

Multiple choice

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*, Penguin, New York, 2004. xviii + 427 pp., £20.00 hb., 1 59420 024 6 hb.

Paolo Virno, *A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life*, foreword by Sylvère Lotringer, trans. Isabella Bertolotti, James Cascaito, Andrea Casson, Semiotext[e] Foreign Agents Series, New York and Los Angeles, 2004. 120 pp., £8.95 pb., 1 58435 021 0.

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* is the companion volume to their previous co-authored work, *Empire* (2000). It is also a response to its reception. In the first place, it is a theoretical response to the perceived lack of conceptual development of its founding political and emancipatory concept, 'the multitude'. In this sense, *Multitude* also completes *Empire*, inverting at the end of the modern era the theoretical gesture of state-building to be found in Hobbes's move from *De Cive* to *Leviathan* at its beginning. Since the publication of *Empire*, the authors have written and spoken on the subject at length, both in books (Negri's 'Kairòs, Alma Venus, Multitude', included in *Time for Revolution, Negri on Negri* – his 'biopolitical abc' – and *Subversive Spinoza: (Un)contemporary Variations*) and in lecture tours around the world. Other writers associated with Negri and neo-autonomist politics have too, such as Paolo Virno, whose *A Grammar of the Multitude* was originally given as a series of seminars in the University of Calabria in 2001. The year 2000 saw the publication in France of the first issue of the radical anti-capitalist journal *Multitudes*, edited by Eric Alliez and Yann Moulier Boutang, who, although not immediately identifiable with Negri, partake of the post-Marxist and neo-positivist Deleuzian paradigm of 'refusal' increasingly associated with him. (Their pluralization of the subject suggests a de-founding that the latter would oppose.) Hardt and Negri's latest work thus participates in this wider diffusion and use of the term 'multitude' for a historical and biopolitical subject, as it simultaneously attempts to produce its concept.

Second, *Multitude* is a response to a series of historical events that have occurred since the publication of *Empire*, which would seem to disprove one of its basic premisses: the end of US imperial dominance. In *Empire*, Hardt and Negri had insisted that, as a new form of global sovereignty that reflects the global subsumption of the social by capital, empire is definitively

a post-imperialist social form. This is a fundamental point because it is what constitutes empire's historical specificity and difference from the past. But world-political affairs changed drastically after the attack on the Twin Towers in New York in September 2001. The US government's national security doctrine of 'regime change' and the subsequent 'war against terror' seemed to confirm the view of many of Hardt and Negri's critics that the US remained the world hegemon and that so-called globalization remained in fact 'Americanization'. In itself, however, such a display of US military dominance does not disprove the post-national and global tendency of empire's emergence, which, the authors maintain, resorts to existing inter-state forms for non-national purposes, as these forms are historically overcome. The kinds of question that such an argument might raise include: what is the relation between the US state apparatus, the uses of its military, technological and economic power, and national capitals? Or, in what sense does the US state represent US capital as capital in general?

However, Hardt and Negri do not pose such questions, first, because nation-state forms are not objects of their concern unless imperial, and second, because their conception of rule is delinked from processes of accumulation and almost entirely coercive and administrative, as their use of the idea of 'command' suggests. In *Multitude* Hardt and Negri thus attempt to maintain and strengthen their original position with an analysis of what they refer to as the permanent character of the contemporary war waged against the multitude's biopolitical productivity and constituent demand for democracy. From this perspective, war today is not international, but a transnational – because globalized – civil war in which military action is increasingly becoming police action.

Multitude has a triadic structure: three parts, each divided into three chapters. The first part is dedicated to contemporary – 'postmodern' – warfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on its actuality from the point of view of

domination (that is, as a permanent state of exception) and its historical emergence (from traditional inter-state war, via counter-insurgency, to network war). Chapter 3 refocuses the same history but from the point of view of the 'primacy of resistance' (the logic of refusal constitutive of historical development) – that is, from the figure of the partisan as it emerges during the Napoleonic Wars, via modern anti-colonial wars and guerrilla warfare (Guevarism to neo-Zapatismo and the Intifada) to the organized network resistance of the anti-globalization movement (as evidenced in Seattle towards the end of 1999, and subsequently in Genoa). This is the most original part of *Multitude*, although much of its account of contemporary shifts in the tactics and ideology of intelligence and information-led 'netwar' may be equally gleaned from day-to-day journalistic accounts of the war in Iraq.

Most interestingly, Hardt and Negri discuss the emergence of new supranational juridico-political structures legitimizing such violence whilst simultaneously, through human rights legislation and new forms of transnational imperial justice, producing 'humanity' as a legal subject in a permanent war of all against all in which the enemy becomes 'inhuman' – elements, all, of a globalized state-form subordinating national territories to its sovereignty. Here, the



authors produce an interesting summary and interpretation of the extensive literature on the subject, giving it an imperial inflection, such that empire emerges in retreat as a network form. But, by resorting to Giorgio Agamben's anachronistic generalization of Schmitt's and Benjamin's experience of fascism in his recent *State of Exception* to suggest that we are living under a permanent and paradoxically normalized 'state of emergency', they fail to think through the implications of the unequal character of its experience across the world, as well as the supposed novelty of the times to which it is being applied.

Parts Two and Three, dedicated to the multitude and to its struggle for democracy, have similar structures. Hardt and Negri insist that they represent a shift from an analysis of form to one of content – the chapters dedicated to the multitude being, at least theoretically, the most important of the book. And there is no doubt that the breadth of determinations – philosophical, economic, cultural and historical – brought to bear on the production of the concept of the multitude are impressive. As Virno points out, the multitude is a 'way of life', the 'mode of being of the many', whose investigation requires a 'varied kind of conceptual orchestration' in which 'one must circumnavigate the multitude-continent changing frequently the angle of perspective'. Unfortunately, however, there is no theoretical advance on the accounts of empire and sovereignty contained either in *Empire* or in Negri's earlier works in political philosophy, *The Savage Anomaly* and *Insurgencies*, other than in their historical narrativization in which the being and becoming of the multitude function as an always present natural-historical and creative substrate emerging (or even evolving) to demand the realization of the absolute democracy it has embodied since Spinoza's seventeenth century. In contrast with the more or less philosophically dense histories of constituent and constitutional power (*potentia* and *potestas*) related in the earlier works, the accounts in *Multitude* read as both overpoliticized and overindebted to the present.

Both *Multitude* and Virno's *Grammar* present themselves as philosophical inquiries, although in this regard the latter is both more condensed and more original. Virno uses the idea of the multitude to open up traditional philosophical themes to new questions, as posed by the contemporary experience of post-Fordist capitalism. The books share a similar structure. *Grammar* also begins by considering the question of 'security', but it does so not from the point of view of recent military strategy, but existentially, focusing on Heidegger's distinction between 'fear' and

'anguish' in *Being and Time* and their contemporary de-differentiation and overlapping as the boundaries between communities break down and a generalized 'not feeling at home' exposes the multitude that emerges in this space 'omnilaterally to the world'. Here, Virno suggests, 'the many' are united in risk. For Virno, the idea of the multitude is intimately associated with crisis. It has returned in the age of post-Fordism from the seventeenth century to take its 'revenge' on the modern world which excluded it, largely through the juridico-political institution of 'the people' historically tied to the modern nation-state – hence its association with monstrosity and the uncanny. In such a context, the 'common places' of language become productive and protective of communities and practices – in the form, even, of a 'noble... conservative violence' – as does, in another of Virno's everyday examples, 'idle talk' in the workplace. However, such invention (which Hardt and Negri refer to as the 'biopolitical' *potentia* of the multitude) is functional to post-Fordist production too, which, in Virno's account of immaterial labour, appropriates and recodes such communicative potential to produce what he calls the 'communism of capital'. This is the last of his ten theses on the multitude and post-Fordism, which bring the book to its conclusion. In Hardt and Negri's final words, on the other hand, the violence and grievances produced by such appropriation 'must at some point be transformed by a strong event, a radical insurrectional demand ... an event that will thrust us like an arrow into that living future' – a future that lives already in the power of the multitude. 'This', they insist, 'will be the real political act of love.'

The figure of 'the one and the many' is crucial for a minimum political definition of a concept of the multitude with emancipatory intent. According to Hardt and Negri, the 'one' is constituted by the unity of what is held 'in common' and refers to concrete forms of social cooperation. This is why, for example, the increasing hegemony of communication – as both natural condition of the social and computerized media technology (networks) – and other forms of 'immaterial labour', such as affect, are so important to their account of contemporary forms of labour-power and capitalist appropriation. Contemporary forms of capital put the dense cultural means of social relation – the 'flesh' of the multitude – to work in a process one could refer to as 'colonization', imposing sovereign 'body' politics and reconfiguring exploitation and value production beyond the factory to occupy the field of the social as a whole. It is at this point, according to Negri, that historical developments explode

and put an end to the measurability on which Marx's theory of value depends. Hardt and Negri, as well as Virno, insist that this does not mean that all labour is immaterial, but that this form is hegemonic and increasingly subordinates all other forms to its logics. What is held in common is thus both constitutive condition and historical result.

In this regard, the authors dedicate much space to the disappearance and/or transformation of the peasantry as traditionally conceived. This attempt at thinking exploitation beyond the factory has been one of the most interesting aspects of post-autonomia thought. In *Multitude* Hardt and Negri also develop one of its key historical and political implications: a critique of the hypostatization of the industrial proletariat as the universal subject of freedom, now historically transcended. This is a critique they share with subalternism (which, in turn, is too peasant-centred as a perspective in their view). However, they tend to reproduce the same developmentalist gesture in their own privileging of the immaterial worker, within the multitude, as the subject of freedom.

The multitude, we are told, is the unity of singularities in which differences are maintained in relations of non-subordination and equality. Hardt and Negri have taken on the lessons of identity politics, of gender and 'race'. They also insist that the multitude is a class concept. At this point, however, an interesting question emerges: can the bourgeoisie, in whatever particular context, be categorized as just another singularity, or is its identity constituted in necessary contradiction (and antagonism) to another class, for example the sellers of their labour power? Does the concept of the multitude look to maintain these kinds of social division, characterized as difference? There is no real answer to such questions because the bourgeoisie as a class does not make an appearance in *Multitude* (or *Empire*). Moreover, with the emergence into dominance of immaterial labour, modelled on forms of symbolic exchange, and the collapsing of the political into the economic, the process of exploitation through which bourgeoisie and proletariat are constituted and reproduced – the wage form – is transformed into a form of semiotic appropriation more akin to the rearticulating or recoding mechanisms of translation. This is what makes it possible for the creative idle talk (virtuosity) of the multitude, for example, to be recombined and transformed into administrative imperatives (command). In this account, exploitation is reconfigured as bureaucratized intellectual labour.

This would seem to be Hardt and Negri's solution to a historical problem signalled in Perry Anderson's *The*

Origins of Postmodernity (1998), where he suggests that one of the defining experiences of contemporary capitalism has been the blurring of class identities into unrecognizability. More specifically, Anderson maintains that, beginning in the 1970s with the definitive disappearance of its aristocratic alter ego and, paradoxically, with the subsequent 'universal triumph of capital' during the 1980s, the bourgeoisie itself, 'in any strict sense, as a class possessed of self-consciousness and morale – was all but extinct'. Anderson resorts to a mix of Jamesonian tropes to produce an image of this state of affairs, and describes the new milieu televisually:

In place of that solid amphitheatre is an aquarium of floating, evanescent forms – the projectors and managers, auditors and janitors, administrators and speculators of contemporary capital: functions of a monetary universe that knows no social fixities or stable identities.

Anderson does not refer to the fate of working-class identity in his discussion, but, given both its structural and historical relation to the bourgeoisie, one might deduce from his arguments that the process of blurring will have been effective there too.

Although pitched principally at the level of cultural experience, Anderson's reflections on the reconfiguration of capital's rule might also be formulated in more conventionally Marxist terms: as the forms taken today of the classic capitalist contradiction between the socialization of production, on the one hand, and

private appropriation, on the other. As Anderson suggests, the ways in which socialization and appropriation combine and are embodied in property relations today, as 'social capital', are not quite so visible. Recent discussions of either the consolidation or the crisis of US imperial dominance since the 1970s, for example in Giovanni Arrighi's *The Long Twentieth Century* (1994) and Peter Gowan's *The Global Gamble* (1999), address this problem too. Hardt and Negri's *Empire* (2000) was an important and polemical addition to this debate. And so is its companion volume *Multitude*. Together, they set out an account of a post-imperialist, globalized form of sovereignty they call 'empire', which is irreducible to US (or any other form of national or regional) dominance, and characterized by new forms of capital and labour – in which the bourgeoisie as a class does not make an appearance – as well as post-televisual, network media. In this sense, the work of Hardt and Negri reveals how technologically outdated Anderson's reflections have already become. The dominant form of capital is thus a network form in which the ruling 'class' has become bureaucratized, as Hegel suggested it might. A new subject of history has emerged, whose emancipatory potential lies in its singular appearance and creativity, but whose political space of actualization simultaneously erases such singularity (its specific political coordinates and historical means) as it becomes a mirror reflecting back the forces of appropriation.

