

English Philosophy in the Fifties

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If you asked me when was the best time for philosophy in England in the twentieth century – for professional, academic philosophy, that is – I would answer: the fifties, without a doubt. And: the fifties, alas. Under the leadership of Gilbert Ryle and J.L. Austin, the career philosophers of that period had their fair share of bigotry and evasiveness of course; but they also faced up honestly and resourcefully to some large and abidingly important theoretical issues. Their headquarters were at that bastion of snobbery and reaction, Oxford University; and by today's standards they were shameless about their social selectness. They also helped philosophy on its sad journey towards being an exclusively universitarian activity. But still, many of them tried to write seriously and unpatronisingly for a larger public, and some of them did it with outstanding success. And collectively they resisted the temptations of sophisticated specialisation – the twin troughs of a blinkered technical expertise which apes the manners of a normal scientific research discipline, and total immersion in the exposition and advocacy of one or two favourite authors. Like any other bunch of academics, they could of course be trivial, arrogant, clubbish and boring; but under the banner of a 'revolution in philosophy' they generated a collective verve and excitement in English professional philosophy which has no rival in the twentieth century.*

In what follows I have tried to piece together their story from a range of social, institutional, political, personal, cultural and theoretical materials. If I give less space than I might to the most celebrated writings from the period, this is not in order to foreground social context at the expense of theoretical content. Nor is it that I think these books are not worth reading. On the contrary: but it is because the philosophical achievements of those years – as of any other, I expect – have as much to do with sets of social habits,

possibly unconscious, as with the contents of the books which were destined to become classics. For these reasons, I have not engaged with the high-altitude synoptic critiques – notably those of Marcuse and Anderson – to which Oxford philosophy has been subjected, either.¹

The story I tell is meant to be an argument as well as a factual record. It shows that although the proponents of the Oxford philosophical revolution prided themselves on their clarity, they never managed to be clear about what their revolution amounted to. In itself this is not remarkable, perhaps; but what is strange is that they were not at all bothered by what was, one might have thought, quite an important failure. This nonchalance corresponded, I believe, to their public-school style – regressive, insiderish, and disconcertingly frivolous. But the deliquescent social and theoretical manner, repellant as some of us may find it, was also able, it seems, to open out onto some of the alpine intellectual vistas of philosophy at its best.

From a commercial point of view, English philosophy in the 1950s was dominated by a single book. In terms of market success, coverage in the high-brow weeklies, and fame in the popular media, it completely outclassed the competition. The entire print-run of 5000 copies was sold on publication day, 28 May 1956, and a further 15,000 in the next six months.² According to the *Daily Mail*, it was enjoying 'the most rapturous reception of any book since the war'.³ The *Evening News* headlined 'A Major Writer – and He's 24'. A new philosophical genius was about to burst on the scene, and he was going to 'shock the arid little academic philosophers a good deal'.⁴

The brilliant young man was sponsored by what may be called the inheritors of the spirit of the Bloomsbury Group. They were not academics, but – in imagination at least – independent intellectuals, living off inherited wealth supplemented by their writing. If they had had a university education, they would boast of having learnt nothing from it. They regarded professional erudition, and the trades of teaching or research, as tedious and degrading. Above all, they prided themselves on their commanding view of international cultural modernity. In fact they could be

* This is an adapted translation of an article written for a seminar on philosophy in the fifties held in Paris in March 1988. A bewilderingly truncated version was published in the proceedings (Pierre Bourdieu et al., *Les enjeux philosophiques des années 50*, Paris, Centre Georges Pompidou, 1989), and a brief summary in the *Times Higher Education Supplement*, 10 March 1989.

suspected of an inverted cultural nationalism. The idea of 'English culture' struck them as pretty laughable. As far as they were concerned, culture meant Europe, and especially France. And French culture, as they understood it, was essentially philosophical, comprising large reflections on the human condition, of a kind that English brains seemed incapable of producing.

During the fifties, the Bloomsburys controlled most of the machinery of literary reception in England, especially in the Sunday papers, the literary periodicals (such as *Encounter*, edited by Stephen Spender, and *The London Magazine*, edited by John Lehmann), and the *Times Literary Supplement*.⁵ And they all did what they could to support their philosophical prodigy. His book was dedicated to Angus Wilson, and Edith Sitwell wrote a pre-publication puff for the 'astonishing' work of this 'truly great writer'. Cyril Connolly's review spoke of 'one of the most remarkable first books I have read for a long time'. Elizabeth Bowen was 'thunderstruck' by the intelligence of the 'brilliant' new philosopher; V.S. Pritchett found the book 'dashing, learned and exact'; and Kenneth Walker said it was 'masterly' and 'the most remarkable book on which the reviewer has ever had to pass judgement'.⁶ Philip Toynbee called it 'an exhaustive and luminously intelligent study ... of a kind which is too rare in England'. It was the sort of book, in fact, that you might expect in France; 'and what makes the book truly astounding is that its alarmingly well-read author is only twenty-four years old'.⁷

It certainly was an unusual work. It gathered diverse information about a range of real and fictional characters – T.E. Lawrence, Nijinsky, van Gogh, Nietzsche, William Blake, Bernard Shaw, and the protagonists of novels by Barbusse, Sartre, Camus, Hemingway, Joyce, Hesse and Dostoevsky – in order to construct a composite portrait of the hero of our time: the exile, the stranger, the marginal. He was the sort of man (and it was definitely a man's world) who insisted on posing deep questions, concerning 'the problem of *pattern or purpose* in life'. He was 'the man who sees "too deep and too much"'. He could not 'consider his own existence or anyone else's *necessary*'. He was a loner, 'cut off from other people by an intelligence that ruthlessly destroys their values'. In the past, sad to say, such heroes had always been misunderstood, not only by others but also by themselves. Today, however, it was at last possible to penetrate the mysteries of their 'religious existentialism' and 'anti-humanism': 'if they had known themselves as well as we know them, their lives need not have been tragic'. From now on these spiritual exiles were destined to occupy the centre of the cultural stage.⁸

The author's title for the book was *The Pain Threshold*, but the publisher changed it to *The Outsider*, thus making an adroit allusion to Camus, whose novel of 1942, *L'étranger*, had been published in English under the same title in 1946. It was an astute choice, because *outsider* could serve as a name for the type of hero depicted in the book, and a byword for all those who wanted to identify with him.


The author of *The Outsider* was Colin Wilson. Wilson was born into a poor family in Leicester in 1931, and had

little formal education. From the age of sixteen, he earned his living as an unskilled factory worker. He kept a journal, and spent all his spare time reading. He married young, and dreamed of becoming a writer some day. Eventually he left home and set out for London. At night, he slept on Hampstead Heath; by day, he laboured on his masterpiece in the British Museum.

Wilson's success was part of a larger media confection: the phenomenon of the 'angry young man'. The phrase, which was launched six weeks after *The Outsider* was published, began as part of the publicity for a flagging production of John Osborne's *Look Back in Anger* at the Royal Court Theatre.⁹ It was picked up in the *Evening Standard*, and then used by Osborne in a *Panorama* programme on BBC TV on 9 July. It caught on as a label not only for Wilson and Osborne, but also for the novelists Kingsley Amis (*Lucky Jim*, 1954) and John Wain (*Hurry on Down*, 1953). The idea of the angry young man was that he was born to a working-class family in the early 1930s; he was too young to fight in the war, but he benefited not only from the Welfare State instituted by the Labour Government of 1945, but also from the system of Grammar Schools set up under the Butler Education Act of 1944, offering free academic education to children who passed an intelligence test at the age of eleven. After Grammar School, the angry young man would probably have gone to university, but only a modern provincial 'redbrick', not Oxford or Cambridge.¹⁰

It could be no surprise to the Bloomsburys that such young men were lazy, loutish, and vindictive. As early as 1948, T.S. Eliot had warned against the 'headlong rush to educate everybody' which was 'destroying our ancient edifices to make ready the ground upon which the barbarian nomads of the future will encamp in their mechanised caravans'.¹¹ It was the same sort of people who would demonstrate against intervention at Suez in 1956, and who formed the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in 1958.

The angry young man seemed to have history on his side, however. An American commentator envied him, saying



The Brains Trust, 1961.

that 'the young British writer has the inestimable advantage of representing a new class'. The angry young man was on his way to taking over the 'the culture of his country' from the old Bloomsburys with their 'blend of homosexual sensibility, upper class aloofness, liberal politics, and avant-garde literary devices'. He was in the process of liberating literature 'from the tyranny of a taste based on a world of wealth and leisure which has become quite unreal'.¹²

The view from Bloomsbury connected the angry young men with the moral fervour which F.R. Leavis had brought to the teaching of English Literature at Cambridge University since the 1930s, and which had created many of the most influential teachers in the Grammar Schools: provincial, sincere, laborious, and earnest.¹³ These schoolmasters knew nothing of 'the continent' – its languages, its opera houses, its galleries, its wines, its cooking, its literatures, its landscapes. They drank warm beer in squalid pubs, and doted on dull English humanistic realism as if international modernism had never happened. The angry young man, in short, represented everything in the England of the fifties which offended and alarmed the Bloomsburys.

Of course this imaginary sociology was quite inaccurate: the Bloomsburys were not necessarily rich, and many of the angry young men were prosperous enough, and had been educated at public school and Oxbridge. It nevertheless helped define some of the issues at stake in the cultural controversies of the time. Participants could advertise their allegiances by how they chose to eat, drink, dress, speak or make love. The angry young man would have a loud, rough voice with a regional accent, and he would prefer the Anglo-saxon to the latinate parts of the English language. The Bloomsburys, however, would speak in a soft, precise, upper-class and melodious voice and they would bestrew their discourse with bits of French. They saw themselves as representatives of *belles lettres*; they were the *ancien régime*, the 'candelabra and wine *rentier* writers ... wincing with distaste ... quivering with *nuance*'.¹⁴ Evelyn Waugh discovered belatedly that the Butler Education Act had 'nothing at all to do with the training of male indoor-servants' but provided instead for 'the free distribution of university degrees to the deserving poor'. The 'grim young people' of '*l'école de Butler*,' as he called it, were 'coming off the assembly lines in their hundreds every year', and, worst of all, they were now 'finding employment as critics, even as poets and novelists'.¹⁵

In reality, a fascination with 'French culture' was common amongst the younger English writers of the fifties. Plenty of recent French novels and plays were available in translation; but the real focus of interest was philosophy, which meant the work of the 'existentialists' – especially Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Camus and Merleau-Ponty. From the mid forties onwards, there were plenty of breathless primers about what Jean Wahl called 'The Philosophical School of Paris',¹⁶ and numerous translations of serious works of philosophy too.¹⁷ Several English novelists nourished themselves on French philosophy – authors like Angus Wilson, William Golding, Anthony Burgess, Muriel Spark, and Iris Murdoch. It gave them the idea of writing about

fundamental and extreme human situations; and as Iris Murdoch put it in 1950, in an article on the future of the novel, it meant the death of '*la littérature morale*' and the dawn of the era of '*la littérature métaphysique*'.¹⁸

The Outsider pleased the Bloomsburys because it seemed to prove that, despite their fears, the *école de Butler* included true intellectuals who not only loved French philosophical culture, but also, from the bottom of their hearts, scorned English provincialism and English academic life. Colin Wilson was a native outsider, a home-grown existentialist. As Philip Toynbee put it, Wilson had beaten the French at their own game, and made 'a real contribution to our understanding of our present predicament'.¹⁹ The *Evening News* alluded to fears that 'the Welfare State has killed the thoughtful man by too much kindness, seducing him from the wholehearted pursuit of his meditative ideal'. The success of *The Outsider* reassured them: 'Thank God', they said, 'it hasn't'.²⁰

The first book on this philosophical phenomenon of the fifties appeared in 1958. In *The Angry Decade*, Kenneth Allsop lamented the British inability to produce intellectual heroes *à la française*. Britain was 'infuriatingly innocent of the facts of life', and 'insulated' from vital currents of European thought. 'By the time they reach Britain, ideas and intellectual argument are muddled,' Allsop said: 'they get too shaken up in transit'. But Colin Wilson had broken this pattern: he had recognised the greatness of 'men like Sartre, Camus and Beckett, and the German Hermann Hesse.' He had 'tasted the deep vein of continental nihilism and pessimism'.²¹ England's own existentialist concurred: in laying his plans for 'the new anti-humanist epoch' he had to acknowledge that 'England is totally unaware of these problems; intellectually, we have always been the most backward country in the world'.²²

