Writing towards the end of his life, the outlook for phenomenology seemed bleak even to Husserl: ʻPhilosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous science – the dream is over.ʼ  This apparently gloomy assessment was echoed, some three decades later, by Heidegger, who observed, also towards the end of his life, that the ʻage of phenomenological philosophy seems to be over. It is already taken as something past which is only recorded historically along with other schools of philosophy.ʼ  What hope can phenomenology have in our own country, when, as Michael Dummett reminds us – seemingly without either irony or regret – at the outset of his Preface for this new edition of Husserlʼs ﬁrst work of phenomenology, the ʻLogical Investigations [is] little known to English-speaking students of philosophy but well known to most students of the subject with a different mother tongueʼ?*The possible demise of phenomenology may be related to two prevalent tendencies in contemporary philosophy. On the one hand, as Heidegger had already anticipated, phenomenology has more and more become something to be studied as a historical event or school of thought, and this is particularly the case in departments which teach ʻcontinental philosophyʼ, in both the UK and the United States. On the other hand, phenomenology – or at any rate, certain, non-threatening aspects of its early, so-called ʻrealistʼ, pre-transcendental incarnation – has gradually been assimilated by such representatives of the analytical tradition as Dreyfus, Puttnam and Dummett himself (not to mention that whole school of analytic interpreters of Husserl so egregiously represented by the Cambridge Companion to Husserl). The problem with both of these tendencies is that they stiﬂe the essence of phenomenology as a movement, as a practice or activity of thought: namely, its ʻradicalityʼ. For phenomenology is, ﬁrst and foremost, a way of doing philosophy, and, as such, it makes extraordinary demands on the phenomenological philosopher. The phenomenologist ﬁnds himor herself continually obliged to ʻbegin againʼ. Rather than relying on the authority of the ʻgreat philosophersʼ, the phenomenologist is entreated to focus instead solely on die Sachen selbst, the matters at hand. To maintain such a focus, it is essential that the phenomenologist ʻrelinquish the untested use of philosophical knowledgeʼ.  All of this goes against the grain of how we are, today, taught to do philosophy.
One of the few recent trends in phenomenological philosophy to have respected this radicality is represented by the work of the Phénoménologie et Cognition research group, in Paris. Sadly, the recent and most untimely death of Francisco Varela has robbed this group of its most distinguished and impressive thinker. The overarching objective of the group is to enable a productive rapprochement between phenomenology and research aiming to achieve a scientiﬁc theory of cognition. Representatives of this group are happy to grant that this project leaves no room for engaging in exegesis of Husserlʼs work; indeed, as they concede, success in the project would be dependent upon a ʻreorientationʼ of Husserlian phenomenology. In many ways, theirs is an ambitious and exciting project, and Does phenomenology have a future?
* Edmund Husserl, The Shorter Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Findlay, edited and abridged with a new Introduction by Dermot Moran and a new Preface by Michael Dummett, Routledge, London, 2001. lxxxv + 422 pp. £16.99 pb., 0 415 24192
8. ^ Routledge have also published a new two-volume paperback edition of Findlayʼs complete 1970 translation of the Logical Investigations, also edited by Dermot Moran, £18.99 each, 0 415 24189 8 (vol. 1), 0 415 24190 1 (vol. 2). Critical editions of the Logische Untersuchungen were published in 1975 by Kluwer as volumes XVII and XIX.i/ii (edited by Elmar Holenstein) of the magniﬁcent Husserliana series. These editions were in turn reprinted in 1992 as volumes 2, 3 and 4 of the eight-volume Gesammelte Schriften, edited by Elisabeth Stréker, published by Felix Meiner.much of the work contained in the recent collection Naturalizing Phenomenology is indeed stimulating.  The problem with this project is, of course, betrayed by the provocative title of the collection. The editors are honest enough to confront head-on Husserlʼs explicit ʻanti-naturalismʼ, beginning their detailed Introduction with the following epigraph, drawn from Husserlʼs 1911 essay ʻPhenomenology as Rigorous Scienceʼ: ʻWe are ﬁghting against the naturalization of consciousness.ʼ The anti-naturalist stance worked out in detail in this essay, and further honed in The Crisis, was already evident in the critique of psychologism which constitutes the main body of the ﬁrst part of the Logical Investigations, the ʻProlegomena to Pure Logicʼ. At this point, and despite the compelling arguments advanced by the representatives of the group, it remains a moot point whether this research can, in the long run, remain in any meaningful way compatible with phenomenology.