John Kraniauskas

It really is time

Neil Lazarus, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Postcolonial Literary Studies*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004. 350 pp., £45.00 hb., £16.99 pb., 0 521 82694 2 hb., 0 521 53418 6 pb.

Janna Thompson, *Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical Justice*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002. 200 pp., £50.00 hb., £15.99 pb., 0 7456 2884 2 hb., 0 7456 2885 0 pb.

In his introduction to this *Cambridge Companion*, Neil Lazarus specifies the aims of the volume as to introduce readers to key concepts, methods, theories and debates; to situate these concepts, theories and debates; and to contextualize the emergence of postcolonial literary studies. These are standard goals for any such collection: to offer the reader, who does not necessarily wish to become an expert in the field, a series of references. If the reader expects to be presented with the pros and cons of the debate, he or she also usually expects some sympathy towards the topic. The reader of *The Cambridge Companion to Postcolonial Literary Studies* is thus a little bit surprised to find a collection of essays that are highly

critical of the central concepts, methods and theories of postcolonial literary studies. The criticisms of Neil Lazarus, Benita Parry, Laura Chrisman and Timothy Brennan are familiar to anyone conversant with the debates around postcolonial theory. Yet one wonders why the collection was not called *A Critique of Postcolonial Literary Studies*, which would be a better description of the contents.

The main reproach levelled at postcolonial literary critics – among whom Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha stand tall – is that they tend to erase, ignore, dismiss that body of literature usually connected with anti-colonialism and decolonization which, despite the claims of postcolonial critics, addressed similar issues

of culture and identity. They are, in other words, exhibiting a symptom that is very common in the social sciences and humanities: pretending that, before them, nobody had noticed, observed or analysed tensions and conflicts that were there nonetheless. This is why previous struggles failed to fulfil their promises. Several chapters here attempt to demonstrate this through detailed and often critically incisive analyses of notions in postcolonial literary criticism. Though they indict postcolonial critics for ignoring the non-English-speaking world, they are themselves, except for Coronil, guilty of ignoring work written in French, Spanish or Chinese. The chapters are uneven. Brennan, Lazarus and Coronil, for instance, demonstrate a deep knowledge of colonial and postcolonial history, postcolonial criticism, theories of globalization and European thought. Others tend to get carried away by their antipathy towards postcolonial literary studies. For those interested in scholarship critical of postcolonial studies, this is the book. Lazarus's and Brennan's essays are very thorough, and Brennan's is also very clear and to the point.

I share the irritation of many of the contributors with a postcolonial literature that seems to ignore the impact of capitalism upon peoples, plays with history, dismisses the violence of predatory practices and appears indifferent to people's suffering. Yet, and this might be where postcolonial critics and their opponents meet, there is an assumption that literature is there to describe the world as it is, to propose solutions, to mobilize readers around political goals. On both sides, literature is assigned a duty, whether it is to support nationalist, anti-imperialist struggles or to deconstruct their discourses and representations. Is it fair to ask literature to describe the situation of a country and to suggest what is to be done? In Chapter 2 for instance, Lazarus eloquently describes the 'global dispensation since 1945': the 'inegalitarian, unevenly integrated, and highly polarized world system', the impact of US hegemony, the 'logic of unilateral capital', the 'unfolding hegemony of neoliberal ideology', and the consequences of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) on local economies. Samir Amin's analysis is often invoked to support Lazarus's argument. Postcolonial critics are criticized for ignoring the unfolding power of the US hegemon. Yet the reader wonders if it is fair to indict Salman Rushdie or Arundhati Roy for not making the right analysis?

Further, it is somewhat disquieting to have just one villain, the United States. Postcolonial rulers are criminal but at the same time 'creatures of larger powers and forces'. Are they only puppets, with no responsibilities

in the degradation of their country's economy and society? And the Soviet Union was not patronizing? Its love for the monumental was not problematic? When Roy wrote about the 'dreams that fuelled the freedom struggle', was she really saying that 'they always lacked substance, plausibility, realism' or was she, rather, pointing to the dimension of idealization in freedom struggles, a dimension we might wish to address, instead of thinking any query about idealization to be guilty of cynicism about decolonization and national liberation?

Tamara Sivanandan pursues a similar approach. Decolonization was a 'key global process', we are told, yet postcolonial critics have disparaged anti-colonialist discourse as Eurocentric and elitist. To prove her point, Sivanandan looks at the liberation struggle in Algeria and celebrates the heroism of the Algerian people. However, we might expect a more complex analysis of the Algerian struggle that would take into account the large body of literature *written by Algerians* which is highly critical of the national narrative; the focus on heroism, often producing a gendered narrative; and the dismissal of conflicts within the national movement. There are novels, plays, films and essays written and made by Algerians that – if we follow Sivanandan's analysis – would be seen as not serving a 'politics of the people'. Consider Nadir Moknèche's film *Viva Ladjérie*; the writers El-Mahdi Acherchour, Maïssa Bey, Rachida Khouazem, Leïla Sebbar; the scholars Mostefa Lacheraf, Mohamed Harbi, Mahfoud Kaddache – do these postcolonial thinkers, filmmakers and artists constitute an elite that betrays 'the people'? They have been harassed by their own state, their work has been censored because they refused to support a 'politics of the people' without first asking how that people has been constructed. Continuing to analyse the Algerian struggle through 'Fanon versus Bhabha', as if no critical analysis of the FLN was produced *during* the struggle or since strikes the reader as somewhat lacking in knowledge of current debates in Algeria.

The English-speaking world seems to have stopped at Frantz Fanon where Algeria is concerned. It is time to read the current generation of postcolonial Algerians, to look at their films, to listen to their voices. What they say would fit the political criteria of the volume's contributors, yet the latter might be surprised at their criticism of the narrative of national liberation. These artists, writers and scholars are aware of the disparities and inequalities of the world, of the responsibility of the 'West' for their country's impoverishment, but they are also very much aware of the responsibilities of their leaders with their shameless

and violent predatory practices. Why still an idealization of the peasant? Who would set the criteria of an 'independent and progressive culture'? The programme sounds great, but it does not answer to the current anxieties of postcolonial thinkers.

Reading one current body of literature – postcolonial studies – through the texts of an older generation (of the 1960s and 1970s), while ignoring the current body of literature coming from postcolonial countries, is a method used by most of the contributors. It is not convincing. Bhabha and Spivak are criticized via Fanon or Cabral, but if we looked at current political activists and intellectuals, the reading would be different. True, Bhabha and Spivak themselves have turned to the generation of the 1960s and 1970s (Fanon et al.) to support their criticism of the national narrative, the discourse of national emancipation, and its gendered dimension. However, it is time to go beyond Fanon and Cabral, not to forget or ignore their theories but to contribute to an analysis of our current condition. Critically reassessing the 'dreams' of national liberation does not in any way signify contempt for what these struggles achieved. If we discuss the notion of the 'nation' via Fanon, Cabral, Mandela and Gandhi, we can confront their views with those of Bhabha, Spivak and Pattherjee, for instance. But we cannot discuss the Algerian struggle, as event, via 'Fanon versus Bhabha'.

Some chapters are confusing: the reader moves from analysis of slavery in the Caribbean to the Indian national struggle, with quotations from Amin, Fanon and Césaire thrown in. We do not get a sense of the chronology (the fact that a work by Césaire published in 1959 appears in the text with the date of its translation into English (1970) does not help). For that matter, Césaire is often invoked along with Fanon and Cabral, although he does not belong at all to the same generation or struggle (and Césaire was *never* an 'anticolonial nationalist' as claimed here). The use of Fanon and Césaire is frequently decontextualized, despite the fact that all authors insist on the importance of context. Some of the contributors would benefit from following Brennan's precept of respecting filiation and genealogy. Coronil's essay is very suggestive. He looks at the reception of postcolonial theory in Latin America and the debate that followed. I was especially interested by the work of the philosophers Santiago Castro-Gómez and Eduardo Mendieta, who suggest understanding the 'post' of postcolonialism as an 'anticolonial position': "'post" at the service of decolonizing decolonization'.

This comparative approach is interesting also because it raises tangentially an important question:

why has a body of work said to use 'French' theories (post-structuralism and postmodernism) extensively had so little resonance in France? Should we rejoice? If I have understood most of the contributors' essays, we should. Edward Said's *Orientalism*, translated into French in 1980, never deeply influenced French literary criticism and there exist no translations of Stuart Hall, Homi Bhabha, the Subaltern Studies Group, Neil Lazarus, Anthony Appiah, Benita Parry, Lisa Lowe, Aihwa Ong or Gayatri Spivak. (Paul Gilroy's *Black Atlantic* was translated in 2004 and references have been made in recent reviews to work by postcolonial thinkers. The 2005 translation of a book on subaltern studies in India was a criticism of the methods and theory of the Subaltern Studies Group, whose works have not themselves been translated.) French literary criticism, art history, historical or anthropological research have not been affected by the 'apolitical' and 'ahistorical' approaches of postcolonial theory. One could suggest that the success of certain French thinkers in the English-speaking world has been a matter of snobbery and the French, being *au courant*, have been amused. Unfortunately, the explanation is more problematic.

French critics are suspicious of the 'populism and culturalism' of postcolonial theory, in the name of 'the universal'. But this too is a way to avoid confrontation with a postcolonial generation. Scholarship on the colonial and postcolonial experience is dominated by either denunciation or remorse. Pierre Vidal-Naquet or Mohamed Harbi, both highly respected scholars, have noted how much French scholarship is still timid where analysis of the colonial's impact on the Republic, the Nation, is concerned. Furthermore, there is a narcissism among many French scholars that forbids them from acknowledging what might come from the postcolony. They must be the ones who will 'discover' the postcolonial – whether to celebrate it or to criticize it. I cannot help thinking that a dose of postcolonial theory would do some good to French research, and that a debate, like the one Coronil describes in Latin America, might challenge French narcissism. I do think that the postcolonial debate has been much more fruitful than most of the contributors here suggest: work on the nation, identity, sexuality, hybridity, creolization, masculinity, femininity has opened up new areas of research and inquiry, and provided concepts to think postcolonial discontent. This work has freed researchers to look at what was considered of minor importance in the theory of national liberation: urban cultures, music, sexuality, gays' and lesbians' lives, theatre. Following Stuart Hall, the method of post-

colonial theory is a method of reading the colonial legacy, the promises of national emancipation, its realizations and its defeats, and the experience of current forms of exclusion and inclusion in neoliberal globalization.

In *Taking Responsibility for the Past*, Janna Thompson proposes a new way of looking at justice and mass crime: historical obligation, the 'moral responsibility incurred by individuals as citizens, owners or executives of corporations, or members of some other transgenerational association or community, as the result of the commitments or actions of their predecessors'. Historical obligation is not the same thing

as 'political obligation': the former exists across time, where the latter can be transformed by new contexts. Thomson looks at the violation of treaties and demands for reparation (for slavery, genocide, deportation). She examines concrete examples, going through arguments and counter-arguments regarding transgenerational obligations. Treaties, she says, are 'promises' and, as such, should be respected. It is not clear who will enforce the promise across time. When she writes 'reluctant citizens might be persuaded that the burdens they are forced to assume are justified because of these good consequences' (promotion of trust and peaceful coexistence), the reader might ask: persuaded by whom? How? Will there be a police to enforce the promise? Or is it goodwill among people that will ensure its enforcement? Thompson seems to believe in a *natural* desire of people to be good. It seems simply a matter of moral education that will allow this natural desire to win over the politics of force and might.

The discussion of historical obligation is unsatisfactory. It seems as though the violation of treaties came from people who were not aware of their historical obligation. What of politics as a site of conflicts between diverging interests, which entails struggle,

which can be armed and violent for what seems 'right' for a group, a people, and which means the violation of a treaty? Further, the focus on heritage is problematic: should people really be accountable for crimes committed by their nation centuries ago? Thompson is right to try to develop a framework in which some restitution, reparation, can be achieved. But is it a matter of proposing an ethics of historical obligation or of thinking about developing international law and tribunal and the means to make this law and tribunal efficient? (But then, who writes the law? Who names the judges? Witness the controversy around the International Tribunal for Rwanda.)



