the context of an entrepreneurial ethos, the implication is that those who have proved their individual
merit and social worth by attaining positions of
leadership in industry and elsewhere are best
equipped to maintain a civilized and integrated
society. Their tutelage should extend to those who,
having failed to make a success of their lives, are
intent on disrupting good social order and on subverting the natural justice of the free economy:
left-wing militants, ‘loungers’ and ‘scroungers’ on
$oc ial welfare, truculent strikers, and so forth.
the overall effect is to portray the beneficiaries of
market forces as guardians of the public interest.
So, despite its strident rhetoric, the ideology of
the so-called New Right is a variation on the ageworn and familiar conservative defence of class
inequality. Whether it continues to succeed in
marshalling a consensus around a set of highly
sectional and exploitative policies remains to be
seen. Perhaps an alternative consensus, organized
around a social image which truly embodies majority interests, can only be mobilized by a reformed
Labour party prepared to raise fundamental questions about capitalist institutions. This is why the
outcome of the current left/right struggle in the
Labour Movement may be instrumental in determining whether conservatism is finally unmasked in the
eyes of ordinary people as the antithesis of common
1 George Gale, ‘The Popular Communication of a Conservative Message’,
in Conservative Essays, ed. Maurice Cowling, london, Cassell, 1978,
2 I am, of course, drawing upon the debate triggered by Anderson and Nairn
regarding the outlines of English cultural development. The principal
articles relevant to the debate are: Perry Anderson, ‘Origins of the
Present Crisis’, in Towards Soc ialism, ed. Anderson and R. Blackburn
(London, Fontana, 1965), ppll-52; idem, ‘Components of the National
Culture’, in Student Power, ed. Alexander Cockburn and Robin Blackburn
(Rarmoltdsworth, Penguin, 1969), pp214-84; idem, ‘Socialism and
Pseudo-Empiricism’, New Left Review 35 (1966), 2-42; Tom Nairn, ‘The
British Political Elite’, New Left Review 23 (1964), pp19-25; idem, ‘The
English Working Class’, in Ideology in Social Science, ed. R. Blackburn
(London, Fontana, 1972), pp187 -206; Nicos Poulantzas, ‘Marxist Political
Theory in Great Britain’, New Left Review 43 (1967), pp 57-74: E.!’.
Thompson, ‘The Peculiarities of the English’, in The Socialist RegIster,
1965, ed. Ralph Miliband and John Saville (London, Merlin Press, 1965),
pp31l-62. My quarrel with Anderson and Nairn is that, stressing. th~ .
traditional flavour of the dominant ideology, they underplay the slgnifIcance
of bourgeois ingredients. Bourgeois ideas have been more instrument~l
than they acknowledge in shaping an alternative liberal ethos to the aristocratic legacy; and also in nourishing the peculiar, resilient amalgam that
constitutes conservatism. See my ‘The Identity of English Liberalism’,
Politics & Society, 9 (1979), ppl-32; and Richard Johnson, ‘Barrington
Moore, Perry Anderson and English Soc ial Development’, Cultural
Studies 9 (Spring 1976), pp7-28.
3 Peter Walker, The Ascent of Britain London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1977,
4 Sir Keith Joseph, ‘The Class War’, The Guardian, 18 July 1979, p7.
5 Sir Geoffrey Rowe, ‘Urgent need to create wealth’, The Guardian 3.July
6 Margaret Thatcher, ‘A Speech on Christianity and Politics’, London,
Conservative Central Office, 30 March 1978, plO.
This is the first of three short articles on
Heidegger. The second will deal with the argument
of Being and Time. The third will be a critical
evaluation of Heidegger’s whole philosophy.
Heidegger gets mentioned,more and more in the
English-speaking world. He even gets read more
than he used to. His works, however, partake of
what Lovejoy called ‘the pathos of sheer obscurity,
the loveliness of the incomprehensible’.