The success of *The Outsider* did not last long. Perhaps his Bloomsbury sponsors began to fear that Wilson's devotion to natural 'leaders' and his belief that the mentally ill ought to be shot were not after all the *dernier cri* of continental philosophical depth.²³ Certainly they suspected that the vulgar appeal of Wilson – the 'literary Elvis Presley' and 'philosophical Tommy Steele,' with his band of 'Spotty Nietzscheans' – was getting out of hand.²⁴

Still, the splash made by *The Outsider* proved that Colin Wilson was right about one thing: English philosophical culture must have been in a sorry state if such a clumsy book could be acclaimed by the literary and intellectual élite. But it is not necessary to invoke a national incapacity for philosophy in order to explain this weakness. The political organisations which had fostered a mass interest in 'proletarian philosophy' between the wars were moribund.²⁵ The British (later Royal) Institute of Philosophy, founded by Lord Balfour in 1925 to encourage the popularisation of an idealist political philosophy of 'citizenship', had only thousand members, but they were mostly elderly and the Institute's activities had an air of pastness, which even the great efforts of its president, Viscount Samuel – elder

statesman and philosophical amateur, author of *Belief and Action: An Everyday Philosophy* (1937) – were unable to remove.²⁶

After the second World War, English philosophy had retreated more and more from civil society, to isolate itself in educational institutions.²⁷ It had almost no presence in secondary schools, however, and even in the universities – which were peripheral in any case, educating less than 4 per cent of the age-group at the beginning of the fifties – it was only a minor discipline. In 1952, the two professional philosophical organisations – the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society – had world-wide memberships of 477 and 287 respectively.²⁸

The philosophical faculty of Oxford University, however, was an exception. With about fifty teachers in 1950, distributed over some thirty colleges, it was by far the largest in England. (It was, indeed, the largest in the British Isles; but Scotland, Ireland, and, to some extent, Wales maintained their own traditions, and my story is only about England.) In 1950 there were about three hundred students who did some philosophy in their BA exams at Oxford – one candidate in six. None of them was a specialist however: the only way Oxford undergraduates could study philosophy was by following either the 'Greats' course, where they would spend at least half their time on Greek and Latin classics, or the PPE or PPP course ('Modern Greats'), where they spent at least half their time on Politics, Economics, Psychology or Physiology. And there were only about a dozen 'graduate students' – mostly Americans – studying philosophy for the new-fangled qualifications of BPhil and DPhil.²⁹

Cambridge University had two professors of philosophy in 1950, and four lecturers. Each year about six students took the philosophy exam (Moral Sciences Part II). In addition there were, as at Oxford, about ten graduate students. Six hundred students sat University of London exams in arts subjects in 1951, but only eight specialised in philosophy. (On the other hand, hundreds of student-teachers took the unprestigious exam in Philosophy of Education.) Finally, the nine independent 'civic' universities in England (Birmingham, Bristol, Durham, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Nottingham, Reading and Sheffield) each had a professor of philosophy, and two or three lecturers.³⁰

There were therefore about two hundred philosophy teachers in England at the beginning of the fifties (a quarter of them in Oxford), and perhaps five hundred students a year sitting exams with a significant amount of philosophy in them. Postgraduate studies in philosophy hardly existed: there was no need for them as Universities were prepared to recruit new philosophy teachers on the basis of personal acquaintance and a BA degree. As A.J. Ayer was to say: 'Having a doctorate was nothing to be proud of, rather the reverse, since it implied that you had not been good enough to obtain an appointment' – 'at the worst to a post in some red-brick university' – 'on the strength of of your first degree'.³¹ Furthermore, the idea of philosophy as a field of academic research, rather than undergraduate teaching, did not command much support. If philosophy teachers wished

to pursue original inquiries, it would be as proud amateurs, in their long vacations or in retirement, rather than as part of their paid work.

So it is not surprising that the guardians of English high culture in the fifties were poorly informed about philosophy: it was not well represented even in the English universities. Still, Colin Wilson and the 'School of Paris' were not the only philosophers who received recognition in London literary circles; there were also a few English professional philosophers with a public reputation.

There was A.J. Ayer, for example, who was a professor in London at the time. He was born in 1910, and educated at Eton and Oxford. But his intellectual and political style made his peers suspicious of him. Like Colin Wilson, he wrote his first and most successful book when he was twenty-four. *Language, Truth and Logic* was published in a cheap format by the left-wing trade publisher Gollancz in 1936, and has sold better than any other English work of professional philosophy this century. Its doctrines were those of the 'Logical Positivists' of the Vienna Circle. Ayer's opening sentence stated bluntly that 'the traditional disputes of philosophers are, for the most part, as unwarranted as they are unfruitful.' His conclusion was that 'philosophy must develop into the logic of science' and that 'it is necessary for a philosopher to become a scientist ... if he is to make any substantial contribution towards the growth of human knowledge'.³²

Language, Truth and Logic was not liked by the philosophical establishment. H.J. Paton, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford, said that Ayer had 'exposed the nature of Logical Positivism, if I may so express myself, in all its naked horror.' Even twenty years later, he would 'hesitate to repeat in print some of the things said about him at the time'.³³ However, Ayer managed to make a vivid if imprecise impression on a wider public, who applauded him as a champion of modern scientific knowledge, and even of the oppressed social classes, against the deadly complacency of English cultural conservatism.

Visibly and audibly, Ayer modelled himself on Bertrand Russell. Russell was born in 1872 into the highest ranks of the English aristocracy, educated at home and then at Cambridge University. He wrote (with A.N. Whitehead) the most imposing English work of philosophy of the century, the *Principia Mathematica* (1910-13). His politics were openly radical: he was an atheist, a feminist, a partisan in theory and practice of free divorce, and creator of an experimental primary school. His pacifism cost him his job at Cambridge in 1916, and six months in prison in 1918. After that, he did not teach again in England except for lecturing in Cambridge from 1944 to 1949. But he wrote prolifically, always acting the part of the courageous non-conformist who has the nerve to ask a simple question, and so puncture the pompous bluster which shields social injustice from political criticism. The priggish cheek of the introduction to his *Sceptical Essays* – which 'captivated' the young Ayer in 1928 – is typical of him:

I wish to propose for the reader's favourable consideration a doctrine which may, I fear, appear wildly paradoxical and subversive. The doctrine in question is this: that it is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for supposing it true.³⁴

In 1950, Russell was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature, and throughout the following decade he continued to publicise his radicalism, especially following his participation in the creation of CND, which, in 1961, led to his second period in an English prison, this time at the age of 89.



A.J. Ayer in the early 1950s.

Ayer shared some of Russell's radicalism. He was divorced, and enjoyed a reputation as a womaniser. He advertised his atheism, his hatred of the Tories, and his active support for Labour in politics and Spurs in football. He played an important part in the Campaign for Homosexual Law Reform, though always keen to emphasise that he had no personal stake in the issue. He was naturally asked for his verdict on *The Outsider*, and was one of the few to be critical of it.³⁵ To the Bloomsburys, therefore, Ayer could be seen, with Leavis, as a pioneer of the conscientious gracelessness of the new generation.³⁶ In an anonymous leading article in 1957, the *Times Literary Supplement* tried to reassure its readers that Ayer's hostility to metaphysics was part of the now withered 'Leftist tendencies' of the thirties. In those days, thanks to *Language, Truth and Logic*, 'logical positivism successfully carried the red flag into the citadel of Oxford philosophy.' (And readers would recall that 'Marx himself had been a great enemy of metaphysics' too.) But now, at last, 'philosophy has been purged of any taint

of Leftism'.³⁷

Ayer's public fame as an iconoclastic radical clear-thinker from the same mould as Russell was secured by his participation in the BBC's *Brains Trust* programme, broadcast weekly first on radio, then on TV. In this capacity he also replaced the third English public professional philosopher of the post-war period, C.E.M. Joad. Joad was born in 1891, son of a provincial university teacher. He was educated at Oxford, entered the civil service, but left in 1930 to become head of the Philosophy Department at Birkbeck College, which gave evening courses to part-time students leading to London University degrees. Through his teaching there, and numerous plain and unimposing books, Joad introduced hundreds of people to Plato, Aristotle and Russell, and to general metaphysics conceived as a justification for mildly progressive politics and a protection against nihilistic scepticism. During the 1940s his work on the radio version of the *Brains Trust*, with his celebrated catch-phrase 'it depends what you mean by ...' gave many listeners their only inkling of the procedures of professional philosophy.

But Joad was not respected by his colleagues. He was proud of his doctorate, and liked to be called 'Dr Joad', which excited their humorous contempt. He naturally preferred to be called 'Professor', though he had no right to the title. People said he took all his ideas and phrases from Russell, who is reported to have refused to review his books because 'modesty forbids.' Russell despised him anyway, and deliberately mispronounced his name as 'Jo-ad', with two syllables, as if he were an old testament prophet.³⁸ Like the rest of the philosophical establishment, he was amused when, in 1948, the self-righteous Joad was convicted for travelling by train without a ticket – a disgrace which, in those days, precluded any further work for the BBC.

Russell, Ayer and Joad were by far the best-known English philosophers of the fifties – apart from Colin Wilson, that is. But Russell was already very old, and Joad had become ridiculous well before his death in 1953. Thus it became the common opinion that English philosophy was dominated by scientific Logical Positivism, and that the 'school of English philosophers' as Colin Wilson put it, was 'led by Professor Ayer'.³⁹ In fact, though, nearly all the energy of English academic philosophy in the fifties came from Oxford, where attitudes to Positivism and A.J. Ayer were cool, to say the least.

The dominant philosophical journal of the time was *Mind*, and at the end of 1947 the editorship was transferred from G.E. Moore, professor of philosophy at Cambridge, to Gilbert Ryle, who had been teaching at Oxford since 1924, and became a professor there in 1945. In the Oxford of the thirties, Ryle was the only teacher who kept in touch with contemporary European philosophy, and he criticised the broad idealism of R.G. Collingwood as hopelessly old-fashioned. Ryle was initially a follower of Croce, and in 1929 he published a perceptive essay on Heidegger's *Being and Time* – which, he claimed, 'marks a big advance in the application of the "Phenomenological Method" – though I

may say at once that I suspect that this advance is an advance towards disaster'.⁴⁰ Ryle also introduced his students to the work of Wittgenstein, who was then unknown in Oxford, and Jean Nicod; in 1932, it was Ryle who advised his student A.J. Ayer to go and study in Vienna.⁴¹

Once installed as editor of *Mind*, Ryle launched what looks in retrospect like a systematic campaign to conquer the commanding heights of philosophy in England and its cultural colonies. He gathered together about twenty colleagues in Oxford, all considerably younger than himself.⁴² By galvanising them into writing, especially about each other, in the pages of *Mind*, he gave English academic philosophy in the fifties an energy and sense of purpose such as it has never had before or since.

One of Ryle's main lieutenants was P.F. Strawson, who was to look back over the decade with extraordinary wistfulness. In an anonymous lead article in the *Times Literary Supplement* in 1960, he recalled that the late forties and early fifties had brought with them 'a new method, a new idea, in English philosophy'. The new technique opened up 'a whole world of infinite subtlety and diversity' and 'captured the imaginations' of many students just as university life was starting up again after the war. The revolutionary 'linguistic method' meant that 'a new level of refinement and accuracy in conceptual awareness' had become attainable. It seemed likely that all the problems of philosophy would soon be definitively solved, and people debated how long it would take to 'finish off' the subject completely. Philosophy at the beginning of the fifties was, in short, in 'a revolutionary situation in which every new move was delightfully subversive and liberating'.⁴³ One fine summer's day, in fact, a young man who was strolling down Turl Street in Oxford with the elderly Professor Paton was inspired to exclaim: 'Never has there been such a blooming of philosophy in the whole history of the world'. ('An almost lyrical remark', as Paton commented, and one with which he heartily disagreed.)⁴⁴

The golden age of Oxford philosophy opened with the publication of Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* in 1949, and was maintained until 1959, which saw the publication of Strawson's *Individuals*, and *Thought and Action* by Stuart Hampshire. But though the organisational leadership was provided by Ryle, the intellectual inspiration came from someone else – J.L. Austin, who was born in 1910. The happy period closed with his sudden death in February 1960. By that time, as Strawson put it, 'the revolutionary ferment had quite subsided'.⁴⁵

At the time of his death, the bibliography of Austin's works comprised – apart from a few reviews and a translation of Frege – just three lectures and four symposium papers, published over a period of twenty years. All were written in the shiniest prose, rhythmically ingratiating, mannered, and not afraid of seeming pleased with itself. (One lecture begins, for example: 'Are *cans* constitutionally iffy? Whenever, that is, we say that we can do something, is there an *if* in the offing – suppressed, it may be, but due nevertheless to appear when we set out our sentence in full or when we give an explanation of its meaning?'⁴⁶) Their arguments are

cryptic, however, and their conclusions elusive, so a reader is liable to end up unsure what Austin was really trying to say. But he was, in his way, a powerful lecturer – on account, paradoxically, of his asperity, and his complete lack of animation and humour. The journalist Ved Mehta attended one of his lectures, 'just out of curiosity,' and was 'entranced by his performance.'