I was uncomfortable with Thompson's understanding of inheritance: 'protecting the right to make bequests and the right of heirs to receive them'. To enjoy the prestige of our heroic parents or to commiserate with the suffering of our victimized parents is normal, but when these sentiments support a political demand we must ask if we are not acting in our own interests rather than in the name of morals. As Tzvetan Todorov has argued, 'The public reminder of the past has an educative dimension only if it also questions our own actions and shows that we (or those with whom we identify ourselves) have not always been the

good incarnate.' Past suffering comes down as a narrative that exercises a powerful attraction because it conjures up images of loss, misfortune and tragedy. Thompson assumes a state of innocence. But the state of innocence, Hannah Arendt has remarked, does not belong to the world of the human conceived as members of a political community. Thompson's book is a contribution to the current debate on crime, reparation, apology, responsibility, but her trust in the moral weight of the promise prevents her from analysing some of its ethical implications.

Françoise Vergès

Wittgenstein supplements

Alessandra Tanesini, *Wittgenstein: A Feminist Interpretation*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004. xiv + 164 pp., £55.00 hb., £15.99 pb., 0 7456 2074 4 hb., 0 7456 2075 2 pb.

Gavin Kitching, *Wittgenstein and Society: Essays in Conceptual Puzzlement*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003. 230 pp., £47.50 hb., 0 7546 3342 X.

There is some playful typography on the title pages of Alessandra Tanesini's boldly argued book on the relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy for feminism. The name of the man whose work is the object of the author's interest has been adapted with two graphic images. The two little *is* have been replaced with the schematic figures of two little 'T's, two children. In the place of the first little *i* is the figure of a little girl, a girl with a short ponytail wearing a knee-length, sleeveless dress. She seems to be taking a peek around the first *t*. Maybe she is hiding from or spying on the second figure at the other end of the line of letters, the figure of a little boy wearing a T-shirt and shorts. He seems to be standing still, alone, facing the back of the *n*, facing away from the girl who seems to be keeping her eye on him. The boy might be quietly counting – obediently inattentive to every other until he is allowed to start looking for the ones who are hiding. But his hands are by his sides, perhaps in his pockets, not covering his eyes. Is he just a boy on his own, in his own world? Is he even aware that he is being watched by a girl? Did he turn away from her so that he could be on his own, playing by himself. The girl has stepped slightly out of line as she tries to get a better view. Perhaps she wants to see whatever it is that the boy is doing on his own, perhaps it intrigues her. She is peeping round the corner of the *t* so she can see the boy.

This is not the first time graphic designers have worked with and on Wittgenstein's name. The cover of the paperback reprint of Henry Staten's *Wittgenstein and Derrida* establishes a visual contrast between the compared authors by using the old German high Gothic font for the name 'Wittgenstein' and a serif font for 'and Derrida'. It is hard not to see the Gothic font as marking a distinction of styles, so that the coming work of 'paralleling' developed by Staten is silently prefaced by a worry which Staten himself quickly voices: namely, 'how Derrida's work could possibly be compatible with Wittgenstein's'. The graphic difference marking the apparently obvious contrast between a proper philosopher, someone who (one might presume) 'continues the old Platonic quarrel with poetry' and someone who develops a view of

language which is attentive 'to the way words as words (sounds, shapes, associative echoes) allow themselves to be fitted together'. If the former uses an unusual style this is something to be 'read *through*' in order that one can come 'to see the point lying behind' them. The way his words are ordered or fitted together is not part of their real business – the work of argument and demonstration. Authors who show too much interest in features of a text that seem to have very little, almost nothing to do with the (literal) meaning of words are involving themselves with 'powers of language which philosophy routinely declares illegitimate for the purposes of rationality'.

Tanesini wants her reading of Wittgenstein to do better than those proposed by imaginatively challenged interpreters, and attempts properly to embrace an attentiveness to a sense that Wittgenstein chooses his words in the way poets choose their words. Indeed, using the new (and in my view rather heavy-handed) translation of a rarely quoted remark from *Culture and Value*, Tanesini urges us 'not to forget' Wittgenstein's saying 'one should write philosophy only as one *writes a poem*'. In Wittgenstein's writing, she wants to insist, 'every word counts'. Well, if every word counts we should perhaps be more attentive to the fact that Wittgenstein wrote that one should only be allowed to write philosophy 'nur *dichten*', not 'nur *Gedicht*'. (Winch's original translation of *dichten* as 'poetic composition' in the 1977 edition seems fine to me.) In order to see why Wittgenstein might want to write in this way – why he finds a distinctively dense (*dicht*) way of writing irreplaceably fitting in philosophy – one will want to read his work in ways which do not expend every effort 'reading *through*' its unusual composition. And even if this should not be too rapidly equated with wanting to write 'as one writes a poem', Tanesini's attempt in this regard is warmly to be welcomed.

In what seems to me a questionable gesture, Tanesini presents this approach as one of two basic 'feminist' strands in her interpretation of Wittgenstein. She bases this on the (no doubt correct) point that 'feminist theorists ... have suggested that we look more closely at the style in which philosophers write'. I think it is fair to say that feminists are not alone here, unless that term

has been so incorporated into contemporary grammar that it now simply denotes the kind of reading championed by anyone who is prepared to be unprepared, prepared for example not to assume that they know what it means to be an appropriately sensitive reader of every text that might be called 'philosophical'. But such an identification would be a loss to feminism – and to reading.

Nevertheless, Tanesini's interpretive proposals seem to me, like Staten's, profoundly more in tune with the texts she is exploring than are the more narrowly 'argumentocentric' varieties that prevail. On the other hand, however, the details of her interpretive work suggest that her conceptual debts owe more to that other sort of reader than she might suppose. The reader she wants to oppose is the one who comes to a text with the following distinctive assumptions:

We are expected to understand the propositional contents, the literal meaning, of the (declarative) sentences which make up a work of philosophy. We understand the philosopher when we understand the claims she puts forward as true in her work.

Tanesini does not endorse this, of course. But the trouble is that she does endorse something like its mirror image. Where the traditional reader wants to focus on 'literal meaning', Tanesini's 'feminist' approach is interested in 'the interpretation of the meanings of imagery'. So her interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy advances through an analysis of 'the metaphors Wittgenstein uses when he discusses philosophy itself'. However, in turning from an interest in literal meaning to an attentiveness to metaphor, Tanesini is, I would suggest, simply turning within the framing assumptions of the more usual treatment. As if a concern with a philosophical text that is composed 'nur *dichten*' demands that one pay special attention to the 'striking images and metaphors' that the text 'resorts to'.

Even if the opposition between a reading that focuses on literal meaning and a reading that focuses on metaphorical meaning is somewhat simplistic, Tanesini does not pursue her interpretation naively but employs 'some of the methodological precepts ... developed by the French feminist philosopher Michèle Le Dœuff'. A 'nutshell' of Le Dœuff's investigation of the metaphors that shore up traditional philosophical theory is then presented, in the form of four methodological instructions, to articulate a theoretically well-grounded route of access to dimensions of Wittgenstein's teachings which are missed if one takes 'metaphors to be mere embellishments'. This appropriation of Le Dœuff is not unproblematic. We are, as Tanesini is aware, some

way from Le Dœuff's critical effort to show how philosophical texts that aim to *eschew* metaphor at crucial points *fail* to do so, when we turn to a text which is self-consciously written with an ideal of composition that is completely foreign to such scientific ambitions. Moreover, Tanesini's feminist efforts do not seem to me to reap many metaphilosophical rewards. Perhaps I have read too much Cavell (who is obviously an important reader of Wittgenstein for Tanesini too), but highlighting the fact that Wittgenstein recurs again and again to the image of the philosopher as 'lost in the landscape of language' and 'a stranger in her homeland' is hardly news. Cavell would also stress the traditional philosopher's resistance to this image, and I think it would be grist to that resisting mill to add, as Tanesini does, that they are 'prone to resist and misconstrue his approach to philosophy ... because he diagnosed correctly some of the impulses that lead people to philosophize'. It's because you are lost and homeless that you resist accepting that you are lost and homeless.

As I have mentioned, however, the 'question of style' is only one side of Tanesini's feminist interpretation. The other is the retrieval in Wittgenstein's thought of 'aspects of his work that can be employed for feminist purposes'. The idea of using Wittgenstein's thought for this purpose is not itself much explored by Tanesini. She distinguishes it sharply from any suggestion of searching for 'ideas' which 'could be put to feminist work' (by which she means, I think, ideas which are about substantive issues of women's oppression or the various feminist approaches to issues concerning equality). But while she confronts tricky questions about Wittgenstein's personal views about women with considerable subtlety, the more general question of using the work of a man to correct a perceived weakness within contemporary feminist thought – the question, one might say, of Tanesini's own 'Héloïse complex' – is not directly addressed. Of course that question can be answered without a flicker of feminist scruple. There are feminists who care not a hoot about the source of helpful or intriguing ideas. But others are less confident.

How deep do differences of thinking go along the lines of differences that matter to feminists? Some feminists might agree with Wittgenstein (on the substantive 'idea') that when one is concerned to 'acknowledge who we are' we cannot simply ignore questions of one's being a man or being a woman. And Tanesini's own composition wriggles around trying to get comfortable with the prospect of seeking a relationship between feminism and Wittgenstein's philosophy.


There is, she suggests, 'a convergence' between them so his response is one 'with which feminist philosophers can fruitfully engage'. In particular, his remarks can 'contribute' to feminist arguments because his concern with the finitude of human existence is 'an important issue for feminist philosophy'. Equally, his rejection of the modern conception of the autonomous subject 'can be put to use' to 'further the feminist debate' in this area because the modern conception of the subject 'has also been the target of much feminist criticism'. The basic theme is that feminist criticism 'is usefully supplemented' by taking on board Wittgenstein's thought. Of course, this kind of relation is only 'furthering' the debate because Wittgenstein's teaching has not hitherto been endorsed by feminism. Indeed, it is a recurrent motif of the book that Wittgenstein's work 'offers an alternative to standard feminist positions'.

One doesn't get much sense of what feminism is from this book. Just one paragraph – on page 117 – is devoted to historical or cultural themes conceived from a perspective which highlights injustices to women. But you get a good sense that Tanesini thinks feminism badly in need of a Wittgensteinian supplement, most frequently in the areas where Wittgenstein's philosophy is itself most focused: the critique of traditional conceptions of the subject, of subjectivity and of language. However, what Tanesini regards as current feminist unclarity isn't confined to these issues. Feminist political philosophy too stands in need of some Wittgensteinian therapy. Interestingly, behind the feminist façade under fire in this case is a male author whose supplement to feminism ought to have caused Tanesini to take stock of the configuration of Wittgenstein as a 'supplement' to feminism: the already mentioned master-dichter, Jacques Derrida.

The 'deconstructive paradox' in political philosophy (so called because of its 'similarities to Derrida's views on meaning') that Wittgenstein's thought will help to 'dissolve' is that the conditions of possibility of a democratic political community are at the same time the conditions of impossibility 'of the full realization' of this same community. The central claim here (rehearsed in Tanesini's article in *RP* 110) is that every construction of a community in which 'insiders' speak together with one voice – as a collective 'we' – thereby produces (as a matter of logic) the possibility of 'outsiders' to this community, the possibility of an excluded 'they'. Special tensions arise as soon as one adds to this logical or conceptual point the political requirement that the constructed community be democratic, that it have a proper respect for equality and a recognition of individual freedom. The democratic

demand would seem ideal and yet, according to Chantal Mouffe, as such it is 'a dangerous illusion': the very realization of such a community would presuppose 'an unjust suppression of some group differences'. In other words, any realized democratic community should (ideally as it were) be less than 'ideal', less than fully at one with itself: it must remain open to internal differences (differences which produce 'insiders' and 'outsiders') that a *fully* realized democracy would have 'resolved'.