The reader doesn °t know exactly what they mean,
but they have all the more on that account an air
of sublimity; an agreeable feeling at once of awe
and of exaltation comes over him as he contemplates thoughts of so immeasurable a profundity their profundity being convincingly evidenced by
him by the fact that he can see no bottom to
Heidegger’s thoughts do have a basis. For the
ordinary English reader that basis is obscured
however not only by Heidegger’s mind-bending
style, but by his own ignorance of the cultural
background from which Heidegger’s thinking sprang.
In these articles I want to make Heidegger’s thinking intelligible as a development out of certain
intellectual trends. His popularity is something
else – to be explained not merely as intellectual
fashion but as answering some clearly felt need.
The truth of what he has to say is a different ques8
tion again: one which can only be addressed after
we have really understood what he is getting at.
My aims, then, are threefold: to express as
simply as possible the main outlines of Heidegger’s
thought; to consider his philosophy as a cultural
phenomenon; and to evaluate the truth of what he has
to say. I shall centre my discussion on his only
major work, Being and Time, because this is the
only systematic exposition of his doctrines. I als9
believe that it anticipates all the themes of his
Martin Heidegger was born in 1889 at a small
town in the Black Forest, near Freiburg-imBreisgau. Virtually the whole of his life was spent
in this area of south-west Germany. He was a man
with roots, which he never forgot and from which
he was never tempted to separate himself. His upbringing was catholic and provincial: his father was
sexton of the local church. His gymnasium education
was of ‘the c’onventional humanistic kind: large
doses of the classics, history and Germany literature – almost total neglect of natural science.
Heidegger was a wizard at Greek and Latin, retaining throughout his life the ability to quote large
chunks at the drop of a hat. When he left school in
1909 he went to the seminary at Freiburg university
and began training for the priesthood. Two years
later he switched his major from theology to philo-
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sophy, partly under the influence of Carl Braig, a
theologian who had written a book on ontology. The
other major influence he recognized from this
period of his life was Wilhelm Vtlge, a well-known
art histor ian.
These strands – the classics, theology, literature
and history of art – outcrop repeatedly in all his
mature work. But a word needs to be said about
Heidegger’s switch out of theology. He did not lose
faith. Indeed throughout his life he retained a theistic belief, and it was no mere formality that he
was buried a Catholic. What did happen was that he
came to the conclusion that theology was theoretically ill-founded and that only philosophy could provide a more adequate foundation. He read Luther
and Kierkegaard; he read Dostoevsky and Nietzsche.
He ceased to talk about ‘God’ as personal, though
he was prepared to speak metaphorically of ‘the
The philosophy department into which Heidegger
transferred was dominated (after the fashion of the
time) -by the professor, Heinrich Rickert. To stick
a label on him, Rickert was a neo-Kantian her meneuticist – but let me explain. Between about 1890
and the first world war there was an identifiable
‘school’ of philosophy predominant in south-west
Germany, centred on Heidelberg. Its leading light
was Wilhelm Dilthey; other big names were
Windelband and Rickert. The school was neo-Kantian in that its members generally held that Kant
had got it right so far as he went i. e. his account
of the natural world and our knowledge of it were
correct. Where Kant had failed, they believed, was
in not giving an adequate account of man in his
noumenal or spiritual being – which was not subject
to the same causal determination as his physical
being. The failure was not trivial, for it meant that
the nature of man, and all the sciences which took
man and his artefacts as their objects, were-without philosophical basis. Dilthey, then, was simultaneously seeking a philosophical account of man in
his spiritual or mental being (Geiste) and a methodological underpinning of the humane sciences
(Geisteswissenschaften). He found it in hermeneutics.
‘Hermeneutics’ was a loose but very broad
intellectual movement which ranged far beyond the
confines of academic philosophy. It had its roots in
the tradition of textual exegesis which stemmed
from the practice of the mediaeval universities, and
which gained a new lease of life in the 18th century.
The r’omantic kickback against ‘scientific ‘enlightenment rationalism came together with the new
awareness of historical process in the person of
one Schleiermacher. He argued that reason is in
history, as h.uman individuals, who already have an
understanding of the world (based on language)
prior to the rationalistic search for knowledge.