To look at, he was a tall and thin man, a sort of parody on the dessicated don. His face suggested an osprey. His voice was flat and metallic, and seemed to be stuck on a note of disillusion. It sounded like a telephone speaking by itself. The day I was present, he opened his lecture by reading aloud a page from Ayer's *The Problem of Knowledge*. He read it in a convincing way, and then he began taking it to bits: 'What does he mean by this?' ... I was told that Austin performed like this every day, mocking, ridiculing, caricaturing, exaggerating, never flagging in his work of demolition, while the sceptical undergraduates watched, amused and bemused, for behind the performance – the legend – there was the voice of distilled intelligence.⁴⁷

For his disciple G.J. Warnock, Austin was a genius, even though he might not live up to the popular idea of one.

Nevertheless, he did succeed in haunting most of the philosophers in England, and to his colleagues it seemed that his terrifying intelligence was never at rest. Many of them used to wake up in the night with a vision of the stringy, wiry Austin standing over their pillow like a bird of prey. Their daylight hours were no better. They would write some philosophical sentences and then read them over as Austin might, in an expressionless, frigid voice, and their blood would run cold. Some of them were so intimidated by the mere fact of his existence that they weren't able to publish a single article during his lifetime'.⁴⁸

Like the Logical Positivists, the Oxford philosophers were united by a conviction that 'traditional metaphysics' was thoroughly misconceived. Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* embodied this approach by arguing that metaphysical positions such as Idealism and Materialism were based on a failure to see that mental words should be analysed in terms of 'dispositional' or hypothetical sentences as opposed to categorical ones. This analysis, which was supposed to dispose of the 'mythical' idea of the mind as 'a ghost in the machine,' provided the starting point for one of the central preoccupations of Oxford philosophy: '*Philosophy of Mind*' or '*Philosophical Psychology*.'

But the Oxfordians were also concerned with ethics (or rather *meta-ethics*, as some of them called it, since what was at stake was the status of ethical thinking in general, rather than any specific questions of right and wrong). Here the canonical text was R.M. Hare's *The Language of Morals* (1952). Hare maintained that, while the positivists were right to reject the idea that moral judgements could be

objectively true or false, they were wrong to conclude that moral principles were no more than projected private emotions. They had neglected the 'logic' of moral choice.

According to Hare, moral discourse consisted in 'prescriptions'. What differentiated moral prescriptions from ordinary ones was that they were 'universalisable': you had to apply them to everyone, including yourself. The beauty of this theory was that it combined a disillusionment with the idea of objective ethical values, with a belief in inescapable norms of behaviour. In fact Hare's theory was worked out while he was a prisoner of war in Singapore and Thailand: it was in this 'constantly disintegrating situation,' as he recalled, that he reached the conclusion that it was pointless and dangerous to look for a foundation for values in the facts of society or nature.⁴⁹ And his proposal had a distinctly progressivist aspect, since it was meant to destroy the metaphysical prejudices which encouraged people to 'rest content with their society's way of life'.⁵⁰ Hare's argument, however, drew not on endlessly debatable matters of prior political allegiance, but on sharp, dry considerations about the logic of moral language.

If there was a single dominant theme in English high culture in the fifties, it was a taste for austerity, and dislike of 'romantic reaction'.⁵¹ The rejection of metaphysics by the Oxford philosophers participated in the same puritanical mood. J.L. Austin called Ryle as 'a *philosophe terrible*', and Stuart Hampshire noticed that *The Concept of Mind* expressed 'a sharply personal and definite view of the world: a world of solid and manageable objects, without hidden recesses, each visibly functioning in its own appropriate pattern'.⁵² Iris Murdoch described Hare's *Language of Morals* as 'expressing the current position' because of its 'elimination of metaphysics from ethics'. It presented us, as she said with a certain awe, with 'a stripped and empty scene'.⁵³ These same attitudes could be detected, if one cared to look for them, in the Festival of Britain, the architecture of the Royal Festival Hall, and in Benjamin Britten's *Billy Budd*, the sculptures of Henry Moore, the paintings of Ben Nicholson, and the work of 'Movement' poets such as Philip Larkin.⁵⁴

The theme of austerity links the Oxford philosophers not only with Logical Positivism but also with the 'existentialism' that excited Colin Wilson and his admirers: in Ryle, as in Sartre, there was a rejection of the 'cartesian' conception of a cozy inner world of private subjectivity; in Hare, as in Camus, an affirmation of moral responsibility despite the collapse in the credibility of any metaphysical foundations for morals.

These similarities did not fail to strike Dr Joad, who in his last years became a Christian and felt obliged, as a consequence, to defend 'metaphysics' from the atheism, immoralism, nihilism and vulgarity which he saw spreading all around him. In 1948, he contributed a pseudonymous attack on Oxford philosophy to the *New Statesman*. In Oxford, he claimed, *Language, Truth and Logic* had 'acquired almost the status of a philosophic Bible'. This was fostering 'anti-aesthetic Philistinism,' and – though there might be 'no direct connection between Logical


Positivism and Fascism' – Joad expected that Fascism would soon come in to fill up 'the vacuum left by an absence of concern with fundamental human values'.

Ayer – who was more accustomed to accusations of Bolshevism than of Fascism – pointed out in reply that Fascists tended to favour metaphysics, but Joad responded by calling on philosophers to return to their traditional duty of 'revealing truth and increasing virtue'. If Ayer was right, he concluded dolefully, 'philosophy has no wisdom to offer the young and no light or leading to give to the times'.⁵⁵ In a book designed to substantiate his accusations, Joad argued that the tendency of Logical Positivism was to pull down all the barriers that ought to prevent a person from leading 'that life which Plato called "democratic" – a Bohemian in art; a Laodicean in affairs, a sceptic in philosophy and religion, an inconstant in love and a dilettante in life'.⁵⁶

But the adoption of attitudes for or against 'metaphysics', 'romanticism' and 'virtue' may not have had much to do with the real springs of initiative in English professional philosophy in the fifties. The Oxford philosophers were certainly opposed to metaphysics, but they were also, and more vehemently, opposed to positivism. Indeed Joad himself referred to 'a well-known Oxford historian' who claimed that Oxford philosophy spent all its time 'debating whether it was once correct to describe it as logical positivism'.⁵⁷ If Oxford philosophers advised their students to read *Language, Truth and Logic*, it was for its prose rather than its doctrines. Austin devoted several of his lecture courses to the destruction of Ayer, and G.J. Warnock fell into the language of defendants before McCarthy's Unamerican Activities Committee when he affirmed 'I would like to say in very plain terms that I am not, nor is any philosopher of my acquaintance, a Logical Positivist'.⁵⁸ A.J. Ayer himself would claim that – 'in a way' – Logical Positivism was 'a thing of the past'.⁵⁹ In 1959 he was at last given a Professorship at Oxford. Ryle openly told him that he had opposed the appointment; but Austin was not so frank. Hostility to luxuriant metaphysics was not, on its own, the secret of the Oxfordian revolution.⁶⁰

What the Oxford revolutionaries prided themselves on was not their hostility to metaphysics – which they shared with Logical Positivism and Existentialism – but the special kind of precaution they took against it: the 'linguistic' method. The idea was that metaphysics arose from misunderstandings of 'ordinary language'. The remedy would be to get a clearer picture of how 'ordinary language' really functions; and the only way to do this was through the techniques developed, above all, by J.L. Austin.

During the fifties, Austin presided over an informal seminar, the 'Saturday mornings', attended by a dozen or so of his younger colleagues (Ryle was thus excluded). Sometimes Austin led the discussion, and on other occasions they read together – Aristotle, Wittgenstein, Frege, Merleau-Ponty, Chomsky. Or rather they read brief passages, for Geoffrey Warnock recalled that 'Austin's favoured unit of discussion in such cases was the *sentence*, – not the paragraph



Peter Strawson, Oxford, 1975.

or chapter, still less the book as a whole'. His assumption was that books should be read 'by taking the sentences one at a time, thoroughly settling the sense (or hash) of each before proceeding to the next one'. (This method of reading, as Warnock admits, 'naturally worked out rather slowly'.) They also used to make lists of English words and phrases and try to discriminate their meanings: for example, *disposition*, *trait*, *propensity*, *characteristic*, *habit*, *inclination*, and *tendency*; or *tool*, *instrument*, *implement*, *utensil*, *appliance*, *equipment*, *apparatus*, *gear*, *kit*, *device*, and *gimmick*; or *highly*, and *very*. The idea was to reveal the intellectual riches that were sedimented in natural languages: 'How clever language is!' as H.P. Grice exclaimed.⁶¹ The Oxford philosophers would turn these riches to theoretical use, so confounding the traditional metaphysicians, who had not been aware of the pearls spread before them, and spurning the Logical Positivists too, who had turned away from ordinary language towards the false gods of science and formal logic.

The Austinian method was soon transformed, at Oxford, into a new discipline, *Philosophical Logic*, which formed the third part of Oxford philosophy, alongside Philosophy of Mind and Ethics. Its architect was P.F. Strawson, who defined its principles in an essay which appeared in *Mind* in 1950. It was meant as a demolition of Russell, but it concluded with a bold dismissal of the claims of formal logic in general. 'Neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules', Strawson says, 'give the exact logic of any expression of

ordinary language; for ordinary language has no exact logic'.⁶² This argument was blatantly question-begging of course: if formal logic and ordinary language diverge, it cannot be assumed that the fault lies with formal logic. But perhaps what the Oxfordians objected to in Russell was not his preference for formal logic over ordinary language, but – as Warnock was to put it – his Procrustean attempt to 'impose the neat simplicities of logic upon the troublesome complexities of language'.⁶³ This too might seem inconclusive: the Russellians could argue that logic described not the vagaries of surface grammar, but the immovable structures of valid reasoning as such. But in that case, the Oxfordians could reply, in a phrase of Iris Murdoch's: 'there may be no deep structure'.⁶⁴

The affection of the Oxford philosophers for ordinary language was open to another obvious objection: even if ordinary language does embody some subtle distinctions, they may not be particularly intelligent ones. Russell had already pointed this out in 1914 when he spoke of the 'the prehistoric metaphysicians to whom common sense is due'.⁶⁵ And he restated it forty years later when retaliating against attacks from the Oxfordians. He described them as 'the "Philosophy-Without-Tears" School, so named because it makes philosophy very much easier than it has ever been before: in order to be a competent philosopher, it is only necessary to study Fowler's *Modern English Usage*'. Oxford philosophy was concerned, Russell said, 'not with the world and our relation to it, but only with the different ways in which silly people can say silly things'.⁶⁶

'I don't like Oxford philosophers', he told Ved Mehta. 'Don't like them. They have made trivial something very great. Don't think much of their apostle Ryle. He's just another clever man'.⁶⁷ Ryle, he wrote on another occasion, 'seems to believe that a philosopher need not know anything scientific beyond what was known in the time of our ancestors when they died themselves with woad'.⁶⁸

The Oxford philosophers were curiously unperturbed by this criticism. A lecture Austin gave in 1956 contained one of their few attempts at a methodological manifesto, and it was hardly a rallying-cry. 'To proceed from "ordinary language", that is, by examining *what we should say when*' is, Austin claims, 'at least *one* philosophical method'. In response to Russell's disparagement of 'the metaphysics of the Stone Age' Austin observed that

our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon – the most favoured alternative method.