Tanesini attempts to dispel the sense of paradox by removing the conceptual floor on which it rests: 'the assumption that any act of saying "we" serves ... to define a group of us from which they – whoever they



are – are excluded'. Specifically, what she seeks is a use of 'we' which relates to a 'community based on acknowledgement' rather than a community based on 'our knowledge of our similarities'. Thus, the most forceful – and distinctively Wittgensteinian – objection to the assumption she advances is that since 'knowing others' is to be regarded as, primarily, a matter of acknowledging them, then the paradox of democratic community turns out to be the claim that 'the conditions for the acknowledgement of some people are at the same time the conditions for the impossibility of acknowledging other people'. And this, Tanesini suggests, 'does not seem compelling after all'. The reasoning is that acknowledging that someone is, say, suffering simply has no bearing on whether there are or could be others that I fail to acknowledge, and acts of saying 'we' which function as acknowledgements are no different.

I don't think that this suffices to remove the paradox, however. Indeed, it seems clear that even the Wittgensteinian 'we' is 'in the business of encircling a group'. Consider the case Tanesini addresses concerning 'what

we share' in sharing a language. The idea here is that there is a shared 'framework of attunements' that makes possible 'a community based on acknowledgement'. That is, each member of the community will be able to acknowledge and be acknowledged by every other. However, the conceptual point that motivates the paradox of community in this case would not be that such relations of acknowledgement require any *failure*, or possible failure, of acknowledgement of others, but rather that the existence of such a community presupposes the possibility of *withholding* acknowledgement from others. Tanesini accepts that, as a matter of logic, 'only if there are inferiors, can we possibly count as superiors', but, by parity of reasoning, we can only make sense of acknowledging others if we can at least conceive of the possibility of withholding it. So the apparently not-so-compelling formulation of the paradox as concerning conditions of acknowledgement turns out to be compelling after all, because the issue is not of someone's *failure* to acknowledge others but of their *refusing* to. (Cavell, to whom Tanesini is again greatly indebted here, is as clear as one could wish on this. See, for example, *The Claim of Reason*, p. 428.)

While Tanesini regards the paradox as a temptation one should resist, she finds the substantive conclusion drawn from the paradox – namely, that we should not strive rationally to resolve all conflicts in a democratic community – as independently 'disturbing'. This is somewhat surprising since Mouffe's acceptance that living in such a community involves the apparently less than ideal feature of living with the permanent possibility of having non-rationally resolvable differences with one's adversaries (and so concerns relations to those among us 'whose ideas we combat'), is not at all far from the Wittgensteinian idea that differences of world-view can be so serious that they cannot be resolved by 'giving reasons', cases where we end up using 'slogans' to 'combat' each other. In any event, to accept, as Mouffe seems to, that reasons come to an end somewhere and that 'at the end of reasons comes *persuasion*' (*On Certainty*, §612) seems to me far less disturbing than what one might envisage as the upshot of attempting to regard the situation as one where reason is in play 'all the way down' as it were. On such a view, it is hard to avoid seeing those who differ *fundamentally* from you as *fundamentally* unreasonable. And, as Geoffrey Bennington has put it in *Arguing with Derrida*, 'nothing is more like a holy war than the war of what perceives itself as reason against what it perceives as unreason.' No doubt Tanesini would want to resist this implication, but her avowedly Rousseauist position precisely affirms that

'outsiders' to a community need not be treated in the same way as 'members' of it.

Towards the end of his book of essays Gavin Kitching is also keen to use Wittgenstein (and indeed Cavell) to 'dissolve' what he calls 'a Derridean or postmodernist puzzle'. However, Kitching's text develops far more dynamically as a lesson *in* conceptual puzzlement than as a text *on* it. That is, while Tanesini writes throughout with the air of someone who has a settled confidence over what feminism is and needs and what Wittgenstein is on about, Kitching's book is largely devoted to putting on show the journey, or his journey, towards any such settled understanding. Indeed, for the most part Kitching gives the impression of being more keen to confess his failures than he is to claim to see things 'aright'.

Kitching's journey starts with an essay written some twenty years ago in which he sees Wittgenstein as providing a richly pragmatic and contextualist conception of the human use of language. This philosophical approach is taken both to be congenial to a classically Marxist emphasis on 'praxis' and also to offer powerful criticisms of claims (especially Althusserian, structuralist claims) concerning the scientific character of Marxian theory. Hostility to approaches which seem to him insufficiently attentive to the lives, thoughts and feelings of flesh-and-bone human beings grows steadily throughout the book, culminating in a bitter and aggressive attack on what he calls 'the cult of theory'. Roughly speaking, then, the twenty-year journey covered by the essays in this collection shows Kitching slowly shifting his position from that of a (mere) Wittgensteinian critic of theoretical stances which affirm some kind of 'scientific realism' to being a (militant) Wittgensteinian opponent of 'theoreticist' tendencies to affirm *philosophical* conceptions of *any* kind (including 'pragmatic' or 'contextualist' ones). For the later Kitching, an active and genuinely challenging political outlook ('some kind of socialism') simply does not need any of that *strictly inhuman*, 'metaphysical' discourse.

The proximity here to at least one reading of Marx's famous eleventh thesis on Feuerbach is greater than Kitching seems to acknowledge. While citing it as a 'favourite Marxian quotation' of his youth, he thinks that it underestimates how far the activity of intellectuals *as* intellectuals (working in the British Library or wherever) can itself be an activity of (literally) world-changing significance. So one shouldn't simply oppose 'philosophical interpretations of the world' and active efforts at 'changing it', in the way his younger self wanted to. But the long-journeyed Kitching seems

to me to have arrived at a position every bit as radical as his youthfully impatient self: namely, to a no-holds-barred affirmation that the *only* point of engaging with philosophy *at all* is 'to get oneself or somebody else to see that they have lapsed into metaphysics and ought to stop doing so'. Kitching's fervent desire, which he takes himself to share with Wittgenstein, is that we *stop doing philosophy*. Marx is convicted at times for sliding into 'metaphysics' too, but what Marx did that is still living today is what he did when he 'turned his back on philosophy'.

It is this profoundly hostile outlook towards what Kitching calls 'theoreticist' reflection that leads to the culminating engagement with Derrida at the end of the book. It aims to show, very much like Tanesini, that 'the Derridean or postmodernist puzzle about meaning is a classical piece of philosophical metaphysics'. Out of the anger that he feels over the fact that some of the 'very best students' today are falling prey to such thinking, Kitching fulminates against a humanities culture that has been 'terrorised by philosophy', a terrorism that has prevented it from doing the decent empirical work, statistical research and outward-looking writing which would bring intellectuals in our time back '*in the world*'. What they need to do, and what philosophy prevents, is seriously to respond to 'a desperate desire for at least some guidance or ideas' on what is to be done about '*material issues*' today.

It is probably a good thing that Kitching specifies his target rather vaguely as 'the Derridean or postmodernist puzzle' since his *only* quotation from Derrida occurs in a part of the discussion illustrating of the difference between texts which do and texts which do not succeed in avoiding the temptation to do philosophy. The failure to read any of Derrida's writings is extremely annoying, however, since the kernel of Kitching's criticism concerns the distinctive difficulty of responding to it, of finding sense in it. That is, the basis for asserting the peculiar emptiness of Derrida's work is supposed to be the fact that 'we do not know what to say in response'. But if that *is* so important it is surely of equal importance to engage at some point with what Derrida actually writes, and not just what a frustrated reader 'read[s] Derrida saying'.

In any case, what Kitching says in feigned response to an absent text shows how his desire to escape philosophy remains profoundly entrenched in it. In particular, his insistence that it is 'more commonly' the case that 'I am absolutely clear that you meant this and not that *in language*', and hence that what people say is more commonly free of 'ambiguity of meaning', shows him wanting, urgently, to engage

in a dispute in which he regards himself as 'stating facts recognised by every reasonable human being' (*Philosophical Investigations*, §402). But to assert that 'Derrida [is] clearly wrong' because we can recall cases where others 'got my meaning immediately' is not to recognize and state facts about what is 'there', an event or happening '*in the world*'; it is, if anything, to recall that statements like 'She got my meaning immediately' *have a use* in – are in circulation in – the economy of our language. As far as I know no one has suggested we take them out. Neither Wittgenstein nor Derrida identifies his work with an effort to affirm or deny the correctness of our ways of speaking, but both engage in effort to come to terms with something they find enigmatic and remarkable, a life with language. And it is in their virtuoso performances, their ways of writing philosophy '*nur dichten*', in which they attempt reflectively to endure without distortion what (*in der tat*) we endure every day – as our every day itself – that I, like Henry Staten, but unlike Tanesini and Kitching, still find Wittgenstein and Derrida, in-deed, uncannily close.

Simon Glendinning

Truth of another's making

Michel Foucault, *Il Faut Défendre la Société*, Gallimard/Seuil, Paris, 1987. 283 pp., 2 02 0231169 7. *Society Must Be Defended*, trans. David Macey, Allen Lane, London, 2003. 310 pp., £16.99 pb., 0 71 399707 9

Michel Foucault, *Les Anormaux*, Gallimard/Seuil, Paris, 1999. 351 pp., 2 02 030798 7. *Abnormal*, trans. Graham Burchell, Verso, London, 2003, 374 pp., £25.00 hb., 1 85984 539 8.

Michel Foucault, *L'Herméneutique du sujet*, Gallimard/Seuil, Paris, 2001. 540 pp., €30.00 hb., 2 02 030800 2.

Michel Foucault, *Le Pouvoir psychiatrique*, Gallimard/Seuil, Paris, 2003. 399 pp., €25.00 pb., 2 02 030769 3.

Michel Foucault, *La Peinture de Manet, suivi de Michel Foucault, un regard*, ed. Maryvonne Saison, Seuil, Paris, 2004. 169 pp., €20.00 hb, 2 02 058537 5.

When Michel Foucault died in June 1984 he left no will. There was, however, a note to his partner Daniel Defert, written 'in case something happened' when

Foucault went to Poland in 1982. Nothing untoward did happen in Poland, but the note has been interpreted as expressing Foucault's last wishes. It stated, among other things, that there were to be 'no posthumous publications'.

In 1984 the corpus was both incomplete and untidy. Anthologies of 'selected writings' existed in English, German, Spanish, Italian and Japanese, but there were no French equivalents. There was no equivalent to the volumes of Sartre's *Situations*. Other material, much of it unpublished, was in circulation in the form of pirate editions (especially in Italy), photocopies and transcripts of lectures but it was surprisingly difficult to get an overview of just how Foucault's work developed. It was certainly possible to locate a great deal of uncollected material but doing so took time and patience, particularly as most bibliographies were unreliable and incomplete. Anyone who wished to read, say, Foucault's views on the Iranian Revolution needed both a reading knowledge of Italian and access to a run of back issues of *Corriere della Sera*. Major lectures given in Brazil on the history of medicine and the politics of health were available only in Portuguese translation.

Given this state of affairs, there were inevitably rumours about 'lost' publications. Some of them concerned a mysterious plan for a book on Manet. Foucault was known to have signed a contract with Éditions de Minuit in 1967, but the book was never written. Some hints as to what it might have looked like emerged from the little book on Magritte (*Ceci n'est pas une pipe*) and Foucault was known to have lectured on Manet, but the texts remained elusive and therefore surrounded by legends. We can now read the famous lecture. *La Peinture de Manet* is a transcript of a lecture given in Tunis in 1971 (there are, apparently, other versions) and it discusses thirteen of the artist's best-known paintings. The lecture raises some of the classic issues, such as that of the puzzling lines of sight in the Courtauld Institute's *Bar at the Folies-Bergère* but, although beautifully produced and illustrated, the book is something of a disappointment. It has its charm but, despite some of the claims made in the eight essays that accompany the lecture, cannot be counted as a major 'lost' work. As is obvious from the opening of *The Order of Things*, the essay on Magritte and other minor pieces, Foucault could write well on the visual arts but he never claimed to be a specialist in aesthetics or art history. He was right not to claim that status. It is, after all, a curious art historian who takes so little interest in colour and, for Foucault, Velasquez's *Las Meninas* and Manet's paintings appear to be mono-

chrome. The main interest of Foucault's lecture is the hesitation between a Greenbergian emphasis on the flatness and two-dimensionality of the canvases, and a phenomenological approach to 'painting as event' that obviously owes a lot to Merleau-Ponty's late work on visibility and invisibility.