Hermeneutics, as the science of understanding the
meaning of texts, was not the professional preserve
of academic pedants, but a general capacity of the
human spirit, by which the individual understood
his own humanity and that of others. Schleiermacher
was best remembered as a theologian, but his
ideas spilled over into all the Geisteswissenschaften
and became firmly embodied both in the departments of the reformed German universities, and in
the values of the gymnasium curriculum (which
Early in his career Dilthey (who also, incidentally, had an initial orientation to theology) seized
upon Schleiermacher’s long-neglected work, and
came to see it as the missing link. Hermeneutics,
as the positive cultivation of human understanding,
could not only provide the missing Kantian critique
– that of historical reason; it would also, by an
elucidation of how we grasp meanings in historical
artefacts, articulate with rigour the methodology of
the Geisteswissenschaften, and so justify them visa-vis the Naturwissenschaften. From psychology
to sociology, from theology to art history, all
could (and did) draw upon the hermeneutic tradition
both for their method and their justification.
This tradition provided Heidegger with a number
of concepts and attitudes crucial throughout his
work. First, the notion of ‘discourse’ – language
as a closed circle of meanings which cannot be
known from the outside but which we must get into
by an imaginative leap. Second·, the notion of the
‘Lebenswelt’ or lived-world – the world as the
(essentially) meaningful place in which we live
which provides the basis for all thought and action,
including scientific study of any kind. Third, the
notion of a cultural tradition associated with a
people (Volk), and embodying values transmitted
through certain exceptional artefacts (works of art)
produced by exceptional individuals of ‘great spirit’.
Fourth, the devaluation of natural scientific knowledge and the rationalist epistemologies based on
it. And finally a (theoretical) rejection of modern
technology and all its works as distinctive of what
is essentially human.
The Question of Being
Heidegger was never uncritical of the hermeneutic tradition. From the first he objected to its neoKantianism. Kant (and by implication his followers)
had been so busy worrying about knowledge that he
never got to grips with the prior question of what
exists: ‘the problem of reality simply had no place
in his epistemology’ he wrote in his first published
article (PR, 1912)(1). Here speaks the influence of
Braig, of Brentano, and even of Aristotle(3}; for
before he ever joined the philosophy department he
had become convinced from his reading that what
exists, so far from being self-evident, was
extremely problematical.’ Indeed, it was the most
important problem which philosophy had to face.
This theme, which is utterly central in
Heidegger’s philosophy from his first works to his
last (a span of 64 years), is not to be understood in
purely intellectual terms. As Heidegger himself
made clear, the problem as articulated in language
is based upon a felt experience – of Being.
‘Why are there beings rather than nothing?’ Many
men never encounter this question, if by encounter
we mean … to feel its inevitability. And yet each
of us is grazed at least once . .. by the hidden
power of this question (which) looms in moments
of great despair … when all meaning becomes
obscured … (and) is present in moments of
rejoicing, when all the things around us are
transfigured and seem to be there for the first
time(4) (IM, p1).
The feelings are powerful, but the experience so
difficult to articulate in language:
You can, as it were, small the Being of this
building in your nostrils. The smell communicates the Being of this thing (seiende) far more
immediately and truly than any description or
inspection could ever do … (IM, p27)
This focussing upon the ‘Question of Being’ takes
place with the switch from theology to philosophy.
Heidegger is a man who has felt the presence of God
in all things, but can no longer say ‘God’. Instead
he says ‘Being’, but can’t say anything about it.
He embarked on a life work of attempting to articulate the experience of Being – or of letting Being say
itself through him – only to conclude that this simply
could not be achieved. He consoled himself with the
thought that the attempt must be enough (DSI).