There have been a number of other developments, particularly in France, where new philosophical positions have emerged from a confrontation with phenomenology. Ricoeurʼs hermeneutics, Derridaʼs deconstruction and Merleau-Pontyʼs chiasmic ontology of the ﬂesh all have their points of departure in Husserlian phenomenology. But it is perhaps the work of Levinas which is most explicit in continually reappraising its phenomenological roots, even as it appears to move further and further away from any possible afﬁnity with Husserlʼs thought. Yet, again, what is apparent from reﬂection upon these thinkers, and speciﬁcally upon Levinasʼs writing, is that, in each case, what is distinctive and essential about their philosophical position derives from the break with phenomenology effected by them. In each case, much of the momentum in their thought derives from the purchase gained by working against phenomenology. It doesnʼt amount to much of a future if all phenomenology can look forward to is serving as a critical stalking horse.
However, the evidence pointing to phenomenologyʼs demise is certainly not straightforward. It is possible, for instance, to disclose a much closer afﬁnity to Husserl than is normally appreciated in Levinasʼs work of the 1970s and 1980s, to the extent that one could even argue that the critical stance adopted towards Husserlian phenomenology in Totality and Inﬁnity has been more or less reversed in the later work.  Moreover, as Moran reminds us in his Introduction to this new edition of the Investigations, Derrida ʻhas acknowledged that his whole philosophical impetus arises out of his studies on Husserlʼ. And if we return to our earlier citation from Heidegger, we ﬁnd that the claim that the age of phenomenology is over, because phenomenology is now treated historically as a school of philosophy, is immediately called into question: ʻBut in what is most its own, phenomenology is not a school. It is the possibility of thinking, at times changing and only thus persisting, of corresponding to the claim of what is to be thought.ʼ  Finally, we must also admit that our own citation from Husserl opens a short essay which, far from dwelling on the end of the dream of phenomenology, in fact reiterates the necessity of the new historical turn in phenomenology, which is continually worked out in all of the texts of The Crisis. Can there be any better evidence of the fecundity of Husserlʼs work than this new departure stemming from his own immanent critique, undertaken when he was well into his seventies?
It seems to me, therefore, that the question of phenomenologyʼs future, provoked by the publication of this new edition of the ﬁrst work of phenomenology, requires us to determine whether Husserlian phenomenology still possesses that potential for radicality which was previously identiﬁed as its essence.
AN inseparable connection
There is no better text to study than the Investigations if we seek an answer to this question. On the one hand, it remains the most concrete of all the work published during Husserlʼs lifetime. It is a text that is overﬂowing with exemplary phenomenological analyses, and to that extent is distinct from texts such as the Ideas, which are far more concerned with questions of method, and of the philosophical status of phenomenological inquiry as such. On the other hand, it is the text which singlehandedly changed the course of philosophy in Germany. Not only were the Prolegomena successful in, as Dummett correctly observes, ʻkilling off the inﬂuence of psychologism within German philosophyʼ; the Investigations as a whole were, within a decade, successful in inaugurating a new ʻphenomenological movementʼ, one which was soon recognized by such inﬂuential philosophical ﬁgures as Natorp, Dilthey, Wundt and Rickert, not to mention inspiring a generation of younger philosophers such as Heidegger, Scheler, Ingarden and Gadamer, who were to have a decisive inﬂuence on the development of European philosophy in the twentieth century.
But, clearly, this historical impact of the Investigations is something which is lost to the contemporary reader. The stiﬂing inﬂuences of post-Hegelian idealism at one extremity, and psychologism at the other, lie well beyond our contemporary ken. Equally, it must be admitted that Husserl has, in his written work, done little to promote the cause of phenomenology to the modern reader. The Logical Investigations is both dauntingly long, at close on 800 pages, and written in a dense, unrelenting, style which offers little in the way of help or relief to the reader.  In turning once again to Husserl, therefore, it is well to pay heed to Heidegger. When we read the Investigations today, is it still possible to discern the possibility of a response to the claim of that which is to be thought? For it is only if we are able to answer this question positively that we will be able, in turn, to afﬁrm phenomenologyʼs continuing potential for radicality.
