his life working on a hugely ambitious history
of the reception of Heidegger in France, published in two volumes as Heidegger
en France in autumn 2001. It is an extremely valuable piece of work that
deserves to be translated.
I knew Dominique well. He was the supervisor of my M.Phil. thesis on the
question of the overcoming of metaphysics in Heidegger and Carnap, a topic that
he assigned to me. During my year and a half in Nice in the mid-1980s, we met
regularly and he would sit patiently as I explained some text in demotic French.
He was a good, kind and generous man, a person of great integrity, hospitality
and warmth. He was intellectually and geographically remote from the paranoid
and finally provincial world of Parisian philosophy and his life in the
provinces paradoxically gave him the liberty of a more international outlook
than other French philosophers of his generation.
Simon Critchley
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