But whatever his private reservations about the
hermeneuticists, in 1911 Heidegger was a humble
apprentice, and Rickert put him through a rigorous
routine of epistemology, logic and theory of
Geisteswissenschaft. This was reflected in his
early publications: a survey of contemporary work
in logic, an essay on ‘psychologism’, a dissertati~n
on the concept of time in historical science. But hIS
major graduate dissertation was on ‘Duns Scotus’
Doctrine of Categories and Meaning’. Significantly,
he found in the mediaeval thinker a doctrine of
meaning superior to any neo-Kantian variant:
thought and reality are unified through expression.
In linguistic expression the intellect articulates the
truth of being. The structure of language mirrors
the structure of the world. The ‘speculative
grammars’ of the mediaevals were therefore not
only getting at the structure of the intellect, but at
the structure of the world(5).
By the time this dissertation was finished in 1915
Heidegger was already doing some teaching.
Although a very junior member of the department he
was clearly very promising, and had a phenomenal
capacity for hard work. Many of his contemporaries
were, of course, being shot to bits. Mter volu.nteering for the army in 1914 he himself had been dIScharged after two months on grounds of ill-health.
Intellectually, he had by now established his basic
problematic, and had gained a great deal from
hermeneutics. But the work with Rickert was at an
end. Fortunately for Heidegger, Rickert left to
take up the chair at Heidelberg. He recommended
as his successor Edmund Husserl.
Husserl was 57 when he arrived in Freiburg in
1916. Always a loner, he had self-consciously tried
to found a new philosophical school (6). Now, after
years of gruelling hard work out in the wilderness,
success was at last beginning to come his way. He
had been trained as a mathematician, and had come
to philosophy by way of logic, in a search for adequate foundations. The core of philosophy as far as
he was concerned was epistemology: how to establish absolutely certain knowledge on which the
sciences could be based. Throughout his life he
retained a high regard for scientific rationality and
its technical achievements. He was quite out of
sympathy with the ‘soft’ ‘Lebensphilosophie’ of the
hermeneuticists (though prepared to concede some
interest in Dilthey’s psychology): what was needed
in philosophy was a good dose of sc ientific ~igour( 7).
Husserl had found his certain knowledge in the
realm of ideas. Basing himself on a theory of
Brentano’s, he started from the claim that consciousness was ‘intentional’ – i. e. it always took
(‘intended’) some object. The object of consciousness (‘intentional object’) might be real or not real,
present or absent, perceived or imagined – but it
was always an idea. Thus consciousness had direct
access to a realm of ideas. The essential relationships between these ideas could be established with
absolute certainty by direct inspection: truth was
founded upon such inner seeing. Since we all partake of a common human rationality, each of us can
establish on the basis of his own ideas philosophical
knowledge which is universal.
The relation of these ideas to some supposed
transcendent reality could, indeed should, be left
till later. The Kantians were far too eager to rush
into speculations about the relationship between
phenomena and noumena – speculations, which were
idle if not based lpon a prior knowledge of the
fundamental ideas (such as ‘truth’, ‘meaning’, etc)
which we are bringing to bear. Patient analysis of
the internal structure of the realm of ideas was
needed instead – a sort of a priori psychology. The
method should imitate science by basing itself on
experience: not common sense, which was no more
than the residue of ancient theories, but the raw
uninterpreted data which came to consciousness the pure phenomena. Examination of these phenomena, without any preconceptions, would reveal
how we are able to apply (correctly) any idea to
them – how consciousness organizes phenomena by
the application of an idea. In this way the essence
of the idea could come to be known. We could then
proceed to a related idea, and gradually accumulate
a body of certain knowledge about ideas – which
would also be knowledge about the structure of
c onsc iousnes s.
Heidegger had heard of Husserl soon after getting
to universitYI he had taken his only published work,
the two-volume Logical Investigations, out of the
library, but hadn’t been able to get into it. He knew
that in 1913 Husserl had published a second book,
Ideas, but probably made no serious effort to read
it until Husserl appeared on the horizon as professor designate – the new boss (8). At that stage
Husserl ‘s phenomenology looked interesting,
certainly was being talked about as a genuine innovation, and seemed highly relevant to some concerns
of his own – psychologism, meaning, truth,
grammatical structure etc. Moreover, when he
read Ideas, Heidegger found statements about
‘reality’ and ‘being’ which were exciting. Husserl
was now saying that consciousness ‘constitutes’ an
idea of the real, and in that sense transcends itself
towards objects. But it does not ‘create’ reality which in any case as natural reality is not to be
identified with the totality of Being (9). There was
ambiguity here, even confusion: but to Heidegger
it seemed exciting.