The landscape changed dramatically in 1994 when the four volumes of *Dits et écrits* were published by Gallimard. They contained 364 items, presented in chronological order, and ran to over three thousand pages. Although *Dits et écrits* supposedly contained 'everything' published in Foucault's lifetime, there were some minor exceptions, such as a few interviews published in the gay press without the interviewee's express authorization. It suddenly became apparent that Foucault was not just the author of the books that had made him famous. A lot of fascinating material could be found in articles, prefaces and marginalia. It was also surprising to see how much of Foucault's work originally relied on oral supports such as interviews, talks and conversations. The publication of the four volumes was the culmination of a long and time-consuming project supervised by Defert and François Ewald, once Foucault's assistant at the Collège de France. The editing, indexing and bibliographical input were of outstanding quality. Taken together, the four volumes were a new and exciting box of intellectual and political tools. Sadly, the three volumes of 'Essential Works' (a 'selected' *Dits et écrits*) available in English translation are not of the same quality (Paul Rabinow, ed. *The Essential Works of Michel Foucault*, vol. I, *Ethics*, Allen Lane, London, 1997; James D. Faubion, *The Essential Works of Michel Foucault*, vol. II, *Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology*, Allen Lane, London, 1998; James D. Faubion, *The Essential Works of Michel Foucault*, vol. III, *Power*, Allen Lane, London, 2001). They are certainly an improvement on the earlier collections, but the choice to group the texts by theme rather than chronology makes it difficult to trace Foucault's development, whilst the absence of a general index to the three volumes makes them awkward to use. The omission of Defert's detailed chronology of Foucault's life is to be regretted.

In 1971, Foucault was elected to a chair at the Collège de France. His only responsibility was to give public lectures and seminars. Professors at the Collège do not teach a syllabus and the institution awards no degrees or qualifications. They are required to present their original research, and that is all. Course summaries are published in the Collège's *Annuaire*. Foucault's lectures were immensely popular and successful. Indeed they were too popular and successful;

the lecture theatre, with its portrait of Bergson, was filled to overflowing and another room had to be provided to accommodate the overspill. A lot of people heard Foucault lecturing without actually seeing him as they listened to the amplified voice coming through the speakers. Many of those present were armed with cassette recorders, and transcripts of the lectures – many of them incomplete and inaccurate – soon began to circulate.

In 1994 it was argued that the lectures were not ‘published’ in Foucault’s lifetime and therefore could not be printed. In 1997 the argument was reversed: the act of giving a public lecture constituted a form of performative publication. In February of that year, the first volume of Foucault’s lectures at the Collège appeared in print, to considerable acclaim. To date, six volumes have appeared (two of them too late to be discussed here: *Naissance de la biopolitique* (1978–79), Gallimard/Seuil, Paris, 2004; *Sécurité, territoire, population* (1977–78), Galimard/Seuil, Paris, 2004) and two have been translated. At the moment, it is not clear whether all the lectures (thirteen volumes) will be published, as tapes of some of the earliest have yet to be located. The order in which the lectures have been published in French is itself slightly mysterious and, whilst all volumes are to be translated under the general editorship of Arnold Davidson (University of Chicago), it is puzzling to find that the first two have been issued by such different publishers.

There is still something ambiguous about these ‘publications’. The texts are not Foucault’s original manuscripts, which still come under the ‘no posthumous publication’ rule. They are transcripts of tape recordings that have been compared with manuscripts in the possession of Daniel Defert, scrupulously annotated and edited with enormous erudition. Most of the recordings were made by Jacques Lagrange, the unsung bibliographical hero of *Dits et écrits* and editor of the 1979–80 lectures on *Le Gouvernement des vivants* (publication announced for 2005). As anyone who has ever suffered headaches as a result of listening to the original tapes (once held by the Bibliothèque du Saulchoir and now by the Institut Mémoires de l’Édition Contemporaine) will appreciate, an enormous amount of work has gone into producing these volumes. We owe their editors an enormous debt of gratitude. The essays appended to each volume help to situate the lectures in terms of both the broader context and Foucault’s complex intellectual trajectory.

As the series is still incomplete, there is a certain unevenness about it. The largest volume reproduces the lectures on the hermeneutics of the subject (1981–82)

and is in effect an immensely long version of the chapter on ‘The Cultivation of the Self’ in *The Care of the Self*. A comparison of the two texts would no doubt provide fascinating insights into Foucault’s working methods, but that task is best left to those with a great familiarity with the more remote byways of Greek and Roman philosophy. The other volumes are more accessible and, for most readers, of more immediate interest. Reading them is a somewhat curious experience. Foucault is not expounding or summarizing some existing body of thought. He is thinking on his feet as he explores the thesis, derived largely from French historiography but also from Hobbes and the English Levellers and Diggers, that society is always the site of a battle between antagonistic ‘races’ (Franks and Gauls, Anglo-Saxons and Normans) in *Society Must Be Defended* (1976), as he surveys the domain of psychiatric power (1974–75) and as he traces the medico-legal genealogy of the concept of ‘abnormality’. There are many digressions and not a little repetition. Some lines of enquiry are pursued for a while and then suddenly dropped. There is much here that is familiar. There are intimations of the themes of *Discipline and Punish* and *I, Pierre Rivière* as Foucault charts the shift from a sovereign power that constantly seeks to legitimize itself by tracing its ancestry (and therefore its ‘racial’ origins) to the disciplinary power that operates anonymously and establishes the capillary mechanisms that allow it to work ‘from below’ as well as from ‘above’. Sovereign power was spectacular and its manifestations brutally physical, but it could be both legitimized and delegitimized from below. Marie-Antoinette was a queen who became a monster: she had committed adultery and incest, and she was a lesbian. No legitimacy there.

The lectures on ‘psychiatric power’ follow the medico-legal shifts that occur as acts and deeds becomes less important than the psychological–pathological types held responsible for them. The first three sets of lectures hint strongly at the work to come as the notions of biopower and governmentality begin to emerge. They also hint at the works that never came. Parts of *Abnormal* look like preparatory material for the anthology of ‘lives of infamous men’, which never saw the light of day. A patient reading of that volume and sections of the others might make it possible to reconstruct the six volumes of the *History of Sexuality* that were announced in 1976 but never written.

Some passages in the lectures on psychiatric power have an almost alarming contemporary relevance. If proposed changes to the Mental Health Act are approved, persons suffering from DSPD (Dangerous

Severe Personality Disorder) – known to most of us as psychopaths – may be held indefinitely in secure institutions not because of what they have done, but because of what they are and might do. Government statements admit, however, that there is no clear definition – legal or medical – of DSPD and that there is no definite diagnosis. The identification of DSPD was not the result of some diagnostic breakthrough but the outcome of discussions in a government committee. Foucault is a very good guide when it comes to comprehending how medico-legal entities such as ‘dangerousness’ come into existence. DSPD is a similar entity. Those suspected of being DSPD – the term functions as both a noun and an adjective – will be referred to a Mental Health Tribunal by doctors, psychiatrists, social workers, carers and so on. The Tribunal will be created from on high but, if it is to function, power must seep downwards and then upwards. The Tribunal will supply the truth that will allow a court and a judge to pass sentence, but it will not be a truth of its own making.

David Macey

Equal access?

Dianna Taylor and Karen Vintges, eds, *Feminism and the Final Foucault*, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 2004. 307 pp., £41.00 hb., £14.95 pb., 0 252 02927 5 hb., 0 252 07182 4 pb.

Given that Foucault’s influence on feminism has been greater possibly than that of any other modern thinker, it is striking that he himself never specifically examines the sources of women’s subjectification. Nonetheless, there is a burgeoning analysis of the implications of his thought for feminism, a sizeable proportion of which focuses on his middle-period works such as *Discipline and Punish*. However, with the exception of Lois McNay’s 1992 critique, *Foucault and Feminism*, and Caroline Ramazonoglu’s collection, *Up Against Foucault* (1993), there have been few extensive feminist explorations of Foucault’s final intellectual phase. During this period, Foucault departed from a genealogical study of the disciplinary subject, analysing instead those practices or ‘technologies’ of freedom that constitute it. Such technologies are ethical in the sense that they extend the possibility of critical human agency in a world in which faith in absolutes has become a remote prospect. *Feminism and the Final Foucault* responds to the need within feminism to

interrogate the critical value of this project by bringing together new reflections on texts such as *The Use of Pleasure* and *Care of the Self*. The later Foucault, the editors claim, contributes to the feminist possibility of fashioning new forms of commitment without truth (Karen Vintges’ primary concern), and of sustaining responsibility within the limits of contingency (Dianna Taylor’s main theme).

Taken as a whole, the volume is a fascinating theoretical engagement, which, I think, largely succeeds in shedding light on the core ambiguity that critics have identified with Foucault’s later work. Whilst he pushes there against a postmodernist interpretation of French existentialism, claiming to find within it the possibility of emancipatory politics, critics have characterized the later work as apolitical on account of its allegedly abstract, or even solipsistic, conception of freedom. In *Care of the Self*, the third volume of *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault returns to the Ancient Greeks and Romans for inspiration, finding in their works productive notions of ‘ethical self-formation’ and practices involving self-care (*askesis*). Far from conceiving these practices as abstract and solipsistic, Foucault himself argues not only that they should be used as strategies to resist normalizing power but self-care also involves care for others and a critical perspective on the world. By departing from the elitist conclusions of classical thinkers, Foucault’s later claims seem uniquely significant for modern times. Much depends, therefore, on their sustainability, and their purportedly emancipatory character. The contributors to this volume raise the relevant questions. What kinds of tactics promote personal dignity and resistance to power? If the moment of freedom occurs in the recognition of power, what sort of beings are we then free to become? What are the necessary conditions for self-creation? Centre stage is the Foucauldian concept of an *ethos*. The three sections of this volume are organized around this idea: first, women’s self-practices conceived as an ethos; second, feminism itself as ethos; and lastly, the political dimension of a feminist ethos.

Feminists might rightly begin by asking how an ethos emerges: is it a purely personal achievement, or does it require a particular social environment in which to develop? What is the relationship between one’s own personal ethos and regnant social beliefs and attitudes? Jeannette Bloem examines this issue in her opening essay, ‘The Shaping of a Beautiful Soul’, by exploring the ‘arts of existence’ in which religious women historically engaged. Anna Maria Van Schurman, for example, was a Dutch intellectual and religious devotee whose social roles appear reactionary

and therefore inimical to feminism. However, it seems that Van Schurman worked on established gender roles within the constraints of conventional religion, and in certain ways transformed the public image of Christian women through subtle 'practices of the self'. Similarly, Emma Goldman, the subject of Kathy Ferguson's study, is often taken to be a failed political philosopher, but a moderately successful feminist activist. Ferguson challenges this reading by arguing that, through persistent techniques of self-production, Goldman constituted herself as a political philosopher according to her own conception of the role. Both Bloem and Ferguson suggest that what is at stake for the subjects of their inquiry is the later Foucault's distinction between writing oneself and *being written*. Since power has no constitutive outside, expressions of authentic selfhood are always complexly related to the structures that discipline and police identities.

In Foucault's later account, the subject's solution to disciplinary power is found in its self-created ethical response to the world. As he puts it, 'we have to create ourselves as a work of art'. Stephen Barber takes up this point in showing that, by transgressing the tendency prevalent in the 1930s to separate politics from aesthetics, protagonists in Virginia Woolf's works embody the notion that the two categories presuppose one another. By analysing the forces that constitute us, we experiment with the possibility of going beyond the limits imposed on us by history. In *Three Guineas*, Woolf thus reveals the way in which religion and patriotism unconsciously affect the human psyche, producing a 'microfascism' within. The recognition of the 'desire for power internalized' is the very painful precondition of 'the outsider's' practice of freedom. Like Woolf, Foucault describes this difficult practice not as a theory, much less as a dogma, but as an attitude of 'hyper- and pessimistic activism'.

The ensuing set of essays, which constitutes nearly half of this volume, concerns feminism itself as a critical ethos. Here Helen O'Grady's examination of gendered processes of identity-formation raises a number of important questions. Citing Sandra Bartky's *Femininity and Domination* (1990), she explains how 'the cultural inferiorization of gender' emerges through women's experiences of guilt and personal exile. However, one might observe here that if feminism is to amount to more than a description of women's social inequality, it should also suggest how to move from recognizing disciplinary power to the conditions under which self-care becomes possible. While Foucault contends that freedom essentially involves continual resistance to panoptical power, it is difficult to distinguish power,

which is potentially creative, from comprehensive domination. Additionally, how can one separate out those practices which are the outcome of disciplinary power from those which manifest resistance? O'Grady suggests that it might only be possible to challenge women's pervasive beliefs about personal inadequacy by seeking to externalize them, perhaps in a group-therapeutic context. However, recognizing subjection does not in itself entail resistance, much less liberation. Therapy is not synonymous with consciousness-raising. Thus, it is unclear that this solution alone grounds a feminist ethos, not least, paradoxically enough, since it appears to evoke the regulation of 'docile bodies' that Foucault himself documented so effectively in works such as *Madness and Civilization*.