But if this defence should fail, Austin added that, since 'words are our tools', it must be a good idea to try to 'prise

them off the world' if only in order to 'realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness', and 'forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us'. This is a fair precept, no doubt; but as a response to Russell's criticisms, it seems wilfully feeble. Austin said he was not seeking for 'the Last Word ... if there is such a thing', as though he found it impertinent to ask what was special about the supposedly revolutionary philosophical school of which he was the intellectual leader. 'So much for the cackle' – that is how Austin concluded his methodological manifesto for ordinary language philosophy.⁶⁹

It was as if the Oxford philosophers could not bear to discuss the new method which was supposed to set them apart from their predecessors. It may be indeed that what distinguished them from the Positivists and the Russellians and indeed the Existentialists was not any methodological programme, but something which belonged to what might be called their collective institutional unconscious. R.M. Hare brought some of its features to light in a lecture designed to explain 'Philosophy in Great Britain' to German audiences. He suggested that the revolution he represented was based not so much on a theory of philosophical method as on the pedagogical practices of Oxford University. 'We have seen', he said, 'what monstrous philosophical edifices have been erected by slipping, surreptitiously, from the ordinary uses of words to extraordinary uses which are never explained; we spend most of our working time explaining our *own* uses of words to our pupils'.⁷⁰ This peculiar behaviour took place in the individual tutorials which had typified Oxford education since the middle of the nineteenth century. The student would visit a tutor's room once a week and read out an essay. Tutors might reciprocate with helpful information; but often they would respond with the simple but petrifying question, 'what exactly do you mean by this word?' Or sometimes, like the great Victorian tutor Benjamin Jowett, they would maintain a menacing gloomy silence until finally their trembling young charge was dismissed.

The effect of the system on both students and teachers was, as Hare observed, quite profound.

The student is very soon made to realize that everything that he says in an essay has to be justified before a highly skilled and usually merciless critic, not only in respect of its truth, but also in respect of relevance, accuracy, significance and clarity. Anything that is put in to fill in space, or which is ambiguous or vague or pretentious, or which contains more sound than significance, or whose object is anything else but to express genuine thought, is ruthlessly exposed for what it is.... What the tutor can do is to teach his pupil to think effectively; to express his thought clearly to himself and to others; to make distinctions where there are distinctions to be made, and thus avoid unnecessary confusion – and not to use long words (or short ones) without being able to explain what they mean.⁷¹

For students, the educational value of tutorials was that they frightened them into internalising some rigorous norms of intellectual or at least verbal continence. (And perhaps for the Oxford philosophy tutors of that time, they also had the psychical function of discharging the terror inspired in them by Austin.)

Tutorials could be described as providing an arena for exercises in translation and paraphrase. Ever since the Renaissance, after all, humanistic education had centered on translating between ancient and modern languages, so as to make linguistic sensibilities more supple and self-aware. In the twentieth century, the same benefits were looked for within a single language. The educational advantages of intra-linguistic translation had been theorised in England in the twenties and thirties by the followers of Bentham and Nietzsche who supported the cause of Basic English – an artificial dialect which was supposed to be able to communicate almost any conceivable message, using only a very simple vocabulary of 850 words.⁷² It is well-known that – thanks especially to I.A. Richards and William Empson – Basic English had a lasting effect on the formation of English Literature as an academic discipline; but it probably had just as much bearing on the development of English philosophy. For, though it may have advertised itself as proposing a philosophical theory of language and a linguistic theory of philosophy, in reality what it offered was a linguistic, and primarily oral, practice of philosophising. English philosophy became an infinite practice of translation – most especially, the translation of vague, figurative, confused or metaphysical expressions into the simplest and most austere language that could be devised. (For the Russellians, the target language was formal logic; for the Oxfordians, it was plain-style English.) Those who had been drilled in it would for ever after respond to questions by re-phrasing them; only then (if ever) would they proceed to an answer. Philosophy in this context was not a set of texts or theories, but a habit of prophylactic paraphrase, based on Rylean 'anti-nonsense rules'.⁷³ Its aim was to promote mental hygiene and prevent the development of what Austin called 'chuckle-headedness'.⁷⁴

In principle, tutorials could be the vehicle for all sorts of theoretical messages; but for the Oxford philosophers the form of the tutorial defined the content and goals of their discipline too. Tutors found themselves obliged to invent a new type of exam question to test the effectiveness of their work: questions calling for quick-witted reflection on linguistic forms, rather than the exposition or criticism of established bodies of theory. A typical new-style question from Ryle might be: 'Why cannot a traveller reach London gradually?' Austin would prefer 'Why is 'I warn you...' the beginning of a warning, but "I insult you..." not the beginning of an insult?'⁷⁵

Historical and textual scholarship were not a high priority for the Oxford philosophers. 'On the whole

we share Plato's attitude towards the written word; it is a *pis aller*,' as Hare put it.

British philosophers, by and large, will not be bothered with a philosophical thesis which is not stated briefly and in clear terms.... So on the whole we do not write long or difficult books; if our ideas are understood by our colleagues in the course of verbal discussion, that is enough for us.... We do not think it a *duty* to write books; still less do we think it a duty to read more than a few of the books which others write.⁷⁶

But despite their cultivated indifference to historical scholarship, the Oxford philosophers had a clear sense of history and their place in it. 'The wise rambler', as Ryle put it, must occasionally 'look back over his shoulder in order to link up the place he has got to with the country through which he has recently passed.' The 'revolution in philosophy,' he believed, was connected with the 'laicizing of our culture' on the one hand, and the 'professionalizing of philosophy' on the other. As an undergraduate in the 1920s, he had found that philosophy had already lost all connection with theology, and the agonies of faith and doubt; since then it had developed into 'a separate academic subject,' and, whether they liked it or not, 'philosophers had now to be philosophers' philosophers'.⁷⁷

'Ontologising is out,' said Ryle; philosophy's only future was as 'a second-order business', whose proper domain was not reality itself, but the words and concepts with which people try to pin it down.⁷⁸ At the beginning of the fifties, Strawson had promised that with the new philosophical logic he was 'on the way to solving a number of ancient logical and metaphysical puzzles',⁷⁹ and R.M. Hare found that progress in ethical theory was so rapid that a book would become out of date between composition and publication.⁸⁰ One of the enthusiasts – an unidentified 'lady' – is said to have opened an argument with the phrase, 'now that we have escaped from the age of error'.⁸¹ Afterwards, Strawson recalled people assuming that all the 'ancient rubbish' would soon be carted away and that 'the total dissolution' of all the old problems and the 'final extinction' of metaphysics were 'foreseeably near'.⁸²

The Oxford revolutionaries accepted that they had some debts to the past however. On its publication in 1949, Stuart Hampshire hailed *The Concept of Mind* as the culmination of a development of certain 'methods of linguistic analysis' of which there had been 'many guarded adumbrations and esoteric hints in British philosophy in the last fifteen years'.⁸³ At the same time, recognition was given to the achievements of an earlier revolution – the 'revolution against idealism' which had been carried out, or so they supposed, by G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell in about 1900, in Cambridge. (Very slowly, though, it came to be acknowledged that some of the credit for creating modern 'philosophical logic' should be passed further back, and over the channel, to Gottlob Frege.)⁸⁴

As the Oxfordians saw it, the post-idealist settlement divided into two wings, one loyal to Russell, the other to Moore. Russell's wing was called philosophical analysis,

and was boosted by the adherence of the young Wittgenstein.⁸⁵ Russell and Wittgenstein tried to get behind what they regarded as the messy forms of everyday thought, in order to discover a structural skeleton of formal logic, based on a foundation of incontrovertible empirical knowledge. But, from the Oxfordian point of view, their project was ill-conceived. The Russellians aimed to avoid metaphysics, but they failed to see that natural science and formal logic were themselves metaphysical.⁸⁶ Formal logic, moreover – as opposed to the 'informal' or 'philosophical' variety being developed by Strawson – was of no more relevance to philosophy than any other branch of mathematics.⁸⁷ Scientific philosophers might be brilliant at 'formal demonstrations and derivations', but that did not save their 'philosophising' from being hopelessly poor.⁸⁸

The revolutionaries felt more affinity with Moore's side of the post-idealist settlement. Moore's writings made a virtue of proceeding very, very slowly, clinging desperately to the intuitions of common sense for fear of being blown away by gusty speculation, and Oxford philosophy can be seen as a linguistified version of Moorean caution.⁸⁹ The Oxfordians were sorry that Moore viewed moral values as objective qualities, and that to this extent he was 'not wholly of the modern time'.⁹⁰ But they forgave him because of his exemplary philosophical courage – a 'courage to seem naive', which found expression not so much in Moore's writings as in his conversation, and indeed in his celebrated seraphic silences.⁹¹ Repeatedly, Moore was compared to the child in Hans Christian Andersen's tale, who had the courage to say that the emperor had no clothes. Andersen's brave little boy was a model with which all the Oxford philosophers liked to identify.⁹²

But Moore was eclipsed by another figure, far more exotic and controversial, and the only person in twentieth-century English philosophy who conducted himself in a way that corresponded to the popular idea of a tormented genius. At the beginning of 1950, in the introduction to the first anthology representing the new philosophical school, Antony Flew asserted that all those associated with it 'would wish to acknowledge their debt to the genius of one man above all'. He was referring to someone 'whose name is almost unknown outside the world of academic philosophy,' although 'everyone who belongs to that world will see throughout this volume marks of the enormous influence, direct and indirect, of the oral teachings of Professor Wittgenstein'.⁹³

For the purposes of the Oxford philosophers, it was necessary to make a sharp distinction between two Wittgensteins. The early Wittgenstein, comrade-in-arms of Bertrand Russell, gave up philosophy after completing the *Tractatus*, and went back to his native Austria to lead a simple life. But in 1929, a second Wittgenstein, who had abandoned the 'analytic' dogmatism of the first, became a Fellow of Trinity College Cambridge. Ten years later he succeeded to Moore's chair, but he resigned in 1947, fearing that his teaching was having a bad influence on students. He published nothing except a brief article in 1929 which he immediately disowned. But he gave informal

lectures, and copies of notes which he dictated to his students between 1933 and 1935 were circulated widely.⁹⁴ Wittgenstein's warnings about the folly of attempting to deal with philosophical problems in the way science does ('this tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness') were alleged to have devastated the project of Philosophical Analysis, as Russell and the first Wittgenstein had envisaged it.⁹⁵ Two Wittgensteinian slogans – 'Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use', and 'Every statement has its own logic' – were regarded by the Oxford philosophers as essential clues to correct philosophical method.⁹⁶

But Wittgenstein died in April 1951. His *Philosophical Investigations* were published, in German but with an English translation on facing pages, in 1953. However, their lack of systematic, paraphrasable argumentation, and their explicit repudiation of 'any kind of theory' and 'all explanation'⁹⁷ were not particularly congenial to many of those who till then had thought of themselves as his followers. The *Investigations* were welcomed by Strawson in a magisterial review in *Mind*, as the work of 'the first philosopher of the age'. Although he had some reservations – Strawson himself was dreaming of 'a purged kind of metaphysics, with more modest and less disreputable claims than the old' – he concluded with satisfaction that the publication of the *Investigations* would 'consolidate the philosophical revolution for which, more than any one else, its author was responsible'.⁹⁸

During the fifties, the problem of the significance of Wittgenstein became more and more agonising for the Oxford revolutionaries. To some commentators, it appeared that the works of Ryle, Austin, and the rest of those who discussed each other's work in *Mind* were nothing but watered-down summaries of the late Wittgenstein. Bertrand Russell, now in his eighties, was displeased at being 'superseded in the opinion of many British philosophers' by his former student. He continued to admire the *Tractatus*, but not the *Investigations*, which he thought contained nothing but 'suave evasion of paradoxes'.⁹⁹

In Oxford too, there was increasing wariness about Wittgenstein, and mockery of the physical and verbal mannerisms of his 'disciples' – especially Elizabeth Anscombe, his executor and translator. Ryle regarded Wittgenstein as 'a genius and a friend', but was so revolted by the 'incontinent' veneration with which he was surrounded in Cambridge that he pointedly strove to avoid being his 'echo'.¹⁰⁰ Austin did not take Wittgenstein very seriously either, and was famously rude to Anscombe. Warnock recalled that he would sometimes read passages from Wittgenstein in his lectures, with a view to demonstrating 'how incomprehensible and obscure the Austrian philosopher was'.¹⁰¹ There was something about the Austrian which made Oxford philosophers uneasy.