But what really converted Heidegger to phenomen·
ology was Husserl’s way of philosophizing.
Husserl’s teaching took place in the form of a
step-by-step training in phenomenological
‘seeing’ which at the same time demanded that
one relinquishes the untested use of philosophical
knowledge. But it also demanded that one give up
introducing the authority of the great thinkers
into the conversation.
So Heidegger described it (MW, p78). So the
scholastically inclined hermeneuticist was made to
evaluate his classics against the experience of the
Heidegger’s work with Husserl was interrupted
towards the end of the war – he was called up and
sent to a meteorological station in the Western
Front. By 1919 he was back working as Husserl’s
assistant with free access to his voluminous unpublished manuscripts, and the job of preparing
some for publication. Mter a couple of years
Husserl was to say confidently, ‘phenomenology,
that is I and Heidegger, and no one else ‘(10).
In teaching terms they were complementary:
Heidegger took the historical courses from Aristotle
to Nietzsche, working carefully from the texts;
while Husserl took ‘topics’ for his courses, working from his own notes, or thinking aloud.
Differences were always there, even in their
teaching styles. But what they shared at this
period was the rejection of Kantian dualism, the
appeal to the phenomena of experience as a way of
evaluating received ideas, the search for essential
meanings within these phenomena, and the discovering of necessary structures in the transcendental
subject. This last, which was how Husserl ha,d
come to conceive of consciousness, was proceeding
by their joint efforts in a particularly fruitful
direction – the exploration of parallel structures in
consciousness and in the lived world, particularly
with respect to time.
It was the manuscripts on time which Heidegger
chose to edit (11). Husserl had concluded, as far
back as 1905, that the perceptual process is rooted
in the phenomenon of time. Our very ability to
recognize an object as real depends upon our
ability to synthesize its different phenomenal
appearances through time. Put ‘another way, to
establish the reality of an object I must be able to
walk round it, reach out and touch it etc. – processes which are necessarily extended in time, and
which presuppose my ability to initiate action and to
synthesize phenomena across the different senses.
So phenomenological method reveals that our
primitive encounter wi~h reality is temporal, active
and multi-sensory. The philosophical model of a
passive observer confronting static visual reality
is thus a travesty of our actual encounter with the
Partly under Heidegger’s .influence, Husserl had
by now come to recognize some valuable notions in
the hermeneutic tradition: that of the lived-world
was cruciaI (12). His early analyses had concentrated upon isolated ‘acts of consciousness’, grasping
individual ideas which could slowly be built into
structural relationships. By now however he was
coming to see that the individual act of meaning
always had, a context, always occurred against a
background, and that the background itself was
structured. At its broadest the background was the
world as we live in it with its structures of time
and space. What’s more, there was a structural
relationship between’!’ as the subject of consciousness, and ‘world’ as its object. Instead of ‘consciousness taking an object’, Husserl began to talk
of a ‘transcendental ego confronting a transcendental
Heidegger thought that this was getting somewhere.
Instead of suspending the question of reality, leaving aside the nature of Being, Husserl now seemed
to be addressing it head on. Husserl could not have
disagreed more. The very essence of phenomenology
was reduction to the phenomena of consciousness
in order to discover its ideas. Therefore what they
were analyzing was the idea of ‘reality’, the idea, of
the ‘world’ and so on. The operation was totally
within consciousness, within the realm of ideas,
and it was difficult to see how it could be otherwise.
Eventually Husserl was to conclude that ‘real’
could have no meaning except that conferred by
consciousness. We do not create the world, but we
do constitute it in thought.