Moreover, O'Grady tends unfortunately to assume, rather than to investigate, the core issue in Foucault's later work, namely the relationship between the free self and its constitutive social world. She does take on board McNay's objection that he often blurs the distinction between those self-practices that are accessible to self-fashioning and those that are less so, due to their deep inscription on the body and the psyche. She also recognizes the objection that Foucault's evocation of Greek practices of self-mastery not only seems to privilege the 'virile male' but also appears disquietingly similar to the disciplinary practices that he hopes the modern subject might overcome. However, it is disappointing that O'Grady does not also interrogate the relationship that Foucault seems to envisage between technologies of self-care and care for others. She appears to accept that a person's enhanced self-dignity *leads to* sociality and compassion for others. However, as Amy Allen points out in her essay, while Foucault does conceive technologies of the self as *social* in a certain sense, nevertheless he predominantly envisages this realm as a domain of strategic power-relations in which the individual strives to attain an individualized freedom. This conception of 'the social' does not readily cohere with the world of equality and reciprocity advocated by feminists. In the context described by O'Grady, therefore, it is not clear how self-care *entails* a 'change in the sexual division of caring', or the 'dichotomizing of self- and other-directed care'.

Sylvia Pritsch is more cautious in 'Inventing Images, Constructing Standpoints', contending that Foucault's aesthetic self is not as easy for feminists to adopt as it may at first appear to be. Whilst feminist aesthetic practices described by de Lauretis and Haraway point towards a *positive* aesthetics (by recommending the construction of positive feminine images, and

images that provide a humane figured perspective on the world), Foucault by contrast is concerned with a *negative* aesthetics – an aesthetics of resistance. *Technologies of the Self*, for example, distinguishes four principal techniques: those of power, of the self, of signification or communication, and of production. While the latter two are other-directed and seek to install new relations between the self and socio-political institutions, the first two (on which Foucault largely focuses) say nothing about the social reconstitution of dominated identities. This, then, represents a genuine difficulty with the idea of support in the later Foucault for a *feminist* ‘technology of care’. Such techniques would involve image-production to build women’s self-dignity, by putting into question existing social institutions as well as conceptualizing those that might be more humane.

However, this criticism is not synonymous with the charge that the later Foucault is *apolitical*. In spite (or perhaps because) of its ambiguities, Foucault’s later work might still generate a positive agenda for justice, as thinkers such as William Connolly and James Tully have argued. With regard to Foucault’s *feminist* political significance, however, the case seems more complicated. Susan Hekman’s contribution to the final, ‘political’ section of this volume thus usefully foregrounds these contradictions of the modern identity that she believes cannot be resolved within the confines of liberal politics alone. Since ‘identity-politics’ seeks to reveal the forces that constitute selves informally as well as legally, practices of resistance and care must be equally dispersed. Foucault’s account of panoptical, or ubiquitous, power is instructive in showing why multicultural and feminist politics strain the parameters of liberalism’s ‘juridico-political’ view. While some of Hekman’s conclusions appear either to be debatable (e.g. that the fixing of identities follows logically from the structure of the liberal polity), or – oddly – to be elementary and contestable at the same time (e.g. that the fixing of identities is not endemic to identity politics as such), the main body of her essay does contribute helpfully to understanding Foucault’s significance for feminism.

Perhaps one should conceptualize Foucault’s significance more broadly by conceiving feminism itself more expansively – that is, not as a species of identity politics *simpliciter*, but as a critical orientation to the world. In ‘Foucault’s Ethos: A Guide(post) for Change’ Taylor suggests that the post-9/11 political climate has produced a ‘crisis of meaning’ to which the Foucauldian ethos responds. However, this brings us back to the question of why exactly Foucault takes

the *personal* ethos he defends to be essentially geared to social transformation. Foucault does associate self-practices with the social world, but this, as we have seen, simply appears to indicate his awareness of the (very important) point that a practice can only occur in the context of a way of life that supports it. But Taylor reads into Foucault a deeper, potentially feminist agenda: not only can self-practices be critical of existing institutions, but they are inherently directed towards forging new forms of social relations. The later Foucault supports not an abstract, individualized freedom, she argues, conceived as an idiosyncratic process significant only to the person who undertakes it, but the free *way of life*, a certain way of being among others. This way of being encourages a ‘political spirituality’ or a collective effort to keep power mobile. As Margaret McClaren also points out in her contribution, Foucauldian freedom occurs when power relations shift through resistance and reversal. Self-transformation implies social transformation precisely because social practices constitute subjectivity.

Vintges reinforces this point in her concluding essay, which examines the relevance of Foucauldian practices of freedom for international feminism. Foucault, she contends, advocates a universalism that is ‘pluralistically enlightened’ through its engagement with other religions such as Islam. An intercultural feminist project thus benefits from an ethos that seeks to foster freedom practices for women everywhere. Foucault’s democratic universalism is not a liberal universalism of values or principles. An ethos is not synonymous with an abstract moral code. Rather, its focus is equal access to freedom-practices within any one discourse. Ethical relations either with oneself or others do not necessitate the coercive internalization of norms or their imposition on the (religious, cultural or sexual) other.

In the last instance, then, one gains the clear sense that the benefit derived from a feminist encounter with Foucault is not to be found exclusively in examining the concept of a self-technology. Rather, it rests on studying another aspect of an ethos, the *telos* or goal. For Foucault, as for feminism, emancipatory politics should reject those self-techniques which aim narcissistically for personal transformation as an end in itself. The point of expanding, changing and developing what we are, think and do lies in the transformation of what *anyone* might become, think or do. The point of ‘working on ourselves’ is, in the end, to promote the general human desire for transformation in communicative acts with others.

Monica Mookherjee

Hacking it

Alexander R. Galloway: *Protocol: How Control Exists after Decentralization*, MIT University Press, Cambridge MA and London, 2004. 248 pp., £18.95 hb., 0 262 072475.

As an earlier period of 'convergence' and 'new economies' in the digital mode fades, along with memories of WebTV and tamagotchi virtual pets, the halcyon days of associating unfettered (and, too often, uncritical) possibility with 'being digital' have given way to more circumspect – not long ago some might have said paranoid – views. The now clearly visible elaboration of digital networks within larger systems of political, economic and mediatic power demonstrates that finding radically 'liberatory' possibility – or its obverse, the radical dissolution of heretofore well-understood, secure modes of subjectivity – in the subject's graphical navigation of internetworked globality was an altogether too simple proposition. It's not as if cybercultural critics locating digital networks within larger networks of power were entirely silent during the period of digital euphoria: the Krovers' conception of 'the virtual class' comes to mind, as do Donna Haraway's explorations of opaque epistemological flows ratifying humanism's conceptualization of the human, the animal and the machine. Yet even these negative or ironic conceptualizations of power, network technologies and the subject were often embraced with that same enthusiasm for 'cyber-possibility' which now appears difficult to sustain. Today, critics of cyberculture and digital media have begun to take a rather more stark view of power and positioning in relation to the Internet and the World Wide Web. A more sceptical posthumanism has met the World Wide Web, and none too soon.

Alexander R. Galloway's *Protocol* is an example of the critical rethinking of network problems and potentials representative of a period too often schematically reduced in the USA to being 'post-9/11'. Today, there is widespread concern in advanced information societies about security (with terrorist networks the symptom now defining the problem of security by default), the deprivileging of liberal democratic values (with voter fraud, digital and otherwise, figuring as the sign of the political dissolution of the rights of citizenship), multinational colonization of individual ownership of cultural commodities (in December 2004 the American Supreme Court agreed to take up the challenges posed by peer-to-peer networks to the interests of the contemporary culture industries), and increasingly unfettered economic domination expressed as

multi-, inter- and transnational networks of economic power (spectacularly characterized at the 2001 Genoa WTO protests by police brutality and murder). It is not surprising that our conceptualizations of the network have taken on more of the cast of Foucault's panopticon, rather than his suggestion of 'heterotopia'. The upshot is a less enthusiastic, and less jejune, critique of interactive media networks as cultural forms or modes of production. The emergent discipline of 'software theory' means that 'new mediation' in its digital variant appears more fully grown. This more mature digital medium, whether games or networks, has become theory's new object.

Adding computational production into the canon of cultural forms susceptible to critical thought has important implications. If Galloway's efforts are fruitful, it is in theorizing contemporary digital networks as opportunities for 'tactical media', rather than supplying strictly technical or sociological descriptions of digital networks or networked social behaviour. In his Introduction to *Protocol*, having proposed a Deleuze-inspired 'bioethics' from his own recent work on cybernetics, genetics and nanotechnology, Eugene Thacker suggests that the value of Galloway's study is that 'Protocological control in biopolitical contexts is not just the means, but the medium for the development of new forms of management, regulation, and control.' However, *Protocol* is not as far-reaching as Thacker's introduction suggests. The author concentrates on the Internet and the HTML-based World Wide Web, mentioning bioinformatics only in passing. Thacker's statement reflects, though, a methodological gap between description and theorization that haunts much of Galloway's project.

Simply, Galloway proposes that digital network protocols now provide the means and the limits of both social control and political resistance. He sees protocol as a general technique of power ('a technique for achieving voluntary regulation within a contingent environment') which extends to the production of digital acts of resistance: hacking, net art, cyber-feminism. Galloway's leap from technological protocol to macrological power structures aims to demonstrate a determined relationship between technological production and political constraint. Digital networks 'force' us to adapt to the strategies of global capital, he says, while 'there has emerged a new set of social practices that inflects or otherwise diverts these protocological flows toward the goal of a utopian form of unalienated social life'. Protocol becomes a form of control and of utopian praxis alike within regimes undergoing decentralization.

Galloway agrees, then, with much recent scholarship suggesting that decentralization emerges historically for material reasons. The author understands the development of the regulatory apparatus of protocol in terms of a periodization which sees computation and 'control societies' emerging after the disciplinary societies of an earlier stage of modernity. Interactive networks are the technical, psychic and social means of regulating late capitalism. Making extensive use of contributions to the history and theory of networked culture, Galloway attempts to reconcile the distinct and conflicting views of networked regulatory apparatus given by Foucault, Kittler or Deleuze. And while never fully addressing the tensions among these various understandings, he suggests their resolution in Hardt and Negri's recent account of 'empire'. What Hardt and Negri have to say about the new 'imperial' order of globalization, Galloway argues, is true as well of the new media emerging along with it. The key here is shifting architectures of power. As the exercise of power shifts from modernity's authoritarian, vertical architectures of discipline to postmodernity's horizon-



tal, decentralized networks, decentralization is but a reconfiguration of social discipline under late capitalism. Decentralization does not imply more freedom but, rather, a distributed form of power, broader in scope.

Through a 'generative contradiction', though, Galloway suggests that the reactionary standardization implied in such protocological distribution of power provides – apparently in dialectical fashion – the means for resistance. We accept universal standardization 'in order to facilitate the ultimate goal of a free and more democratic medium'. Working towards that goal are practitioners of 'tactical media'. Here, Gallo-

way emphasizes the distinction between software code and hardware inscription – software means adaptability as well as a potentially subversive mastery, so the hacker allegorically becomes a Robin Hood figure for the multitudes of global information networks. Yet when he proposes the hacker as an agent of liberatory desire in networked culture, Galloway's rhetoric tends to escalate beyond his theorization, obliterating any distance between his careful critical framing (as in the periodization of information societies as control societies) and the metaphors he marshals in his own desire to valorize specific modes of protocological behaviour as utopian.

For example, 'hackers are machines for the identification of this possibility [of moving towards a utopian vision based in desire].' This kind of discursive excess, evidence of Galloway's aim of identifying the utopian possibilities at work within digital networks, occurs throughout the book. The problem is not so much that Galloway never really presents a thorough account of technological humanity as protocological machine, but rather that his attribution to the hacker of a status above, say, 'newbie' users of what is to be a more democratic medium seems reductive and one-dimensional – not to mention contrary to the purposes of understanding how networked multitudes might produce some effective, non-representational democracy beyond that of humanism or the nation-state. Similarly, the 1990s cyberfeminism of Sadie Plant or Australian VNSMatrix is understood primarily as a protocological intervention – feminist historiography is less important than scanning the networks for protocological rebellion. Finally, traditional aesthetic terminologies which might seem out of place given the size of the changes Galloway describes nonetheless manage to clutter the manuscript: one team of net art practitioners is said to practise a "computer virus" style – but what does 'style' mean in the evaluation of such work? Too often, the overloaded histories of terms such as 'style' and the theoretical weight they imply are left uninterrogated – theoretical baggage, as it were, in Galloway's navigation of virtual resistance practices. Galloway has not entirely worked through the problem of evaluating tactical media resistance in terms appropriate to the changes he suggests are under way.