The Oxford revolutionaries saw little philosophical point in studying the history of philosophy, though the college system obliged most of them to teach Plato and

Aristotle, as well as 'modern philosophy', meaning the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Descartes to Kant. Nineteenth-century thinkers – especially Hegel and such anti-Hegelians as Kierkegaard, Marx and Nietzsche – were scarcely mentioned at all. This rather dull picture was brightened, however, by a streak of patriotism. When it came to the 'British Empiricists' – Locke, Berkeley and Hume – the Oxford philosophers were willing to admit that the 'revolution' carried out by Russell and Moore had not been 'the thunderbolt that it is popularly supposed to be'.¹⁰² Ayer edited an anthology of *British Empirical Philosophers* to make the national tradition more available to students.¹⁰³ And Iris Murdoch went so far as to describe the Oxford school as the 'present-day version of our traditional empiricism'.¹⁰⁴

The Oxford philosophers' confidence in the category of 'British Empiricism' is surprising in many ways. As a theoretical proposal, the very idea of philosophical national characters is, one might have thought, severely compromised by dubious presuppositions of a metaphysical, idealistic and Hegelian kind. As a matter of historical record, too, it could be more appropriate to see Britain as the home of idealism, from the Cambridge Platonists through the civic humanists and Coleridge to the Christian idealists led by T.H. Green and their successors in the Royal Institute of Philosophy; or of irrationalism and emotionalism, starting with Duns Scotus, and continuing in Burke, Blake, Carlyle, Ruskin and successive generations of British Nietzscheans.

There was also the difficulty of defining Britishness. Of Ayer's five empirical philosophers, only Locke was English: Berkeley was Irish, and Hume, Reid and Mill were all Scottish. Nevertheless, the concept of British Empiricism was peculiarly Anglo-centric, and helped to cover up the fact that philosophy had deeper roots and wider resonance in Ireland, Scotland and Wales than in England.¹⁰⁵

Nevertheless, the concept of British Empiricism was called on to do a task which was of considerable importance to the Oxford philosophers. It enabled them to define themselves in contrast with a hated rival, which came to be known, in the course of the decade, by the title of 'continental philosophy'. Continental philosophy, to the Oxfordians, was the epitome of the intellectual habits that their revolution was meant to eradicate: excessive interest in the history of philosophy, failure to respect the gap between philosophy and science, and above all a self-indulgent use of language. The continentals, it was insinuated, followed fashions, not arguments, and if literary intellectuals were attracted to them, this was only because of their skin-deep sex-appeal.

Oxfordian attacks on 'continental philosophy' were aggressive, even sadistic. 'The thing wrong with the Existentialists and the other Continental philosophers', as Hare put it, 'is that they haven't had their noses rubbed in the necessity of saying exactly what they mean. I sometimes think it's because they don't have a tutorial system'.¹⁰⁶ The reviews section of *Mind* tried to keep readers informed about the antics of the foreign colleagues. Every work of continental philosophy turned out, upon careful examination, to be pretentious rubbish: some faith perhaps, but not

enough hope, and a complete lack of clarity. Reviewing a German book on relativism in 1951, T.D. Weldon could hardly get past the author's 'fatal liking for long abstract and hyphenated words of which no explanation is offered' – a proclivity which he knew 'philosophers in this country' would find intolerable. The German philosopher would not make any progress, Weldon said, 'until he pays less attention to high-sounding abstractions and devotes some time to the more mundane study of ordinary discourse'.¹⁰⁷ A year later, C.A. Mace amused himself at the expense of Sartre. The Frenchman might be of some interest to 'those who entertain the hypothesis that philosophical reflexion may not infrequently serve as a medium through which personal emotional problems find their expression', Mace said. But still it was clear that 'a rough count would be sufficient to show that only a small number of philosophers actually feel sick when they contemplate the contingency of the existent'. The only existential problem raised by Sartre was how anyone could count him as a philosopher.¹⁰⁸ Isaiah Berlin too gazed into the huge gulf which divided philosophers in most of 'the continent of Europe' from those in 'the Anglo-American world'. The chasm was so deep that 'philosophers on one side of it can scarcely bring themselves to think of those on the other as being occupied with the same subject as themselves.' And the reason for the difference was clear: intellectual progress had passed the continentals by. Philosophers from 'the Latin countries' had 'lived through the great logico-philosophical revolution of the last half-century, initiated by Frege and Russell – perhaps the most complete transformation of thought in this field since the seventeenth century – without being noticeably affected by it.'¹⁰⁹ Reassurance was offered by P.F. Strawson, reviewing a French work on Virginia Woolf: 'Mr Chastaing places Virginia Woolf where she, no doubt, belongs: in the British Empiricist tradition.'¹¹⁰

A.J. Ayer, too – though disdainful of the provincialism of *Mind* and proud of his cosmopolitanism, his affinity for French culture, and his friendships with Wahl, Camus and Merleau-Ponty – liked to join his Oxford colleagues when it came to making fun of the continentals. Complaining about the poor reception of *Language, Truth and Logic* in France, he commented that 'one of Descartes's least happy legacies to France has been the belief that empirical questions can be decided *a priori*, and one of these *a priori* judgements is that among foreign philosophers only the Germans need be taken seriously.'¹¹¹ And German philosophy was actually even worse than French, since it was dominated by Heidegger the Nazi – whose work, though it might raise 'some points of psychological interest,' was altogether bogus in its 'pretensions to philosophical profundity.'¹¹² A story from early in the decade shows, however, that Ayer knew how to put the Heideggerians in their place.

I remember an occasion on which an official of the British Council asked me to lunch with a German professor, said to be a leading phenomenologist, whom the Council had invited on a tour of British universities. Neither the professor's English nor my

colloquial German was very fluent; our host was self-effacing and conversation languished. There seemed nothing for it but to resort to talking shop. 'What are you working on now?' I asked the professor. 'It is complicated', he replied, 'but I will give an example of the kind of problem I am trying to solve. What is the essence of a glass?' On the whole I counted myself an opponent of the type of linguistic philosophy that was coming into fashion at Oxford, but here it seemed to me to meet the case. 'Surely', I said, 'there is nothing very perplexing about the way in which the word 'glass' and its counterparts in other languages are ordinarily used.' He looked at me with contempt. 'I will give you the answer,' he said. 'The essence of the glass is to be empty.' I made a sign to our host who filled our glasses. This did not please the professor who remarked irritably that the essence of a glass with wine was not the same as the essence of a glass without wine. 'But', he went on, 'I will put to you a deeper question. What is the essence of emptiness? (*Was ist das Wesen von der Leere?*)' 'Ah', I said, 'that really is deep', and I went on to talk about the universities that he had visited.¹¹³

The Oxford philosophers evidently enjoyed telling each other funny stories about foreigners. This is how R.M. Hare, for example, would describe what happened 'when a typical Oxford philosopher meets a typical German philosopher in a philosophical discussion.'

The German philosopher will say something relating to his own philosophical views; the British philosopher will then say that he cannot understand what has been said, and will ask for an elucidation. The German will take this, the first time that it happens to him, for an encouragement, and will go on expounding his views; but he will be disappointed by the reaction. What was desired, it turns out, was not more of the same sort of thing; what the British philosopher wanted was to take just one sentence that the German had uttered – say the first sentence – or perhaps, for a start, just one word in this sentence; and he wanted an explanation given of the way in which this word was being used.... Nothing pleases us so much as to sit back and have a German metaphysician explain to us, if he can, how he is going to get his metaphysical system started. And as he is usually unable to do this, the discussion never gets on to what he thinks of as the meat of the theory. This is a great disappointment to him....¹¹⁴

The poor German might have started to retaliate by grilling Hare over his failure to distinguish between the word 'Britain' and the word 'Oxford'; but in the end it was a game the foreigners were bound to lose. If they agreed to translate themselves into a language acceptable to their hosts, they would have conceded that they had nothing un-Oxfordian to say; but if they refused, they would have condemned themselves as deliberate obfuscators.

In 1958 a small platoon of Oxford philosophers attended

the fourth philosophical conference at Royaumont, which their French colleagues had organised in the hope of informing themselves about the state of 'analytic philosophy' in Britain and America.¹¹⁵ It was hardly a meeting of minds: the French hosts manifested a respectful curiosity about 'Anglo-saxon philosophy', and 'the Oxford School', but the 'chorus of Oxford analysts' huddled together in self-defence, as if they feared some kind of intellectual infection from the over-friendly continentals.¹¹⁶ In a session on 'Phenomenology versus *The Concept of Mind*', Ryle attributed 'the wide gulf that has existed for three quarters of a century between Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophy' to the fact that the Continentals were unaware of 'the massive developments of our logical theory'. He accused his hosts of being stuck with the discredited procedures of Husserlian phenomenology which – with flamboyant inaccuracy – he described as 'Platonised Cartesianism'. Husserl, according to Ryle, had been 'bewitched by the Platonic idea that conceptual inquiries were scrutinies of the super-objects that he called "Essences"', and this had led him to the arrogant idea that philosophy was 'the Mistress Science'. The British could never make such a mistake:

I guess that our thinkers have been immunised against the idea of philosophy as the Mistress Science by the fact that their daily lives in Cambridge and Oxford Colleges have kept them in personal contact with real scientists. Claims to Führership vanish when postprandial joking begins. Husserl wrote as if he had never met a scientist – or a joke.¹¹⁷

Despite Ryle's reproaches against anyone who read Husserl 'too assiduously', Herman van Bréda attempted to set Ryle right about Husserl's relation to Platonism, though he did have to concede that Husserl had not enjoyed 'the distinguished privilege of living within the community of a "college"'. Father van Bréda also gently deprecated Ryle's phrase about the philosophical *Führer*, and suggested, with some justice, that if anyone was 'hypostatizing concepts and words', it was Ryle: 'the Oxford analysts are great Platonists, but Husserl was not'.¹¹⁸

Ryle brushed this aside by saying that he did not care what Husserl happened to think – which was rather impolite considering that he had raised the subject in the first place. Austin also gave offence by saying he had no faith in any philosophical methods at all, most especially those 'which are currently in vogue on the continent.' Ayer earned gratitude for making it clear to van Bréda that he was wasting his time: analytical philosophy as a whole, he explained, had a 'negative attitude ... towards all philosophical work on the continent'.¹¹⁹ When Merleau-Ponty asked Ryle whether he thought that 'correctness' was the 'cardinal virtue of thinking,' or whether there was not a different and more demanding value, that of truth, Ryle responded quite obtusely by saying that he had no interest in the trivialities of grammar. Merleau-Ponty, however – who had read Ryle, a courtesy which was not reciprocated – said that Ryle's work was 'not so strange to us, and that the

distance, if there is a distance, is one that he puts between us rather than one I find there'.¹²⁰

During the fifties, the young revolutionaries of Ryle's Army established a virtual monopoly over university philosophy in England. They managed to contain the influence of all other potential philosophical power-brokers – most notably Karl Popper at the London School of Economics.¹²¹ But their take-over remained almost unknown outside the world of academic philosophy, at least until the end of 1959; and when fame came, it was not in a form that pleased them. On 5 November, *The Times* published a letter from Bertrand Russell complaining that *Mind* would not review a book which attempted a systematic demolition of Oxford philosophy.