The difference between their two positions was
subtle, and certainly in the early twenties did not
seem irreconcilable. In any case Heidegger did not
press it: Husserl was his boss and thirty year s his
senior. Husserl was not a good listener, had only
got where he was by being pig-headed and having
faith in the rightness of his own ideas (13): in any
case he was convinced that Heidegger would see
sense in the end. The matter only came to a head
in their attempt to collaborate in an article on
phenomenology for the Encyclopedia Britannica but that was some years away and water was to
flow under the bridge before then.
The post-war years were no less unsettled and
disoriented for intellectuals than for other groups
in German society. With defeat and revolution in
the air, paramilitary groups on the streets and
reactionary student societies blossoming, most
fixed points seemed to have dissolved. Husserl had
lost his elder son in the war, Heidegger at least
one good friend (4) – the world could no longer be
the same. On this world burst Spengler’s prophetic
Decline of the West, blaming the ‘decay of civilization’squarely on scientific rationality and the technological society it had produced. The trouble was
too much ‘intellect’ and not enough ‘religiousness’
(15). A hundred thousand copies of the book were
sold between 1918 and 1926 (16).
It was another, though less popular, best seller
which had the greater impact on Heidegger. In
1919 Karl Jaspers published a book called
Psychology of Worldviews. In it he proclaimed a
passionate faith in the individual, in the best
tradition of Lebensphilosophie. War, death,
extreme anxiety could bring out the best in man:
such ‘limit situations’ reveal to the suffering
individual the truth of his existence. This
‘Existenzphilosophie’ grabbed Heidegger at a gut
level. ‘Existence’, as the specifically human way
of being, was what it was all about. The ‘life’s
striving’ of a concrete human individual should be
the heart of philosophy, not Husserl’s dessicated
consciousness, grubbing about for ‘certain knowledge’ at the roots of natural science. But Jaspers’
work was sloppy – small wonder for a man just
working himself into philosophy from psychotherapy.
It lacked that ‘historical self-criticism’ which
should expose the discrepancy between ‘who we are
and who we think we are’. Between 1919 and 1921
Heidegger worked on a review of Jaspers’ book(17).
Eventually he abandoned the project, but sent a
copy of what he had done to Jaspers, in the hope he
would take account of the criticisms in any future
edition. Thus began a friendship which was only
terminated by Heidegger’s espousal of Nazism in
The slack and sketchy nature of ~aspers’ account
gave Heidegger a definite project: a rigorous,
phenomenological account, not of ‘consciousness’,
but of ‘human existence’. The project was to be
realized in the writing of Being and Time, but only
after he had left Freiburg and Husserl. In 1922 he
was offered an associate professorship at Marburg.
He got it on the strength of a manuscript on the
relevance of Aristotle to the situation of contemporary man, a hermeneutic exercise which had grown
out of his teaching – and an example of what he
meant by ‘historical self -criticism’. He was
attempting to clarify an idea that the Decline of the
~ was due to the centring of philosophy on
problems of knowledge, rather than on the question
of Being and its relation to individual human existence. At least since Aristotle our thinking, and
even our language, had been corrupt. The relevance
of Aristotle-today was not that he had been right
where others had gone wrong. Rather, his works
contain~d both some truth and also the sources of
subsequent error. To destroy by exegesis the
errors which had been transmitted in our intellectual history was the only way of transcending them.
Both Husserl and Jaspers had failed because they
neglected the history of the philosophical tradition.
Marburg was especially attractive to Heidegger
because it had long been a centre of neo-Kantian
theology, and exciting developments were now
occurring there. To Heidegger, by far the most
interesting was the thinking of Rudolph Bultmann,
with who he soon struck up a life-long friendship.
Bultmann was in process of attacking the Marburg
liberal tradition by a critique of Christian mythology. The historical Jesus had been so mythologized
by primitive Christianity that it was no longer
possible to recapture the historical reality. But
nor was it necessary, for the myth contains
theological truth: it is a message addressed by God
to man, a divine call (kerygma). The problem was
to attune oneself to the call, to be receptive to the
word of God, and not to get bogged down in literal
interpretation of scripture.