The larger virtue of the book lies in Galloway's provocative claim that the Internet never was liberatory in its essence, that it evolves as a regulatory mode of distributing power. In this sense, Galloway's account differs notably from, say, Lawrence Lessig's earlier treatment of much the same territory (to which

Galloway refers more than once). In his 1999 *Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace*, Lessig argued that we must come to grips with a tendency towards the diminution of rights of expression, privacy and access to intellectual property, as the Internet proceeds through a phase of corporate commercialization and increased scrutiny by government regulators. Lessig's work thus performed a liberal version of the 'paradise lost' narrative of digital media long ago observed by Sandy Stone. In this narrative, technological virtuality *promised* – even more, *had begun* to provide – a revolutionary unfettering of speech, subjectivity, mediated embodiment, until power interests (commercial, governmental, technofascists at America Online, take your pick) came to tap this potential, to the detriment of the pioneer users who drove its initial development. Some version of this narrative runs through most treatments of the digital network as 'new medium'. It is to Galloway's credit that he is able to propose a model of power, instead, in its place. Still, proposing net art as a utopian praxis on the way to an 'unalienated social life' looks like a lingering mark of the 'paradise lost' narrative of cyberspace. If so, Galloway has not yet given up on that enterprise. More power to his counter-programme of protocological intervention! But the problem with *Protocol* centres on precisely this point: because Galloway identifies technologically determined network protocols as providing the contemporary means for a regulatory domination of the subject, the economy and material culture, his analysis is left with no other resource for resistance than exactly this highly reified mode of distributed materiality: 'it is *through* protocol that one must guide one's efforts, not against it.'

In this regard, then, Lessig's earlier analysis, while liberal rather than radical in its critique of the Internet, offers in comparison a surprising heterogeneity, which should be brought to bear on Galloway's project of protocological critique. For Lessig, governmentality, economics, behavioral norms and material 'architectures' (including cybernetic code) determine the subject's experience as citizen of technological postmodernity – I doubt that these heterogeneous forces can be reduced simply to 'protocol' writ large. The challenge in relating these forces to Galloway's project lies in determining how these other 'codes', norms, or 'architectures' square with praxes of tactical media, and, therefore, in treating tactical media production as a matter of something more like literacy, speech or even mediatic gesture – instead of treating it, as Galloway does, as something like conceptual art. While Lessig's book conflated legal code and cybernetic code (this overdetermination provides the very thematic of

Code), Galloway's *Protocol* avoids discussion of a larger field of epistemological forces, in the interest of positing tactical media interventions capable of resisting globalizing empire. But if action today is, as Paolo Virno has suggested, contra Hardt and Negri, a question of the multitude's relationship to its own conflicts rather than the enactment of conflicts given in global capital's terms for living, it is engagement with this larger forcefield of politics, labour and intellect that motivates a vibrant, noisy, tactical media – not the protocological reduction of these domains to standards within which opposition might be formatted.

James Tobias

Shit, it's the police

John Carter and Dave Morland, eds, *Anti-Capitalist Britain*, New Clarion Press, Cheltenham, 2004. x + 182 pp., £12.95 pb., 1 873797 43 5.

Jonathan Purkis and James Bowen, eds, *Changing Anarchism: Anarchist Theory and Practice in a Global Age*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2004. x + 259 pp., £50.00 hb., 0 7190 6694 8.

The number of books about anti-capitalism is fast approaching the number of books about capitalism; books on anti-globalization are gradually catching up with the number of books on globalization. This might be welcomed as a good thing – indicative of the extent to which the Left is organizing itself once more. But in an era in which both the 'Old Left' and, increasingly, what was once called the 'New Left' are said to be defunct, this poses two immediate and obvious questions. What is the relation between anti-globalization and anti-capitalism? And is there a political core to the anti-capitalist movement (ACM)?

Dealing with these questions in roundabout ways, these books share two beliefs. The first is that the anti-globalization movement is indeed anti-capitalist. (This point is not thought through in any way whatsoever; it is left entirely as an assumption.) The second is that despite the diversity of the anti-capitalist movement, anarchism is its core. The opening chapter of the Carter and Morland collection asks 'Anti-Capitalism: Are We All Anarchists Now?', and the answer given in both collections is a definitive 'yes'. 'The theoretical concepts most apparently to the fore [of the movement]', comment Bowen and Purkis in the Introduction to their edited volume, 'appear to be those associated with anarchism.' This is a huge claim, implying that

anarchism provides the heart, soul and rationale of contemporary anti-capitalism. Anarchism, it would appear, is the new black.

On the face of it, it is an absurd claim. It is quite clear that vast chunks of the ACM are manifestly not anarchist, have no desire to be drawn under the anarchist umbrella, and in many cases are positively anti-anarchist. But the general claim made in these books is that these other dimensions of the ACM are decreasing in both size and importance: fewer and fewer people want any kind of formalized organization, let alone a vanguard party; fewer and fewer people want to read Marx's critique of political economy, let alone talk about a revolutionary class. And stripped of these 'traditional' organizational forms and theoretical claims, what is left but anarchism? Both books aim to fill out some of the anarchist claims and positions within the broader context of the ACM. That they both fail to do so, and in fairly similar ways, is testament to the short distance anarchism has travelled since the nineteenth century. The contradictions, absences, overstatements and ill-considered claims are too many to list; let me take just a few as indicative of the whole.

None of the essays in either book makes any attempt genuinely to engage with Marx or contemporary Marxism. The implicit assumption is that the battle against Marxism has been won, to the extent that little more needs to be done beyond repeating the constant refrain that Marxism's problem is that it situates oppression in one basic problematic – capital. But this is never set alongside the fact that the ACM appears to situate itself within this very problematic – at the end of the day, it defines itself as anti-capitalist. Yet despite being anti-capitalist, the essays eschew anything that might be called a *critique* of capital. Instead, they oscillate between listing the problems generated by capital – poverty, starvation, etc. – but without explaining why these occur, and simply reiterating anarchist commonplaces regarding authority, oppression and the good life. To be sure, some big names (mostly from within poststructuralism and virtually always read through the filter of Todd May's *Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism*, 1994) are wheeled on to offer up some alternatives, but an actual critique of capital is the last thing on anyone's mind. At the same time, and presumably as a further way of distancing itself from Marxism, the claim is often made that the ACM is 'explicitly anti-political' – although we are told that the movement aims to 'construct power relationships that can be lived with', which sounds very much like a traditional view of 'political' to me. No assessment is made of what a non-political anti-

capitalism might actually achieve; no consideration is given to whether those in favour of capitalism might see anti-capitalism as 'unpolitical'.

By 'non-political' the writers presumably mean that the ACM engages in a whole range of practices that had for some time been sidelined. This does generate some interesting discussions. It is good to read about the 'Art Bi-pass', SHAG (Super Heroes Against Eugenics) and the politics of carnival. But in each case either the writing never develops a sustained or coherent position, or it ends in a position which is far from being anti-capitalist. Thus one writer suggests that the taking of narcotics can constitute a form of radical opposition, a self-determined recreational resistance and thus a rejection of the very organization of capitalist reality. Maybe. But the taking of narcotics can also constitute a form of stupidity, a self-obsessed egotism and acceptance of the very organization of capitalist reality. The chapter in question, 'What did you do in the Drug War, Daddy?' in the Purkis and Bowen collection, ends by taking a libertarian line on drugs. Anarchist it may be, anti-capitalist it certainly isn't. This is perhaps symptomatic of a more general problem, which is that the target of many of the essays is not capitalism at all, but a whole range of recent 'bad things' that are lumped together under the label 'neo-liberalism'. The running assumption seems to be that it is the 'neo' that is the problem, with the implication that if only we could get back to the days of traditional liberalism then everything would be alright.

The incoherence of the new anarchism that is said to be emerging here comes when one traces themes across the two books. Bakhtin, for example, appears in both collections, as the most important writer on carnival as political practice, but also because of his supposedly scatological celebration of life. The claim is made that his recognition of 'sex, shit, birth, death, eating, etc. [as] part of the cycle of life' was based on a more fundamental affinity with 'fertile life'. This is intended to draw out the question of nature as a philosophical issue and to suggest a potentially emancipatory rejection of the mind-matter division in favour of a celebration of the materiality and fleshiness of human existence. And yet at the same time the question of spirituality crops up throughout the volumes. We are reminded that anarchists are strongly against 'religion', yet also informed that there is a growing tendency for activists in the ACM to call themselves 'spiritual'. The problems involved with 'religion' are thus circumvented by changing the term while simultaneously accepting its central assumption – that we need this thing called 'spirituality'. This new

spirituality is then suggested as a basis for the possible re-enchantment of the world, to be achieved through a variety of processes and practices.

At the most mundane level, spirituality can act as a potential ‘technology of the self’ – the Foucauldian trope here concealing more than it reveals. At another level, the spirituality is said to involve a range of ‘healing arts’ which might then reorient us towards the earth via a new ‘ecomagic’ harnessing nature’s divine powers and thus allowing us to ‘heal the earth’. Finally, this spirituality is said to open the movement to various myths and beliefs. For example, ‘one popular myth [within the movement] prophesies that a time will come when children of the white people will come and seek the wisdom of the “Elders”, wearing long hair and beads’. It’s not clear quite how consciously Sorelian this talk of myths is intended to be, but one can only hope that for the sake of the unity of the ACM the long hair of the Elders won’t get trailed in the shit of the Bakhtinians.

In their introduction to *Changing Anarchism* Purkis and Bowen claim that for too long anarchists ‘have been burdened by embarrassingly simplistic, redundant visions of political analysis and engagement’. These books suggest that little has changed. On the other hand, perhaps that’s not entirely true. In February 2002, Brian Paddick, then the Brixton police chief, commented that the idea of anarchism had always appealed to him, based as it is on the innate goodness of the individual which has been corrupted by the system. His comments are repeated by Bowen and Purkis and are treated with sufficient weight for Paddick to be given an entry in the glossary to their book, roughly midway between ‘Bakunin’ and ‘Zapatistas’. So maybe some things have changed. But if it involves quoting coppers approvingly, the change might not be for the better.

Mark Neocleous

Something missing

Renaud Barbaras, *The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology*, trans. and intro. Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawler, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, xxxiv + 332 pp., £52.00 hb., £18.95 pb., 0 253 343550 hb., 1 800 842 6796 pb.

Although it deals centrally with issues of praxis and the self-constituting nature of social being, this account of Merleau-Ponty’s oeuvre eschews any reference to

his encounter with Marxism and, moreover, barely acknowledges the influence of Hegel. This encapsulates the continuing marginality of Merleau-Ponty to radical currents of thought. Merleau-Ponty is a writer whose dominant appropriation is via the academy rather than the *engagé*. Further, despite the scope of his intellectual trajectory Merleau-Ponty remains in the shadows of, first, Sartre and latterly Derrida.

The off-centre character of his reception does, however, strangely chime with Merleau-Ponty’s intellectual preoccupations. The ec-centric is characteristic of his view of the self-mediation of the subject in the world. Rather than taking theory as a point of departure, phenomenological reading addresses clues or pointers provided by the style and strategies – not the overt claims – found within a text and in this way arrives at its sense and object. Hence such a reading is, as Barbaras argues, grounded in contingency.

Sense in the early work is arrived at via perception, and in the later through bodily apprehension, sensibility. The relationship between sense and perception as phenomenal transcendence in the *Phenomenology of Perception* and later between sense and its expression, which is taken as an aspect of *being*, are both seen as tensions between a way of arriving and its end result, a situating of objects or speech which produces intersubjectivity, an opening on the world. Intentionality is delineated in successive modes of incompleteness. This underlying contingency – that is, the situatedness of ontological outcomes, whether in the earlier mode of perception, or subsequently in expression – renders any comparison with the ineffability of Heideggerian Being otiose.

The chiasm between theory and reality is for Merleau-Ponty only negotiable via the order of the *Lebenswelt*, the lifeworld, which at once defies philosophical reflection and yet demands understanding via examination of its indexical, background nature in philosophical speech. Such a philosophy, in and of the *Lebenswelt*, calls for a deconstruction in the form of what it might be to *do* philosophy – that is, how philosophy is *lived* as the – in Garfinkel’s phrase – ‘practically untellable’ of its production. Barbaras’s emphasis on philosophy as an interrogation of the lifeworld problematizes the text by reintroducing the chiasm. Nonetheless this project is perhaps in tune with Lefebvre’s recognition of the different but linked rhythms and routines which structure official and everyday existence, providing a fundamental heterogeneity between theory and its everyday practical interpretation. Similarly, for Merleau-Ponty, the lifeworld contains a ‘wild logos’ via which expression

is arrived at, underlining the contingency with which theory comes to be practically articulated.