I now learn that Professor Ryle, the editor of *Mind*, has written to Messrs Gollancz [the publishers] refusing to have this book reviewed in *Mind* on the ground that it is abusive.... If all books that do not endorse Professor Ryle's opinions are to be boycotted in the pages of *Mind*, that hitherto respected periodical will sink to the level of a mutual admiration organ of a coterie.¹²²

The book Russell was supporting was *Words and Things* by Ernest Gellner, a young man who had himself escaped from Oxford philosophy (he had even written for *Mind* in the early fifties) in order to become an anthropologist at the London School of Economics. Gellner had got to know Austin at Oxford, and learned to detest him deeply: 'I had an impression of someone very strongly obsessed with never being wrong, and using all kinds of dialectical devices to avoid being wrong'. His lectures had been like 'a creeping barrage, going into endless detail in a very slow and fumbling way'. By this method, Austin used to 'browbeat people into acceptance; it was a kind of brain-washing'.¹²³

In *Words and Things* Gellner offered a sarcastic but brilliant summary of Oxford philosophy – that 'strange love-child of Wittgenstein's messianism and Oxonian complacency', as he called it. He even contrived to present the characteristic dialectical manoeuvres of the Oxford philosophers in a diagram, and explained how readers could become Oxford philosophers simply by playing parlour games based upon it. The object of the game was to avoid having to confront any serious theoretical issues. Just as thought was muzzled in Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* by Newspeak, so it was muzzled in Ryle's Oxford by Oldspeak. Because of their apparently populist idea that anything worth saying could be expressed in ordinary English, Gellner called Ryle's troops 'the Narodniks of North Oxford'. At the same time the Conspicuous Triviality of their conversational routines was just an example of the Conspicuous Waste characteristic of a leisure class; and while it made social sense for the upper classes in Oxford, it would become grotesque when offered to poorer students at the redbrick universities.¹²⁴

Gellner's sociology was not implausible. For a start, the pages of *Who's Who* show that of the twenty leading figures in Oxford philosophy in the fifties, there was only one who did not come from a high-bourgeois family. Similarly, there were only four who did not receive their secondary education in a famous boys' school – they were the four women. And there was only one who was not an undergraduate at Oxford – he went to Cambridge instead. Even at Oxford there can hardly have been a discipline whose staff were drawn from a narrower social base.¹²⁵

To some extent, the Oxford philosophers could be aligned with the remnants of Bloomsbury: certainly they spoke with the same accents; they liked to make use of French phrases; and – as Russell observed – they were 'gentlemanly' in their aversion from taking things too seriously.¹²⁶ This placed a distance between them and the 'proletentious' world of the Angry Young Men: only A.J. Ayer, always anxious to be a London intellectual rather than an Oxford don, was at ease with them.¹²⁷

However, the Oxford philosophers were a generation younger than the Bloomsburys, and their presentation of themselves as plain-speaking revolutionaries identified them with the post-war settlement to which their seniors refused to be reconciled. They complained that they were deliberately cold-shouldered by the London intellectual world, which – after Sartre, Camus and Colin Wilson – was interested only in Ayer, Russell, and Popper. They may indeed have had a point: if you count up all the philosophical books reviewed in the *Times Literary Supplement*, only twenty – two a year, or 6 per cent – represented the Oxfordian line, whereas four times that number came from their 'continental' rivals.¹²⁸

The plain prose-style cultivated by the Oxford philosophers was itself enough to offend their cultured elders. The review of *The Concept of Mind* in the *Times Literary Supplement* was favourable – not surprisingly, since it was by J.L. Austin. Austin commented on Ryle's sensitivity to "the nuances of words" and his 'refreshingly wide choice of words, especially of polysyllables'. The excellence of this revolutionary book was a matter of its style, according to Austin, and '*le style, c'est Ryle*'.¹²⁹ However, in its survey of 'The Philosophy of 1951', the *TLS* was not so sympathetic. The anonymous author picked on the then President of the Aristotelian Society, who was 'completely the *beau idéal* of the contemporary young philosopher'. This paragon was John Wisdom, the Cambridge prophet of the Oxford revolution.¹³⁰ 'Dr Wisdom's mode of writing', according to the *TLS*, 'suggests a man self-righteously denying himself many of the resources and all the graces of a literary use of language, as if they were temptations to lure him away from his austere pursuit of an unsullied clarity'. The result was a 'flat colloquialism' with hardly a word of more than two syllables, except 'every' (a word which, of course, only the classiest speakers would put three syllables into anyway).¹³¹ In *Mind* itself, a representative of the old school lamented that it was becoming rare for philosophy to be written 'in the language of a gentleman and a scholar'. There had been a disastrous lurch towards 'that vulgar colloquialism which nervously

shuns every word and phrase which would not naturally occur in the conversation of one's bedmaker or one's bookmaker'.¹³² Back in the *TLS*, Antony Flew was arraigned for his 'derisive and bumptious manner', and for prose which was unreadable because of 'that unhappy style, at once "blokey" and elaborate, which a number of young Oxford philosophers, all more or less *scuola di Ryle* ... have made so self-consciously their own'.¹³³

Thus the Oxford philosophers could not be quite so confident in their social standing as Gellner alleged. But their consequent defensiveness did nothing to disconfirm his analysis of their intellectual position. They did not respond to him any more than they did to Russell or Joad, or to later left-wing critics like Marcuse and Anderson. All outsiders were bound to miss the point of what they stood for. You could not understand Oxford philosophy in general, or Austin in particular, if you were only interested in detachable methods or doctrines. It was necessary, as Warnock put it, to attend to those who 'had the advantage of, so to speak, observing at close quarters Austin in action, and of having themselves inhabited, in some cases for many years, the philosophical scene in which he was himself so conspicuous a figure'.¹³⁴ This response is not just a sign of excessive sensitivity to criticism, though. The Oxford philosophers were equally unreceptive to friendly offers to systematise and summarise the intellectual goals that held them together.¹³⁵ Attempts to develop Austin's concept of speech-acts in the direction of systematic linguistics, or to extend it in the direction of general social theory,¹³⁶ though they might have pleased Austin himself, were unwelcome to most of his colleagues. The Oxfordian conception of philosophy could not recognise itself apart from its social style.

Outsiders who try to comment on the ordinary language philosophers, whether in admiration or hostility, always run into vertiginous difficulties. Three things are clear: they believed they had a revolutionary mission; they held that this was based on a new 'linguistic' technique, summarisable in the slogan 'Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use'; and they were implacably opposed to evasiveness or imprecision. But these three propositions did not add up. When asked for a clear definition of their new method, Oxfordians treated the request as inept, and never came up with a straightforward answer.

These inconsistent attitudes had serious theoretical motives, however. The central idea to which the Oxford philosophers were committed – the importance of trying to give lucid translations of concepts or expressions which are confused, misleading, or contaminated with prejudice or folly – is an admirable one, undeniably. This kind of linguistic consciousness-raising should play a part in all kinds of education, at every level. In fact it probably does. So to take it as marking a breakthrough into a new theoretical discipline – 'philosophical analysis' perhaps, or 'linguistic philosophy' – is implausible, and indeed paradoxical. Ryle had articulated the difficulty as early as 1932, in an article

which is often regarded as prophetic of the 1950s:


Sometimes philosophers say that they are analysing or clarifying the 'concepts' which are embodied in the 'judgements' of the plain man or of the scientist, historian, artist, or who-not.... But the whole procedure is very odd. For if the expressions under consideration are intelligently used, their employers must already know what they mean and do not need the aid or admonition of philosophers before they can understand what they are saying.... Certainly it is often the case that expressions are not being intelligently used and to that extent their authors are just gabbling parrot-wise. But then it is obviously fruitless to ask what the expressions really mean. For there is no reason to suppose that they mean anything. It would not be mere gabbling if there was any such reason. And if the philosopher cares to ask what these expressions *would* mean *if* a rational man were using them, the only answer would be that they would mean what they would then mean. Understanding them would be enough, and that could be done by any reasonable listener. Philosophizing could not help him.... It seems, then, that if an expression can be understood, then it is already known in that understanding what the expression means. So there is no darkness present and no illumination required or possible.¹³⁷

In the fifties, this apparent contradiction was widely discussed under the heading 'the paradox of analysis.' If you accepted that philosophy's task was to analyse ordinary language, then you were in a dilemma. The philosophical translation might have the same sense as the original expression; or alternatively it might not. But if it did, then the analysis would be pointless; and if it didn't, then it would be false.¹³⁸

The paradox is indeed catastrophic for the idea that the Oxford philosophers had devised a technique for making progressively more accurate representations of what ordinary people actually mean.¹³⁹ But they carried on regardless. Despite his earlier sharpness on the matter, Ryle relapsed into presenting *The Concept of Mind* as if it were a purely descriptive attempt to 'determine the logical geography of concepts'.¹⁴⁰ It is not surprising that some readers thought that Ryle was treating concepts (for instance, the concept of mind) as if they were 'super-objects' – the very vice which he attributed to 'continental philosophers' as a whole. Moreover, as Stuart Hampshire pointed out when he reviewed the book in *Mind*, Ryle's description of his method was acutely puzzling. Ordinary language is stacked with phrases which treat the psyche as an inner world: you burst with emotion, keep your opinions to yourself, or reveal unexpected depths of feeling, for instance. In arguing against 'cartesian dualism', therefore, Ryle was not so much correcting a mistaken map of ordinary language, as calling for a re-shaping of the linguistic terrain itself. He was protesting, as Hampshire pointed out, at 'a universal feature of ordinary language itself'. If ordinary language

was his master, then Ryle had no authority to dismiss the ghost in the machine.¹⁴¹

Though Ryle was stoical, it became more and more clear that there was a deep flaw in his revolutionary programme. But Ryle's army soldiered on, if in an increasingly prickly state of self-protective irony. Ryle had long ago sniffed out a weakness for 'nursery' words in Heidegger's *Being and Time*.¹⁴² It was a surprising observation, perhaps; but in the whole matter of baby-talk, Ryle and his colleagues were certainly on familiar ground. Their jokiness ensured that their special method, if they had one, would appear completely different to insiders than to earnest critics or adulators on the outside.



Gilbert Ryle in the mid 1920s.

The Concept of Mind itself cultivates a knowing naivety of language which recalls, if not Heidegger, then at least Lewis Carroll, Edward Lear, A.A. Milne and John Betjeman. Austin employed the same artful regressiveness: you need only think of the titles of some of his most celebrated works: 'How to do things with words', 'Three Ways of Spilling Ink', 'A Plea for Excuses', 'Ifs and Cans', 'The Meaning of a Word', 'How to Talk: Some Simple Ways'. They all have a tone of making philosophy available to infants; but woe betide anyone who fails to hear in them, as well, the voice of a severe and tricky professor. It is common for public school boys to use babyish nicknames for their teachers, and to keep using them throughout their lives. The habit may have its charm; but when Austin responded to a remark from an earnest American student by saying 'Let's see what Wittgenstein has to say about that', he was not only demonstrating his doubts about Wittgenstein, but also derailing an outsider and putting him in his place.¹⁴³ The French hosts at Royaumont received a similar rebuff when, after they had

spent a week trying to discover the secret of the Oxford revolution, Austin assured them that there was no such thing. The Oxford School had no particular conception of philosophy, except perhaps that it was all 'a pretty fair mess', he said.¹⁴⁴ As for his own special method – the revolutionary secret of the Oxford school – Austin at last agreed to sum it up and put it in a nutshell. 'What my creed boils down to, on the whole', he said, 'is excusing myself from having to do what I have no intention of doing'.¹⁴⁵ Don't ask for the meaning, as they liked to say: ask for the use.