The purpose of hermeneutics was thus a preparation for hearing. The protestant Bultmann was
pulling the emphasis back to a Kierkegaardian
location: that of the individual’s direct relationship
to God. Scheler, who had followed a ‘phenomenological’ course parallel to, but separate from, that
of Husserl, had broken new ground in philosophical
discussion of the inter-personal relations of individuals. Not only was Bultmann drawing on this,
but within Judaism too Martin Buber was using it
to describe the individual’s experience of God(18).
And for his part Heidegger appraised Shceler’s
work as second only to Husserl’s in phenomenology
The post-war resurgence of individualism, antiscientism and religiosity amongst German intellectuals was now ripe for philosophical synthesis. It
was that synthesis which Heidegger so brilliantly
provided in Being and Time.
1 Lovejoy, pI J .
? I have abbreviated referenceE to Heidegger’s works: key at the end.
3 In old age, Heidegger recalled being turned on to philosophy at the age of
17 by reading a work of Rrentano’s: ‘On the Manifold Meaning of Being
according to AriEtoUe’. (IVIW).
4 I have Eubstituted ‘thing’ and ‘being’ for the clumsy ‘esEent’ in thiE and the
Eubsequent quotation, as tranElationE of ‘Seiende’. Heidegger oppoEes to
beings (Seiende), ‘Being’ in general (Sein), of which things in some Eense
partake. He thus comeI’ to talk about the ‘Being of beings’.
6 For more detail on Husserl, Eee my article ‘Husserl & Dhenomenology’
7 See his logiE article of 1910.
8 In old age Heidegger implied that he came to terms with Husserl’s Ideas
as soon as it appeared (IVIW, p77). This is belied by what he published in
9 Husserl, Ideas, p168.
10 Quoted by Gadamer, p143.
] 1 These appeared in 1928 as The Phenomenology of Internal Time
12 This development is clearly evidenced in his positive appreciations of
Dilthey in the ‘Phenomenological Psychology’ of 1923.
] 3 See, for instance, Spiegelbeg, Vo!. I, pp88-89.
14 Emil Lask, killed in Galicia.
15 Spengler, Vo!. I, p424.
] 6 Forman, p30.
17 Krell (1).
18 Buber’s ‘I and Thou’ was published in 1923.
‘The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy’, JBSP, Vo!.4,!.
,Jan 1973, pp64-71.
1912 NFL ‘Neuer Forschungen fUr Logik’, l iterarische Rundschau fUr das
Katholische Deutschland, 38, pp466-72: 517-’24: 565-70, Freiburg
1914 l UP ‘Die Lehre vom Urteil im PEychologismus: ein kritisch-positi’er
Beitrag zur Logik’, Zeitschrift fUr Philosophie und philosophische
Kritik, 160, Leipzig.
1915 CTSH ‘The Concept of Time in the Science of History’, JBSP, Vo!. 9, 1.
Jan 1978, pp3-10.
1916 KBDS Die Kategorien-und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus , Ttibingen.
-26 B&T Being & Time, Blackwell, 1962.
Introduction to MetaphysicE , Doubleday Anchor, 1961.
‘My Way to PhenomenOlogy’, in Time & Being, Harper &: Ro\,.
‘Only a God can Save UE’: inten-iew with Del’ Spiegel ,
Philosophy Today, Vu!. ’20, 4/4: Winter 1976. pp267-84.
Buber, M., I and Thou, T.& T. Clark, 1959.
Caputo, J. D., ‘Phenomenology, Mystic ism and the GramaticaSpeculativa’:
a study of Heidegger’s ‘Habilitationsschrift’ – JBSP, 5, 2: May 1974,
Dilthey, W. Selected Writings, ed. H. P. Rickman, Cambridge U”P, 1976.
Forman, P. ‘Weimar Culture, Causality and Quantum Theory, 1918-1927’,
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JBSP = Journal of the British Society for “phenomenology.