It remains well enough known that phenomenologyʼs decisive ﬁnding is that of intentionality, the underlying structure of consciousness expressed in the formula that all consciousness is consciousness-of. Whatever else we do, it is of the utmost importance that, if we are to do phenomenology, we must understand this claim in its full radicality. Strangely enough, it may well be that Deleuze, of all people, is best able to help us accomplish this. He rightly identiﬁes a crisis in the psychology of the late nineteenth century which, in many ways, still works contemporary philosophical debates from within. This crisis emerges from the acknowledgement of an impossible position:
This position involved placing images in consciousness and movements in space. In consciousness there would be only images – these were qualitative and without extension. In space there would be only movements – these were extended and quantitative.
But how is it possible to pass from one order to the other? How is it possible to explain that movements, all of a sudden, produce an image – as in perception – or that the image produces a movement – as in voluntary action?
Deleuze identiﬁes the responses of ʻtwo very different authorsʼ who, at more or less the same time, undertook the task of overcoming the ʻduality of image and movement, of consciousness and thingʼ. On the one hand, Bergson seeks to argue that ʻall consciousness is somethingʼ, working this position out by means, as Deleuze would have it, of the ʻmovement-imageʼ; whereas Husserl argues that ʻall consciousness is consciousness of somethingʼ. 
Deleuzeʼs formulation discloses the profundity of these two distinct responses to the impossible position. His appropriation of the Bergsonist position, based on the ﬁrst chapter of Matter and Memory, has become justly famous. It underpins, I would contend, the only credible alternative to the phenomenological (and subsequently, in the case of Heidegger, phenomenological–ontological, and even, in the case of Levinas, phenomenological–ethical) response to this problem. The signiﬁcance of this Bergsonist position is precisely the way in which it conceives of movement as an image, thereby in turn revealing the deep signiﬁcance of Bergsonʼs work on duration and movement in Time and Free Will. In comparison, what Deleuzeʼs formulation gestures towards in the Husserlian position is the irreducible relationality underpinning the phenomenological conception of intentionality. And it is, I believe, in the fundamental importance accorded to a certain ʻa prioriʼ relationality that the Logical Investigations responds most importantly to the claim of that which is to be thought.
This aspect of the phenomenological inquiry as it is developed in the Logical Investigations is initially adumbrated in Chapter 11 of the Prolegomena, ʻThe Idea of Pure Logicʼ.  Now, despite the reputation which it has gradually accumulated, the ﬁrst volume of the Investigations does not solely consist in the critique of psychologism. (For the record, this critique comprises Chapters 3 to 9 of the Prolegomena). Its more fundamental objective is to establish the necessity and coherence of the idea of a ʻpure logicʼ – that is, a ʻtheoretical science independent of everything empiricalʼ – which would, in turn, ʻrender possible a technology of scientiﬁc knowledgeʼ [Prolegomena, §57] – in other words, a ʻscience of scienceʼ. The point of the critique of psychologism is to demonstrate once and for all the inadmissibility of that line of thinking which seeks to show that all concepts, logical or otherwise, have their provenance in, and thereby can only be explained by reference to, those ʻinner mental operationsʼ which are ʻsupposedly involved in attaining themʼ. What the critique conﬁrms is that, while psychology is undoubtedly useful in revealing something of the mental processes which may occur during the initial phases in which concepts have their origin, it is quite unable to account for that quality of ideality which marks the independence of concepts from the particularity of any actual mental event. Pythagorasʼ theorem both possesses the same meaning, and is true and valid, for anyone who thinks it, at any time and in any place.