Notes

- 1 See the chapter on 'The triumph of positive thinking' in Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964, and Perry Anderson, 'Components of the National Culture,' *New Left Review* 50, May–June 1968.
- 2 Kenneth Allsop, *The Angry Decade*, London, Peter Owen, 1958, p. 150.
- 3 Daniel Farson, *Daily Mail*, 13 July 1956, cited in Harry Ritchie, *Success Stories: Literature and the Media in England, 1950–1959*, London, Faber, 1988, p. 145.
- 4 John Connell, *Evening News*, 26 May 1956, cited in Ritchie, p. 144.
- 5 See F.W. Bateson, 'Organs of Critical Opinion IV: *The Times Literary Supplement*', *Essays in Criticism* VII, 4, October 1957.
- 6 Ritchie, *Success Stories*, pp. 144, 145.
- 7 Philip Toynbee, *The Observer*, 27 May 1956, p. 13.
- 8 Colin Wilson, *The Outsider* (London, Gollancz, 1956), second edition, 1967, new impression, London, Picador, 1978, pp. 93, 82.
- 9 See Harry Ritchie, *Success Stories*, pp. 26–7.
- 10 See Robert Hewison, *In Anger, Culture in the Cold War 1945–60*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981, ch. 2.
- 11 T.S. Eliot, *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*, London, Faber and Faber, 1948, p. 108.
- 12 Leslie Fiedler, 'The Un-angry young men', *Encounter* 52, January 1958, pp. 3–12.
- 13 See Francis Mulhern, *The Moment of 'Scrutiny'*, London, New Left Books, 1979.
- 14 Kenneth Allsop, *The Angry Decade*, p. 10.
- 15 Evelyn Waugh, 'An Open Letter on a Very Serious Subject', *Encounter* 27, December 1955, pp. 11–16.
- 16 See for example Guido de Ruggiero, *Existentialism*, London, Secker and Warburg, 1946; Jean Wahl, *A Short History of Existentialism*, New York, Philosophical Library, 1949; Herbert Read, *Existentialism Marxism and Anarchism*, London, Freedom Press, 1949, H.J. Blackham, *Six Existentialist Thinkers*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952.
- 17 Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego* (1936), 1937; *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions* (1938), 1948; *The Psychology of Imagination (L'imaginaire)* (1940), 1956; *Being and Nothingness* (1943), 1956; *Existentialism and Humanism* (1947), 1948; *What is Literature?* (1947), 1949. Weil, *The Need for Roots* (1949), 1952. Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus* (1942), 1955; *The Rebel (L'homme révolté)* (1951), 1953. de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity* (1947) 1948; *The Second Sex* (1949), 1953.
- 18 Iris Murdoch, 'The Novelist as Metaphysician', *The Listener*, 16 March 1950, pp. 473–6. Cf. Alistair Davies and Peter Saunders, 'Literature, Politics and Society', in Alan Sinfield, ed., *Society and Literature 1945–1970*, London, Methuen, 1983.
- 19 Philip Toynbee, *The Observer*, 27 May 1956, p. 13.
- 20 David Wainwright, *Evening News*, 26 May 1956, cited in

- Ritchie, *Success Stories*, p. 181.
- 21 Kenneth Allsop, *The Angry Decade*, pp. 200, 179.
- 22 Colin Wilson, *The Outsider*, p. 293; and 'Postscript' (1967), p. 309.
- 23 See Ritchie, *Success Stories*, p. 172.
- 24 The phrases come from Kenneth Allsop (*Daily Mail*, 26 February 1957), Keith Waterhouse (*Tribune*, 1 November 1957), and Peter Green ('Child's Guide to the AYMs', *Time and Tide*, 2 November 1957); cited in Ritchie, *Success Stories*, pp. 172, 157.
- 25 See Jonathan Rée, *Proletarian Philosophers*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984.
- 26 Viscount Samuel, *Memoirs*, London, Cresset Press, 1945, pp. 248–9; see also the letter from Viscount Samuel, W.D. Ross and Lord Lindsay of Birker, *Mind* LV, 219, July 1946, p. 287.
- 27 On the earlier history of university philosophy, see Jonathan Rée, 'Philosophy as an academic discipline: the changing place of philosophy in an arts education', *Studies in Higher Education* 3, 1, 1978, pp. 5–23.
- 28 See Donald MacKinnon, 'The Teaching of Philosophy in the United Kingdom', in Georges Canguilhem, ed., *The Teaching of Philosophy: an International Inquiry*, Paris, UNESCO, 1953, p. 127. Numbers increased steadily with the elevation of several colleges to University status: Southampton (1952), Hull (1954), Exeter (1955), and Leicester (1957).
- 29 See H.H. Price, 'The Study of Philosophy at Oxford', in Canguilhem, ed., *The Teaching of Philosophy*, pp. 128–9.
- 30 See C.D. Broad, 'Notes on the Teaching of Philosophy at Cambridge', in Canguilhem, ed., *The Teaching of Philosophy*, pp. 130–2; see also the reports on London and the civic universities, pp. 134, 135.
- 31 'Before the war it was rare for aspiring philosophers to work for doctorates. If they had made their mark as undergraduates, and had done reasonably well in their examinations for a bachelor's degree, they were directly appointed to lectureships or even fellowships in an Oxford college, or at the worst to a post in some red-brick university from which they might hope eventually to transfer to an Oxford or Cambridge fellowship.' A.J. Ayer, *More of My Life*, London, Collins, 1984, p. 180.
- 32 A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, London, Gollancz, 1936, second edition, 1946, pp. 33, 153.
- 33 H.J. Paton, 'Fifty Years of Philosophy', in H.D. Lewis, ed., *Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1956, p. 346.
- 34 Bertrand Russell, *Sceptical Essays*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1928, p. 11; see also A.J. Ayer, *Part of my Life*, pp. 53–4.
- 35 A.J. Ayer, *Encounter* 36, September 1956, pp. 75–77; *More of my Life*, p. 124. One of the other negative reviews of *The Outsider* was by Raymond Williams in *Essays in Criticism*, VII, 4, October 1957.
- 36 See Walter Allen's review of *Lucky Jim*, *New Statesman*, 30 January 1955; cf. Ritchie, *Success Stories*, p. 68.
- 37 Anon., *Times Literary Supplement*, 13 December 1957, p. 757.
- 38 See A.J. Ayer, *Part of my Life*, pp. 301–2.
- 39 Colin Wilson, 'Postscript' (1967) to *The Outsider*, p. 300.
- 40 Gilbert Ryle, review of *Sein und Zeit*, *Mind* XXXVIII, 151, July 1929, pp. 355–370, reprinted in Michael Murray, ed., *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1978, pp. 53–64. See also Gilbert Ryle, 'Phenomenology', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume IX, 1932, pp. 68–83.
- 41 Gilbert Ryle, 'Autobiographical', in Oscar P. Wood and George Pitcher, eds, *Ryle*, London, Macmillan, 1971, pp. 8–9; A.J. Ayer, *Part of my Life*, p. 121.
- 42 Ryle's army included – apart from himself (1900–1976) – Elizabeth Anscombe (1919–), J.L. Austin (1911–1960), Isaiah

- Berlin (1909–), Michael Dummett (1925–), A.G.N. Flew (1923), Phillipa Foot (born Bosanquet) (1920), Stuart Hampshire (1914), R.M. Hare (1919–), H.L.A. Hart (1907–1992), Iris Murdoch (1919–), P.H. Nowell-Smith (1914–), David Pears (1921–), Anthony Quinton (1925–), P.F. Strawson (1919), Stephen Toulmin (1922–), J.O. Urmson (1915–), G.J. Warnock (1923), Mary Warnock (born Wilson) (1925–), and Bernard Williams (1929–).
- 43 Anon. (in fact P.F. Strawson – see Ved Mehta, *The Fly and the Fly-bottle: Encounters with British Intellectuals*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963, p. 58), ‘The Post-Linguistic Thaw’, *Times Literary Supplement*, 9 September 1960, p. lx.
- 44 The young man was Richard Robinson; the incident is recorded in H.J. Paton, ‘Fifty Years of Philosophy’, p. 351.
- 45 ‘The Post-Linguistic Thaw’, p. lx.
- 46 J.L. Austin, ‘Ifs and Cans’ (1956), in *Philosophical Papers*, edited by J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 152.
- 47 Ved Mehta, *The Fly and the Fly-bottle*, pp. 51–2.
- 48 G.J. Warnock, interviewed by Ved Mehta, *The Fly and the Fly-bottle*, pp. 53–4.
- 49 R.M. Hare, interviewed in Ved Mehta, *The Fly and the Fly-bottle*, p. 46.
- 50 R.M. Hare, review of Lepley, ed., *Value, a Co-operative Inquiry*, *Mind* LX, 239, July 1951, pp 430–432.
- 51 Opposition to ‘the ubiquitous romantic reaction’ was part of the programme of the review *Polemic*, which appeared in eight issues from 1945 to 1947. It was edited by Humphrey Slater, and contributors included A.J. Ayer, Geoffrey Grigson, Ben Nicholson, George Orwell, Karl Popper, Bertrand Russell, Adrian Stokes, and Edgar Wind.
- 52 Anon. (in fact J.L. Austin), review of *The Concept of Mind*, *Times Literary Supplement*, 7 April 1950, p. xi; Stuart Hampshire, review of *The Concept of Mind*, *Mind* LIX, 234, April 1950, p. 255. Both these reviews are reprinted in Wood and Pitcher, eds, *Ryle*.
- 53 Iris Murdoch, ‘Metaphysics and Ethics’, in D.F. Pears, ed., *The Nature of Metaphysics*, London, Macmillan, 1957, p. 105.
- 54 See Michael Frayn, ‘Festival’, in Michael Sissons and Philip France, eds, *The Age of Austerity*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1963, pp. 319–338.
- 55 Oxonian (in fact C.E.M. Joad), ‘A Visit to Oxford’, *New Statesman*, 26 June 1948, pp. 518–9; A.J. Ayer, *New Statesman*, 10 July 1948, p. 30; Joad, *New Statesman*, 31 July 1948, p. 91.
- 56 C.E.M. Joad, *A Critique of Logical Positivism*, London, Gollancz, 1950, p. 145; see also the review by R.J. Spilsbury, *Mind*, LX, 238, April 1951, p. 276.
- 57 C.E.M. Joad, *A Critique of Logical Positivism*, p. 16. See also anon. (Joad?), ‘The Philosophy of 1951’, *Times Literary Supplement*, 24 August 1951, p. x.
- 58 G.J. Warnock, ‘Analysis and Imagination’, in Gilbert Ryle, ed., *The Revolution in Philosophy*, London, Macmillan, 1956, p. 124.
- 59 A.J. Ayer, ‘The Vienna Circle’, in Ryle, ed., *The Revolution in Philosophy*, p. 73.
- 60 A.J. Ayer, *More of My Life*, p. 162.
- 61 G.J. Warnock, ‘Saturday Mornings,’ in Isaiah Berlin *et al.*, *Essays on J.L. Austin*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 36–7, 39.
- 62 P.F. Strawson, ‘On Referring’, *Mind* LIX, 235, July 1950, p. 344.
- 63 G.J. Warnock, ‘Metaphysics in Logic’, in A.G.N. Flew, ed., *Essays in Conceptual Analysis*, London, Macmillan, 1956, p. 76.
- 64 Iris Murdoch, *Metaphysics and Ethics*, p. 120.
- 65 Bertrand Russell, ‘The Relation of Sense-data to Physics’ (1914), in *Mysticism and Logic* (1918), Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1953, p. 148.
- 66 Bertrand Russell, ‘Logic and Ontology’ and ‘Philosophical Analysis’, in *My Philosophical Development*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1959, pp. 231, 230.
- 67 Bertrand Russell, interviewed in Ved Mehta, *The Fly and the Fly-bottle*, p. 41.
- 68 Bertrand Russell, ‘What is Mind?’, *My Philosophical Development*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1959, p. 250.
- 69 J.L. Austin, ‘A Plea for Excuses’ (1956), in *Philosophical Papers*, pp. 129–137.
- 70 R.M. Hare, ‘A School for Philosophers’, *Ratio*, II, 2, February 1960, p. 115.
- 71 ‘A School for Philosophers’, p. 109.
- 72 See Andrew Large, *The Artificial Language Movement*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1985, pp. 162–173.
- 73 Gilbert Ryle, ‘Autobiographical’, p. 15.
- 74 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Austin and the Early Beginnings of Oxford Philosophy’, in Isaiah Berlin *et al.*, *Essays on J.L. Austin*, p. 1.
- 75 Gilbert Ryle, ‘Autobiographical’, p. 15.
- 76 ‘A School for Philosophers’, pp. 113–4.
- 77 See Ryle’s introduction to Gilbert Ryle *et al.*, *The Revolution in Philosophy*, London, Macmillan, 1956, pp. 1–4.
- 78 Gilbert Ryle in David Pears, ed., *The Nature of Metaphysics*, p. 150.
- 79 P.F. Strawson, ‘On Referring’, *Mind* LIX, 235, July 1950, p. 335.
- 80 R.M. Hare, review of Stephen Toulmin, *An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics*, *Philosophical Quarterly* I, 4, July 1951, pp. 372–5.
- 81 The remark is reported with some dismay in H.J. Paton, ‘Fifty Years of Philosophy’, p. 351.
- 82 P.F. Strawson, ‘The Post-Linguistic Thaw’, p. lx.
- 83 Stuart Hampshire, review of *The Concept of Mind*, *Mind* LIX, 234, April 1950, p. 238, reprinted in Wood and Pitcher, *Ryle*, p. 18.
- 84 Frege (1848–1925) was hardly mentioned in Urmson’s *Philosophical Analysis* (1956), but acknowledgement grew as a result of the efforts of Michael Dummett, for instance in his article on Frege in *The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers*, edited by J.O. Urmson, London, 1960. See also Antony Flew, ed., *Logic and Language*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1951, p. 10, n. 1.
- 85 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung* (1918), translated into English by C.K. Ogden, the inventor of Basic English, under the unfortunate title – suggested by G.E. Moore – of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, London, Routledge, 1922.
- 86 See D.F. Pears, ‘Logical Atomism’, in Gilbert Ryle *et al.*, *The Revolution in Philosophy*.
- 87 See J.O. Urmson, *Philosophical Analysis: its Development between the two World Wars*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1956.
- 88 Stephen Toulmin, review of Rudolph Carnap, *Logical Foundations of Probability*, *Mind* LXII, 245, January 1953, p. 99.
- 89 G.E. Moore (1873–1958) explained some of this programme in his essay ‘A Defence of Common Sense’ (1923), reprinted in the posthumous *Philosophical Papers*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959.
- 90 Iris Murdoch, ‘Metaphysics and Ethics’, p. 100.
- 91 G.A. Paul, ‘G.E. Moore: Analysis, Common Usage, and Common Sense’, in Gilbert Ryle *et al.*, *The Revolution in Philosophy*, pp. 67, 69; on Moore’s ‘famous taciturnity’ see Quentin Bell,

