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Husserl and Phenomenology

Here, then, is a rundown of the argument:

1 The emergence of image-specificity through
Western art is indirectly linked (but not directly
until the present) with the emergence of the
bourgeoisie and the values of individualism in their
wake. Its technical qualitative change comes with
the invention of photography and with the technological developments in specificity since then (as
.

the technical rendition of specificity became no
longer an artistic problem).

2 In a society whose governing contradiction remains that between productive forces and the social
relations of prodUction, the development of the
image towards ever greater realism exacerbates
the discrepancy between what is witnessed and what
can be actively decided upon.

3 The old ‘nonrealistic’ image did not exist as
isolated from the processes of social communication
and their artet[acts. The increasingly ‘realistic’

image becomes itself a substitute for social cohesion as it defines itself as an isolatable cOJ)cept.

However, it is not imaginable as a thing. It can
only be conceived in terms of function, relationship
and effects – the stronger its influence is.

4 Socialization is internalized by means of the
realistic image. This recreates narcissism in a
mature form, for narcissism is the stunted
attempt at sociality in a society of isolated individuals given to living and perception passively
through images.

5 As image-specificity brings external imageforms closer to what we are actually like (a development taken over from art as, indeed, art reverted
to opposition to social images – indeed, the
struggle of the modern artist· can be seen as the
penetration beyond them) the potential arises for
destroying the whole process of image-making.

But as the last qualitative change was technical,
the next one required is political. However, in the
absence of political event, cognition of imagemirrors and the gradual deterioration of communal
life make narcissism an ever more pervasive
possibility.

6 The image, instead of being destroyed in favour
of the real, takes its place .. It bursts out of its
confines and is prOjected upon other living persons.

The image loses ri’chness as it descends into reality, and reality is drained dry of richness as it is
usurped by images. The imagination loses a depth
of projection as it becomes the sole mediation with
real life.

7 By the same token, image-specificityawakens
consciousness through forcible confrontation with
.the detail of the real world. Given disturbing situations, image-specificity is a poor substitute either
for action or for an ideology, because its ascendancy was born of an inherently unstable process of
technical refinement and shallow positivism~ In the
end, it will produce not awe but disillusionment in
its viewers, without being able to withhold from
them the visible facts of a deteriorating world situation. What has been seen as the strongest imagebinding possible turns out also to be, and simultaneously, the inadequate means for preventing social
change. The revolution itself will be the dissolution
of images into reality: that in itself is one aspect of
the revolutionary act. Revolution and social image
as function are antithetical, and with revolution,
with the development of socialism, transparent
social experience becomes possible. This experience in itself requires the mediation of art, though
not perhaps the art as we know it today with its
coteries and critics, salerooms, galleries and high
prices. Rather, a socialist art will be one in which
transparent social (i. e. individual) experience is
mediated and transcended – which, indeed, makes
it no different in quality from that of all great art
of the past. In V. G. Kiernan’s words, art had a
hand in the invention of socialism, and socialism
itself, without a central place for art in its development, will simply re-create another version of a
one-dimensional society. There is more to socialism than democracy: there is interpretation of
experience, the kind of experience that can only be
achieved under socialism. Interpretation must take
the ‘facts’ of social life, under whatever system,
and develop and extend the richness of the potential
kernel of all experience. The ‘images’ of socialism
will lie in a wider development of artistic interpretation of the greater transparency of social life
under socialism, an interpretation which will be
necessary in the making of men as individuals.

BUSSERL aND PHENOMENOLOGY
Roger Waterhouse
I began to study phenomenology seriously about ten
years ago. I came to it by way of Sartre, Laing,
and the Swiss analyst Ludwig Binswanger. At the
time it rekindled an interest in philosophy which
had been all but extinguished by a surfeit of Oxford
academicism. Thephenomenologists not only took
seriously those very serious questions about the
nature of man and his place in the world that I had
been taught to play games with – but them seemed
to have new perspectives, and new insights to offer.

It took me a long time and quite a lot of perserverance before I felt that I had ‘got inside’ the phenomenological tradition, and could not only read and
understand, but also evaluate and criticize phenomenological writings. With my Oxford training it
was sometimes too easy to dismiss as confused and
wrong-headed the formulation of an argument, without appreciating the inSight it was striving to
express.

The effort was worthwhile. The phenomenologists

have not merely been doing philosophy in a different
way: they have said some very positive and significant things. And they have evolved a way of thinking
which is not only grounded in the problems of our
day-to-day existence, but has powerful implications
for a whole range of theoretical studies.

Such is my opinion, and, apparently, that of an
increaSing number of people in the English-speaking
world. But the problem for the would-be student
(perhaps arriving at phenomenology from some
otlier discipline than philosophy) is where to begin what to read, and how to disentangle the jargon, the
often turgid prose, the widely different stances
adopted by writers all of whom call themselves
phenomenologists.

This article is an attempt to give some guidance.

It deals primarily with Husserl. I shall stress the
way in which his thinking changed during the course
of his life, because that evolution was responsible
for the major trends which subsequently developed
within the phenomenological movement.