Thus, Husserl argues at the outset of Chapter 11 that ʻwhat makes science science … is certainly not its psychology, nor any real context into which acts of thought are ﬁtted, but rather a certain objective or ideal interconnection which gives these acts a unitary objective relevance, and, in such unitary relevance, an ideal validity.ʼ Logical Investigations as a whole therefore seeks to effect a passage from ʻthe psychological connections of thinking, to the logical unity of the thought-content (the unity of theory)ʼ (ʻForewordʼ to 1st edn, p. 2). However, as Husserl proceeds to point out, this logical unity or objective interconnection can function both as an interconnection of things (that is, the unity of a science could derive from the interconnection between the ﬁeld of objects that it studies – typical of ʻconcreteʼ sciences such as natural history) and an interconnection of truths (whereby the unity of the particular fundamental lawfulness explored by the science would derive from the interconnection between the principles of explanation exploited by that science – typical of ʻabstractʼ sciences, such as mathematics). The goal of the Logical Investigations would thus be the achievement of a pure logic understood as pure a priori science (a pure theory of any judgement – or signiﬁcational formation – whatsoever), balanced by an equivalent pure a priori science of objects (a pure theory of any object whatsoever), which is worked out in the formal ontology of the Third Investigation. But already, as Husserl subsequently reﬂected, Chapter 11 of the Prolegomena had revealed the ʻinseparable connectionʼ between the ʻApriori of formal ontologyʼ and the ʻapophantic Aprioriʼ, and so, as a consequence, had brought out an awareness of ʻthe problem of how this inseparability should be understood.ʼ 
This inseparability is evident from the fact that the sense of any judgement whatsoever is dependent upon its having some bearing upon some possible objectivity – a judgement, however well formed, which is literally about nothing is, in the ﬁnal analysis, senseless. Thus, on a level higher than that of the pure a priori theories of any-judgements-whatsoever, on the one hand, and of any-objects-whatsoever, on the other, what is required is a unitary theory of ʻjudgement-systems in their entiretyʼ, a pure theory of the unity of any ʻpossible deductive theoryʼ  – that is, a pure theory of the possible form of any-theory-whatsoever. Husserl responds to this need by turning to the Riemannian theory of multiplicities (Mannigfaltigkeitslehre).
What is remarkable about multiplicities, as Riemann described them, is that, on the one hand, they are distinct from mere aggregates, to the extent that they are determined by a certain speciﬁc ʻlawfulnessʼ – that is, a series of ʻoperationsʼ to which the elements of the multiplicity are subject. On the other hand, however, the multiplicity is distinct from ʻsetsʼ properly socalled, to the extent that the elements of the multiplicity are not determined in advance in their concrete mathematical nature. The apophantic apriori and the apriori of formal ontology thus converge within the theory of multiplicities:
The objective correlate of the concept of a possible theory, determined only in its form, is the concept of any possible ﬁeld of cognition [Erkenntnisgebiets] that would be governed by a theory having such a form. Such a ﬁeld, however, the mathematician (in their sphere) calls a multiplicity [Mannigfaltigkeit].
Husserl proceeds to specify the nature of the ʻformʼ that determines the possible theory, and thereby, at the same time, ʻgovernsʼ the ﬁeld of cognition or objective correlate of the theory:
among the objects belonging to the ﬁeld, certain relations [Verknüpfungen] are possible, which come under certain fundamental laws having such and such a determinate form (here, the only determining condition). In respect of their matter the objects remain completely indeterminate … Thus, they are determined, neither directly as individual or speciﬁc singularities, nor indirectly by their intrinsic species or genera, but exclusively by the form of the relations ascribed to them. These relations themselves are accordingly as little determined in respect of content as the objects connected; only their form is determined, namely by the form of the elementary laws assumed to hold good for them. These laws, then, determine both the ﬁeld and its form, and the theory that can be built, or, more correctly, the theory-form.… The multiplicity is determined by the circumstance that the thought-objects belonging to it make possible [ermöglichen] these ʻoperationsʼ. (Prolegomena, §70)I have quoted this passage at length because, I believe, it discloses the operative principles of Husserlʼs phenomenology. Let us underscore the salient features: First, the only determining condition of the multiplicity is the determinate form of those laws which govern (both the form and the ﬁeld of) the multiplicity. Second, the matter of the objects of the multiplicity remains undetermined. It is determined solely by ʻthe form of the relations ascribed to themʼ. Third, the content of these relations themselves is equally undetermined. Finally, it is the objects of the multiplicity that actualize, or make possible, these very relations.
It is noteworthy that both Husserl and Bergson, in seeking to develop a response to what Deleuze styled the ʻimpossible positionʼ of contemporary psychology, should have recourse to the theory of multiplicities. In the characterization of Husserl I am developing here, I am consciously allowing certain elements of Deleuzeʼs explication of Bergsonʼs use of multiplicities to exercise a determining function. Bearing this in mind, what I believe to be most signiﬁcant in this account for philosophy today is, on the one hand, the speciﬁc nature of the a priori determinate relations governing the multiplicityʼs ʻﬁeld and its formʼ.  This provides us with the clue as to how we must undertake our phenomenological investigations if we are to respect the radical impetus of phenomenology. On the other hand, there is an important ontological hint contained within this account: while the determinate forms of the relations are a priori with respect to the matter of the objects determined by these relations, nevertheless the objects themselves are not simply secondary to these relations, for they precisely make possible the relations. This ʻnon-indifferenceʼ of the relations to those objects which they determine accords, very closely, to one speciﬁc aspect of the ontology of immanence which Deleuze begins to delineate in Difference and Repetition.