- Virginia Woolf, London, Hogarth, 1972, II, 215.
- 92 A.J. Ayer, *Part of my Life*, London, Collins, 1977, p. 150. Ayer refers here to G.E. Moore, and the same comparison with the little boy is to be found, for example, in C.D. Broad, 'The Local Background of Contemporary Cambridge Philosophy', in C.A. Mace, ed., *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century: a Cambridge Symposium*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1957, p. 51.
- 93 Antony Flew, ed., *Logic and Language*, p. 10.
- 94 They were eventually published as *The Blue and Brown Books*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1958.
- 95 *The Blue and Brown Books*, p. 18.
- 96 See J.O. Urmson, *Philosophical Analysis*, pp. 169–182.
- 97 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 109.
- 98 P.F. Strawson, review of *Philosophical Investigations*, *Mind* LXIII, 249, January 1954, pp. 78, 99.
- 99 Bertrand Russell, *My Philosophical Development*, p. 214.
- 100 Gilbert Ryle, 'Autobiographical', p. 11.
- 101 G.J. Warnock, interviewed in Ved Mehta, *The Fly and the Fly-bottle*, p. 55.
- 102 D.F. Pears, 'Logical Atomism', in *The Revolution in Philosophy*, pp. 54–5.
- 103 A.J. Ayer and Raymond Winch, eds, *British Empirical Philosophers*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952.
- 104 Iris Murdoch, 'Metaphysics and Ethics', in *The Nature of Metaphysics*, p. 99.
- 105 In Ireland, apart from the work of the protestant Trinity College Dublin, catholic priests maintained an unbroken tradition of scholasticism, though it had no academic base until the foundation of Queen's University in Belfast in 1845. In Wales, the colleges which formed the University of Wales at the end of the nineteenth century required a philosophical training in nearly all their arts students. In 1952, there was even a philosophical journal in Welsh. (See H.D. Lewis, 'The Position of Philosophy in the University of Wales', in Canguilhem, ed., *The Teaching of Philosophy*, pp. 137–40.) And in the three ancient universities of Scotland, there was a continuous tradition of compulsory moral philosophy. The English versions of many philosophical classics were due to Scots translators. *Mind* itself began as a Scottish journal, and its first issue said that there were as yet no professional philosophers south of the border. By 1900 however the Scots began to feel they were being taken over by the English. (See Norman Kemp Smith, 'The Scots Philosophical Club', *Philosophical Quarterly* I, 1, October 1950, pp. 1–4.)
- 106 R.M. Hare, interviewed in Ved Mehta, *The Fly and the Fly-bottle*, p. 47.
- 107 T.D. Weldon, review of Hermann Wein, *Das Problem des Relativismus*, *Mind* LX, 240, October 1951, p. 567.
- 108 C.A. Mace, review of P.J.R. Dempsey, *The Psychology of Sartre*, *Mind* LXI, 243, July 1952, pp. 425–427.
- 109 Isaiah Berlin, review of Benedetto Croce, *My Philosophy*, *Mind* LXI, 244, October 1952, pp. 574–575.
- 110 P.F. Strawson, review of Maxime Chastaing, *La philosophie de Virginia Woolf*, *Mind* LXIII, 252, October 1954, pp. 574–575.
- 111 A.J. Ayer, *Part of my Life*, pp. 284–5, 299.
- 112 A.J. Ayer, *More of My Life*, pp. 28–9; see also 'Reflections on Existentialism' (1966), in A.J. Ayer, *Metaphysics and Common Sense*, London, Macmillan, 1969, pp. 203–218.
- 113 A.J. Ayer, *More of My Life*, pp. 26–7. Perhaps the reference was to the discussion of the emptiness of a jug in Heidegger's essay 'The Thing' (1950), translated by Albert Hofstadter in Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, New York, Harper and Row 1971.
- 114 R.M. Hare, 'A School for Philosophers', pp. 114–5.
- 115 The date of 1958 is given in Ernest Gellner, *Words and Things*, (1959), Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968, p. 242, n. 1, which rules out 1960, which has been given elsewhere.
- 116 Leslie Beck, Jean Wahl, et al., *La philosophie analytique*, Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie, IV, Paris, Minuit, 1962, p. 230.
- 117 Gilbert Ryle, 'La phénoménologie contre *The Concept of Mind*,' *La philosophie analytique*, pp. 67–68. The text quoted here is the English original, published in his *Philosophical Papers*, London, Hutchinson, 1971, pp. 180–182.
- 118 *La philosophie analytique*, pp. 85–7.
- 119 *La philosophie analytique*, pp. 87, 375, 344.
- 120 *La philosophie analytique*, pp. 93–4, 99. A translation of this exchange is available in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Texts and Dialogues*, edited by Hugh J. Silverman and James Barry, New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1992, pp. 65–6, 71.
- 121 Karl Popper (1902) came to the LSE in 1947, having spent ten years in New Zealand after leaving his native Austria. His *The Open Society and its Enemies* (1945) was well-received (see for example Ryle's review in *Mind* LVI, 222, April 1947, pp. 167–72), but he was isolated as a result of his implacable hostility to 'Wittgenstein and his school' with their belief that 'genuine philosophical problems do not exist'. (Karl Popper, 'Philosophy of Science: A Personal Report,' in C.A. Mace, *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*, p. 183, reprinted in Popper's *Conjectures and Refutations*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, p. 44.) Popper remained truculent: 'I claim that there are philosophical problems; and even that I have solved them'. (*Unended Quest, an Intellectual Autobiography*, London, Collins Fontana, 1976, p. 124.)
- 122 *The Times*, 5 November 1959, p. 13.
- 123 Ernest Gellner (1925–), interviewed in Ved Mehta, *The Fly and the Fly-bottle*, p. 36.
- 124 Ernest Gellner, *Words and Things*, with an introduction by Bertrand Russell, (1959), Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968, pp. 288–9, 176, 257, 249, 264–5, 272–3.
- 125 Elizabeth Anscombe, Sydenham High and St Hugh's; J.L. Austin, Shrewsbury and Balliol; Isaiah Berlin, St Paul's and Corpus; Michael Dummett, Winchester and Christ Church; A.G.N. Flew, Kingswood and St. John's; Phillipa Foot, privately and Somerville; Stuart Hampshire, Repton and Balliol; R.M. Hare, Rugby and Balliol; H.L.A. Hart, Cheltenham College, Bradford Grammar School, New; Iris Murdoch, Badminton and Somerville; P.H. Nowell-Smith, Winchester and New; David Pears, Westminster and Balliol; Anthony Quinton, Stowe and Christchurch; Gilbert Ryle, Brighton College and Queen's; P.F. Strawson, Christ's College Finchley and St John's; Stephen Toulmin, Oundle and King's, Cambridge; J.O. Urmson, Kingswood and Corpus; G.J. Warnock, Winchester and New; Mary Warnock, St Swithun's Winchester and Lady Margaret Hall; Bernard Williams, Chigwell and Balliol.
- 126 Bertrand Russell, interviewed in Ved Mehta, *The Fly and the Fly-bottle*, p. 40.
- 127 'Perhaps this explains why I find London much more exciting than Oxford', A.J. Ayer, interviewed in Ved Mehta, *The Fly and the Fly-bottle*, p. 69.
- 128 Of the 340 philosophy books, mostly in English but some in foreign languages, which were reviewed in the *TLS* in the fifties, 20 (less than 6 per cent) were Oxfordian; 46 (14 per cent) were analytic in the old style of Russell; 83 (24 per cent) were idealist; and no less than 79 (23 per cent) were 'continental,' mostly existentialist. The remaining 112 (33 per cent) do not fit any of these categories.
- 129 Anon. (in fact J.L. Austin), review of *The Concept of Mind*, *Times Literary Supplement*, 7 April 1950, reprinted in Wood and Pitcher, eds, *Ryle*, pp. 45–51.
- 130 John Wisdom (1904–), who taught at Cambridge, had been a colleague of Wittgenstein, but was never suspected of being a

- 'disciple'. He was an adherent of the Basic English movement (see his *Interpretation and Analysis in Relation to Bentham's Theory of Definition*, Psyche Miniatures, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1931). His paper 'Philosophical Perplexity' (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, XXXVII, 1936-7, reprinted in his *Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1953) was for many years taken to be the closest statement of Wittgenstein's later, unpublished doctrines, and is described by Urmson as 'the first manifesto of a new way of doing philosophy' (*Philosophical Analysis*, p. 178).
- 131 'The Philosophy of 1951', *Times Literary Supplement*, 24 August 1951, p. x.
- 132 C.D. Broad, review of H.H. Price, *Thinking and Experience*, *Mind* LXIII, 251, July 1954, p. 403.
- 133 Anon., review of Antony Flew, ed., *Essays in Conceptual Analysis*, *Times Literary Supplement*, 8 March 1957, p. 149.
- 134 G.J. Warnock, foreword to Isaiah Berlin et al., *Essays on J.L. Austin*, p. v.
- 135 See for example Friedrich Waismann, *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*, edited by Rom Harré, London, Macmillan, 1965.
- 136 See for example John Searle, *Speech Acts*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969; Stephen C. Levinson, *Pragmatics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983; Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action* (1981), translated by Thomas McCarthy, 2 vols, Boston, Beacon Press, 1984.
- 137 Gilbert Ryle, 'Systematically misleading expressions', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, XXXII, 1931-2, reprinted in A.G.N. Flew, ed., *Logic and Language*, pp. 11-12.
- 138 C.H. Langford, 'The Notion of Analysis in Moore's Philosophy,' in P.A. Schilpp, ed., *The Philosophy of G.E. Moore*, La Salle, Illinois, Open Court, p. 323.
- 139 The criticism was made very cogently by W.V.O. Quine particularly in his 'Mr Strawson on Logical Theory', *Mind* LXII, 248, October 1953, reprinted in *The Ways of Paradox*, New York, Random House, 1966.
- 140 Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, London, Hutchinson, 1949, p. 10.
- 141 Stuart Hampshire, review of *The Concept of Mind*, *Mind* LIX, 234, April 1950, pp. 239-241, reprinted in Wood and Pitcher, eds, Ryle, pp. 20-23.
- 142 Gilbert Ryle, review of *Sein und Zeit*, *Mind* XXXVIII, 151, July 1929, p. 364; reprinted in Murray, ed., *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy*, p. 57.
- 143 George Pitcher, 'Austin: a personal memoir', in Isaiah Berlin et al., *Essays on J.L. Austin*, p. 24.
- 144 J.L. Austin in *La philosophie analytique*, p. 292.
- 145 'Mon credo se ramène en gros à m'excuser de ne pas faire ce qu'il n'entre nullement en mon propos de faire', *La philosophie analytique*, p. 375.

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