This ellipsis in speech between conception and the way it is arrived at is marked both via Merleau-Ponty's approach to language and communication and in his work on the sensibility of the body. In *Prose of the World* the distinction between operative and constitutive moments of an utterance is emblematic of this point. The sense of an expression cannot be conveyed constitutively but only through the operative mode of language, its doing and showing which moves towards a completion/goal. This incompleteness demonstrates the dependence of language on its base in the lifeworld of practical routine and the impossibility of closure in the rationalist style. By contrast to rationalism, in *Prose of the World* it is the positivity of utterances that grounds their theoretical claims. Their meaning can never be complete because it is mediated by their performance, which is an aspect of the world rather than of theory. Hence concepts and theories function metonymically – that is, connectively in the operative mode of utterances. They work *prepositionally* rather than *propositionally*, their identifications serve as a series of indicators rather than an overarching system of classification. As such, operatively, theories demonstrate their truth situationally; the *specificity* of the world speaks through them.

For Merleau-Ponty this positivity of utterances is to be distinguished from the factual claims of *positivism*. Here the utterance qua theoretical reflection renders a *mute* world intelligible. Language is the *transparent* medium through which the world is understood rather than being grasped as an aspect of being. As a result, we have no sense of how such a reflection is *produced*. At the other end of the spectrum is the flat ontology of the constructionists where language constitutes the world. Both these cases entail linguistic conventionalism and hence closure to the world. Phenomenology is positioned by its rejection of the Western philosophical tradition of dualism to offer a way out of this problem of inherent circularity, as Barbaras suggests, through the idea that expression is a moment of being rather than split off from it.

The theoreticist orientation in both empiricism and constructionism ignores the variation of language and its intersecting viewpoints which are conveyed when we speak, whether we see this or not. The truth of an utterance is therefore conveyed by these equivalences rather than by its overt claims as these connections or self-evidences are the point of articulation of language with the world. Articulation is seen as the institution of language as sedimented praxis, which is referred

back by Merleau-Ponty to Husserl's *The Origin of Geometry*, where the latter argued that meaning is sedimented as a form of writing or inscription which gives utterance a determinate sense. It may be possible to understand this in the way Husserl's contemporary and correspondent Frege did, as expression of sense depending on the *sentential* nature of utterances. That is, that thoughts are always structured according to certain linguistic rules involving the way that a topic/subject is predicated, but to grasp the way predication works in any given situation always involves an appeal to other predications sedimented within the context of the speaker, the mute or indexical features (being) expressed in the performance of the utterance. Sense or intentionality is always overdetermined by the structural effects of its previous articulations (which are continuously revived in the ongoing history of articulation's renewal).

Utterances involve the appropriation and consequent sedimentation of lived experience. Utterance is sedimentation in its self-evidencing of the speaker's position with that of the world. Aspects of a culture surface from their muteness transitorily in their appropriation by speakers in judgement and then, via the equivalencing of their variations with the already sedimented culture, they are deposited into muteness. It is clear from this account that sedimentation refers not to geological stasis, 'stocks of knowledge', as in Schutz's account, but to elements of culture that are continuously lived without judgement. Sedimented praxis is the ongoing performance of the past in the present. The utterance appropriated as the muteness of being again emphasizes Merleau-Ponty's break with dualism.

The sub-theme in the praxis-oriented later work which is central to Barbaras's overall reading is that communication is already mediated by what it consciously mediates to us – the latter traditionally seen as a starting point for interpretation. In *The Visible and the Invisible* the body is seen as a third term within which self and world are already enfolded. The relation of the body to things and others expresses their existence and in doing so situates our consciousness of them. As such, this mode of relating expresses the positivity – the objectivity or truth – of the subject's agency.

One way in which Merleau-Ponty approaches this theme is through the example of touching our own bodies. The subject's sensibility enables it to grasp itself as an exteriority. The body tells us things: we have aches, pains, tiredness; it produces and reacts to body language, we feel uncomfortable, and so on. The body's movement through space and time enables us to

grasp agents as enfolded in the wider historical process and in this respect subjects are incarnations of the lines of force existing in any historical conjuncture. The body in its movements reveals the movement of the body as an expression of the times in which it lives. This concretization of historical conditions contrasts with the Foucauldian treatment of the body as a docile abstraction on which institutional lines of force operate, instantiating dualism in the form of brute corporeality versus shaping discursive knowledge/power. The constructionist body cannot tell us any thing we don't know *a priori*.

The parallels with *Prose of the World* are clear. The body *is* expression. It is the means through which the world is appropriated, *made flesh*, given an individuated, situated expression. As such the body is also the ground of sense, its sensibility the template for construction of projects possible in its situation. Consequently, lines of force emanate from the body and institutional structures congeal around these, rather than the body being inscribed within the latter's discourse. The body as expression gives a different order of ontological priority from constructionism, as its intentionality always both exceeds and mediates institutional inscription.

These ideas are clearly elaborated by Barbaras, but it could never be guessed from a reading of his book that Merleau-Ponty developed his conception of the self-mediatedness of being from his engagement with Marxism and its post-Hegel/Feuerbachian notions of intersubjectivity and self-constitution, or that his ideas about the self-mediation of power relations owe anything to Hegel's observations on the master-slave dialectic. The significance of Marx's *18th Brumaire* for Merleau-Ponty's approach to the contingency and 'terror' accompanying all historical projects is likewise sedimented history. Neither would one have guessed that the subject of this work was the collaborator of Sartre on *Les Temps Modernes*. For a narrative of situation and institution this is a strangely disembodied account. It omits the everyday for another kind of reduction.

For Barbaras the role of philosophy towards the life-world is to unfold experience, to make its content more explicit, to reveal the prepositional content enfolded within it. However, this ignores the way philosophy enters the lifeworld, becomes part of experience, and then, as such, interrupts its retrieval from the margins of theory. It seems that an opportunity to show the radical potential of the wild logos has been missed, for it is precisely in the appropriation of lived experience, the *performativity* of theory, that the lineaments of the

world *in* theory can be discerned. It is here that theory becomes an event, as the situationists, for example, claimed.

Howard Feather

No such thing

Jeffrey A. Schaler, ed., *Szasz under Fire: The Psychiatric Abolitionist Faces His Critics*, Open Court, La Salle IL, 2004. 472 pp., £19.75 pb., 0 8126 9568 2.

Despite all the efforts towards human rights and human emancipation, one group still systematically suppressed is those individuals diagnosed in the medical jargon as being 'mentally ill' and in their daily lives equally slandered as 'ill' or 'insane'. Human rights and citizens' rights in general do not apply to them, because at practically any time they can be locked up, tied up and subjected to mind-altering drugs. Even the use of electric shocks against the will of 'the patient' is still practised. Physicians define them as 'subhuman' on the assumption of a changed biology and in this they regularly obtain the support of judges, whose legal measures give the appearance of legitimacy. The fact that this systematic dehumanizing found its climax in the 'Aktion T4' extermination by doctors in the Nazi era is well known. Less known is that this action was the prelude to and the blueprint for the extermination camps in Poland which followed. As Thomas Szasz put it in an interview in *The New Physician* in 1969:

'Schizophrenia' is a strategic label as 'Jew' was in Nazi Germany. If you want to exclude people from the social order, you must justify this to others, but especially to yourself. So you invent a justificatory rhetoric. That's what the really nasty psychiatric words are all about: they are justificatory rhetoric, labelling a package 'garbage', it means 'take it away! Get it out of my sight!' etc. That's what the word 'Jew' meant in Nazi Germany; it did not mean a person with a certain kind of religious belief. It meant 'vermin!', 'gas him!' I am afraid that 'schizophrenic' and 'sociopathic personality' and many other psychiatric diagnostic terms mean exactly the same thing; they mean 'human garbage,' 'take him away!', 'get him out of my sight.'

A cartel of power commits these crimes and organizes them from the universities. There, the agents of the system are indoctrinated, the connections are made from physicians to the politicians, the media and the legal system, and those in charge are recruited. The gears are lubricated by the profits of the drug companies, which gladly assist the villains with

substantial funds. One purpose is to counteract any criticism before it reaches a certain level and support any campaign which increases the number of people forcibly made dependent on the system.

The camouflage used by academics is the myth that knowledge produced in universities is committed to the 'truth', when in fact it is all about the occupation of positions of power. There are, however, a few exceptions: for example, Foucault and Szasz. Around 1961 both uncovered and publicized a fundamental flaw in the epistemic structure: that there is no such thing as 'mental illness'; rather, 'insanity' is a medical fairytale told in order to extenuate the repression.

The typical response to this unwanted truth was to ignore it completely. Where that doesn't work, disciplining and marginalization are used. One is slandered and even incriminated. After the '68 rebellion this slowly changed and in the 1970s autonomous groups were created and began to speak publicly about these cruelties and started to operate politically. This stage of development reached its zenith in the Foucault Tribunal. This public tribunal, and its international jury comprising survivors with Kate Millett as their spokeswoman, succeeded in reaching a verdict condemning coercive psychiatry using human rights as a yardstick for their judgement. Thomas Szasz delivered the indictment, and the defendants of the system were neither able to propose a settlement, nor capable of making a convincing argument of exoneration.

The Russell Tribunal, which took place three years later, confirmed this judgement, once again with Szasz as a brilliant prosecutor. These events ended the phase of the 'denial defence' and in my opinion heralded the definite decline of the psychiatric system. At the symposium of the University of Syracuse in honour of Thomas Szasz on his 80th birthday, at which the chair of the Department of Psychiatry, Mantosh Dewan, praised Szasz in the highest terms, calling him 'our gem!' Germany, which was once at the forefront of crimes against humanity, now seems to lead the social disassembly of medical coercion.

Soon all advanced directives about treatment (proposed by Szasz in 1982 as a 'Psychiatric Will') will be legally binding, even if the person can no longer express him/herself, is unable to consent, has no illness insight or is considered incompetent, as long as active killing is not requested. Each coerced diagnosis against such a directive would become a violation of the fundamental rights of informal self-determination. A psychiatric incarceration becomes a sanctioned deprivation of liberty. Any coercive treatment would be a bodily injury, indeed torture. The further development

of such legislation throughout the European Union can hardly be stopped.

Szasz under Fire contains critical essays by thirteen prominent academic defenders of the system, each answering to one of Szasz's theses, to which he replies. Kaleidoscopically different premisses, conclusions and insinuations on the following topics are elucidated: the reality of mentally illness, physician-assisted suicide, the right to drugs, moral and medical ethic, civil commitment and the insanity defence.

Szasz's replies are to the point, sometimes full of polemic and irony but always based on the libertarian ground of his thinking. To give just one example:

Kendell suggests that I would have been more successful if I had been satisfied with aiming to reform psychiatry. But I did not want to reform psychiatry. Why? Because it was clear to me then – and it ought to be painfully clear to everyone today – that psychiatry and coercion are locked in a deadly embrace, that psychiatry is synonymous with psychiatric slavery. Psychiatry and coercion are like conjoined twins sharing a single heart: they cannot be separated without killing at least one.

The book is suitable not only for connoisseurs of Szasz; it offers an overview of all Szasz's most important theses. Beyond that it contains a complete bibliography of his 646 publications. Another reason for reading it is the 'Autobiographical Sketch' included, charting his development up to his thirty-sixth birthday, showing how distrustful he was from the very beginning of the notion of 'mental illness'.

To understand the importance of Szasz's work, we need to take into account its far-reaching consequences for epistemic questions in philosophy: it could turn out that the foundations of the theology of science are built on quicksand. If there is no such thing as 'mental illness' in principle, then all experience has to be valued in equal terms. Experience may be impractical it but must not be subject to discrimination.

Currently, experience is only validated if it is deemed non-hallucinatory. Thus the sword of power has divided experience into the insane experience of the madman and the sane experience of the others. However, as soon as the distorting lens of power starts to crack, natural science loses its firm standing and begins to fall. An uncertainty principle on a far broader scale would have to be accepted. By his new interpretation of Marx's statement, 'The free development of each is the condition for the free development of all', Szasz changed the world.

Rene Talbot