We can use the aprioricity of relations derived from the theory of multiplicities to chart a course through the Investigations. We recall that the Prolegomena established that there is an ʻidealityʼ of sense, whose status entails the ʻrepeatability as the sameʼ of that sense in any particular empirical situation. The First Investigation extends the analysis of ideal sense into the speciﬁc realm of language and signiﬁcation. The Second Investigation critically assesses traditional theories of abstract ideas, showing by implication that, to the extent that they inevitably hypostatize universals, they are inadequate for theorizing ideality. In the Third Investigation, Husserl advances his formal ontology, developed in terms of a ʻTheory of Parts and Wholesʼ. This is something of a misnomer – it is, in fact, a theory of relations. Recalling the theory of multiplicities, we can see that it is an ontology founded on the a priori determinate relations of dependence and independence. Any object whatsoever will be analysed according to its determination either by the relation of dependence (thus, in the analysis of our consciousness of inner-time, for example, Husserl shows that the present cannot exist independently of its ʻcometʼs tailʼ of retentions and protentions) or of independence (a table leg, for instance, can exist independently of a table). As recent work on this Investigation has begun to make clear, these analyses are crucial for the rest of the book; indeed, it has been plausibly argued that all of the subsequent inquiries are worked out within the horizon opened up by these initial analyses of dependent and independent relations. Initially, the Fourth Investigation repeats the same formal analyses, but focusing on the grammatical relations in any possible language, rather than on the ontological relations in a ﬁeld of any possible objects.
In the Fifth Investigation, we come at last upon the theory of intentionality. Now, it is clear that we can recast this theory as revealing the dependent relations that subsist between consciousness and its objects. As a consequence, of course, we could go on to demonstrate, on this basis, the precise nature of the mistakes that give rise to epistemological dualism. And it is just this line of reasoning which can sustain much of phenomenologyʼs liberating quality for philosophers today. However, I think we can push the signiﬁcance of the aprioricity of relations much further. It seems to me that the key to carrying out intentional analyses is always to begin with the relation, rather than seeking to construct a relation between already extant objects. We must not begin with the notion of a transcendental subject, for example, and then seek to explain its various properties and ways of interacting with the ﬂow of consciousness. Rather, we should seek to show how subject and object emerge as such through being so determined by relations which govern the ﬂow as ﬁeld. We must, that is, begin with the ﬂow as ﬁeld, and seek to explicate those determinate relations which govern the ﬁeld. In this way, we can then investigate how the relata emerge as a determination of the relation. The key in all of this is not to begin with preconceptions derived from, for instance, the history of philosophy. Thus, we might analyse the relation of perception, ﬁnding how the perceiving and the perceived emerge as such from the prior relation. As before, we would thereby be able to show the way in which the assumption that we perceive representations inevitably undermines traditional theories of perception. And this Husserl indeed does in §14 of the Sixth Investigation, where he demonstrates that the relation between perceiver and perceived is quite distinct from that between representer and represented, with the consequence that the relata themselves are determined in distinct ways.
However, the most signiﬁcant of the analyses conducted in the Investigations is to be found in the second section of the Sixth Investigation, which deals with ʻcategorial intuitionsʼ. This analysis represents the highest goal of the Investigations. In the adequate unity of categorial and sensuous intuition, we attain the dignity of true knowledge, or evidence. Equally, the phenomenological demonstration of the possibility of intuiting categories represents Husserlʼs response to the failure of traditional theories of abstract ideas, and hence his demonstration of how we can have actual, concrete and productive experiences of the idealities ﬁrst uncovered in the Prolegomena, and which are, of course, a necessary condition of any scientiﬁc work in the broadest sense.
These analyses were subjected to a remarkable reading by Heidegger in his 1925 lecture course.  Husserl had shown that categorial intuitions are founded upon sensuous intuitions, and that, as a consequence, we, so to speak, see through the sensuously intuited object to the category which is founded upon it. This is, as Heidegger argues so forcibly, a notable departure in the history of philosophy. However, he also goes on to show that sensuous intuitions are themselves founded upon categorial intuitions, to the extent that it is the category which enables us to intuit the sensible object as such. Thus, while I can intuit the categorial relation of ʻbeing aboveʼ by intuiting the computer on top of my desk, it is only through being founded in this categorial relation that I am able to see the computer as being, precisely, ʻon top ofʼ the desk. There is, therefore, a co-founding relation between sensuous and categorial intuitions, and we now know that for Heidegger this co-founding relation contained an anticipation of his own articulation of the ontological difference.
But if we review Husserlʼs analysis of the relation between sensuous and categorial intuitions from the perspective of the theory of multiplicities, we can see that Heideggerʼs reading had, in a sense, been anticipated. For, as we have suggested, one of the key aspects of Husserlʼs account of the theory of multiplicities is his claim that while it is the relations which determine the objects, it is these objects which ʻmake possibleʼ the relations. This formulation clearly anticipates Heideggerʼs articulation of the co-founding relation between sensuous and categorial intuitions.
It is at the level of this profoundly ontological interpretation of the signiﬁcance of Husserlʼs theory of multiplicities that we once again encounter the claim of that which is to be thought. The phenomenologist offers a richly productive way of responding to this claim through the aprioricity of relations which emerges from Husserlʼs account of the theory of multiplicities. It is within this context – unfortunately omitted from the ʻshorterʼ edition – that we can, I believe, offer a conﬁdently afﬁrmative response to the question of phenomenologyʼs future today.
1. ^ E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Philosophy, trans. D. Carr, Northwestern University Press, Evanston IL, 1970, p. 389. This remark dates from ʻSummer 1935ʼ.
2. ^ M. Heidegger, ʻMy Way to Phenomenologyʼ, in On Time and Being, trans. J. Stambaugh, Harper & Row, New York, 1972, p. 82.
3. ^ Ibid., p. 78.
4. ^ J. Petitot, F.J. Varela, B. Pachoud and J.-M. Roy, eds, Naturalizing Phenomenology, Stanford University Press,
Stanford CA, 1999.
5. ^ I demonstrate one element of this afﬁnity in ʻSpeaking of Time … Husserl and Levinas on the Saying of Timeʼ, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol. 30, no. 1, 1999, pp. 35–58.
6. ^ Heidegger, ʻMy Way to Phenomenologyʼ, p. 82.
7. ^ These latter shortcomings have, unfortunately, tended to be exacerbated by Husserlʼs English translators – Dermot Moranʼs observation that ʻFindlay has produced a powerful translationʼ, one in which the ʻprose [is] smooth, clear, even elegantʼ, provoked much rueful perplexity amongst participants in concurrent seminars devoted to the Investigations at Staffordshire and Manchester Metropolitan universities last year. His earlier admission, that most commentators agree as to the ʻuneven, fragmentary and sprawling characterʼ of the Investigations, is surely more appropriate.
8. ^ G. Deleuze, Cinema 1, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, Athlone, London, 1986, p. 56.
9. ^ It is one of the frustrating, though inevitable, consequences of abridging the Investigations to a single, manageable, volume that certain key sections are omitted – in this case, the crucially important §70 of Chapter 11, ʻElucidation of the Idea of a pure theory of multiplicities [Mannigfaltigkeitslehre]ʼ.
10. ^ E. Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans.
D. Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1978, p. 86.
Husserl notes that the problem of this relationship was not expressed explicitly in the Investigations, although it can nevertheless be discerned therein from the perspective of the Logic. The difference in perspectives between these two works consists essentially in the supplementation of the ʻobjectivistʼ orientation of the Prolegomena with the turn to subjective problems of constitution in the Logic.
11. ^ Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 90.
12. ^ In a recent essay (ʻImmanence and Difference: Towards a Relation Ontologyʼ, forthcoming in The Southern Journal of Philosophy) I have sought to show why these relations must, ﬁrst and foremost, be differential. One way or another, it is notable that a certain prioritization of relations is a deﬁning characteristic of some of the most remarkable work being done in contemporary theoretical physics. I have in mind, in particular, the work of Lee Smolin and Stuart Kauffman, among others.
13. ^ M. Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, trans. T.
Kisiel, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1985.