27

The undisputed founder of the phenomenological
movement was Edmund Husserl, a German of Jewish descent (converted to Lutheranism in his twenties) who lived from 1859 to 1938. 1 He was very
much the German professor: almost his whole adult
life was bounded by the walls (and the attitudes) of
ancient universities. 2 Only the rampant antisemitism of the Nazis in his later years forced him
reluctantly out of his political naivety. 3 Like
Russell, and roughly at the same time, he came to
philosophy out of mathematics by way of logic, and
was similarly engrossed by problems of truth,
meaning and knn’.vledge. Like Freud, and at roughly
the same time, he self-consciously founded a
school, and gathered around himself an everexpanding band of disciples. Like Freud also he
was betrayed by his chosen Si. Peter: for Heidegger
retained his masterTs support not only for succession to his chair, but for publication of a work
theoretically devastating Husserl’s position, 4 and
he eventually joined the Nazi Party.

‘contradiction’ etc must in some way be known prior
to any empirical investigation, since they are presupposed by it. Moreover, any particular science
presupposes a further range of ideas which must be
known prior to any question being asked: so psychology presupposes the idea of ‘psyche’, medicin~ that
of ‘health’ etc. Therefore, Husserl fallaciously concludes, there must be a whole range of ideas, knowable ‘a priori’ and with utter certainty (‘apodictically’): arid the most fundamental of these (ideas of
logic) are the foundations of all rational thought and
must already be known, at least in an implicit form,
by all men (i. e. they are ‘universal ‘). Thus we have
a proper subject matter for philosophy – the investigation of this realm of ideas (the ‘eidetic’), and a
proper task – the establishment of apodictic a priori
knowledge of their essences. Philosophy is to be a
rigorous eidetic science, analogous in aim though
not in method to other sciences: 12 it is to provide
the foundation fori and express the unity of, all the
special sciences. 3

Beginnings

The unity of knowledge

Although Husserl \’as on the whole ill-acquainted
with the western philosophical tradition, he was
influenced by the British Empiricists, impressed
by J. S. Mill’s logic, and interested in American
pragmatism (particularly William James). 5
Ine~itably he was affected by the prevalent neoKantianism ~manating from Heidelberg, though it
was only later that he seriously studied Kant (or
even D~scartes). 6
Husserl attributed his own commitment to philosophy to Brentano, whose influence on him,
although direct and indisputable, is usually overemphasized by secondary writers. 7 I shall pass
aver the early work on logic that brought Husserl
into contact with Frege, 8 and gurn to his initial
conception of phenomenology.

In the 1890s Husserl first became preoccupied
with a question which was to remain central throughout his works: ‘How is it possible to establish true
knowledge, i. e. that which is absolutely certain,
beyond all doubt or prospect of revision?’ For
Husserl, this!mQ. to be possible: without it human
rationality was a mockery, the whole edifice of
science was built on sand, and the triumphal process of European culture from the Greeks to the
19th century would diSintegrate. 10
The theory of ideas

2
3

4

5

This much Husserl stuck to throughout his life. But
wait before you categorize him as a straightforward
idealist. Husserl has been all things to all men:

there is hardly a sentence he wrote which is not
qualified by a dozen others, ten of which are still
unpublished and eight not yet transcribed out of his
shorthand notes. 14 Although he believed there were
universal ideas, with essences that could be known
a priori with apodictic certainty, he denied they had
any platonic existence outside the human mind. 15
Rather, human consciousness, by its very nature,
had a certain ‘necessary’ structure, expressible in
terms of the relationships between its fundamental
ideas. His descriptive investigations into such concepts as that of ‘number’ convinced him that this
was so. But the direct inference which he drew was
that all thinking, and all knowledge, as the product
of human thought, was an interconnected system
with an a priori structure. At the roots are ideas
like ‘truth’, . ‘reality’, ‘time’. Higher up, at the
nodal points of great branches, are ideas like ‘self’,
‘society’, ‘nature’. Higher still are ideas like
‘weight’, ‘price’, ‘justice’, which fit together with
other ideas in their special areas. The whole tree
is a single, complex, logically interrelated system
of ideas to be investigated by philosophy: what the
investigation will yield is a priori knowledge about
ideas. 16

Husser! ‘s first two steps are generally taken to be
first his ffPousal, and then his rejection of ‘psychologism ‘ ,
understood as the doctrine that the
tl’Uths of logic are empirical generalisations about
the way the human mind functions. Husser! ‘s chief
round for rejectin this was that ideas like ‘truth’.

But what is it about consciousness that makes such
an investigation possible? And how does ‘eidetic’

(philosophical) science relate to empirical science?

The answer came to Husserl while he was stud i

or Husserl s
e see Spiegelberg
, Vo . I, pp – 6 passim. ost’

secondary works trace the historical development of his thought.

Studied at Leipzig, Berlin and Vienna. Taught at Halle (1887-1901),
Gtlttingen (1901-1916), Freiburg-am-Breisgau (1916-1938). He retired
6
in 1929.

7
He retired before the Nazis took over, and died before the final round-up
8
of Jews in Baden. The Third Reich prevented him lecturing or publishing
9
in Germany. His last work – The CriSis – was directly influenced by
political events (Husserl(10), Intro.). His political naivety is best ex10
pressed in the Vienna lecture of 1935 (Husserl(lO), p290).

Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’, dedicated to Husserl, was published in the
Jahrbuch fUr Phltnomenologie und phltnomenologische Forschung. Husserl, 11
as editor, saw the text before publication, but did not recognize the funda- 12
mental criticisms which Heidegger was making of him. For his part,
13
Heidegger obscured the attack (apparently out of loyalty to Husserl), which 14
is therefore overlooked by readers unfamiliar with Husserl’s work. When
the truth dawned, Husserl was very bitter. (See Husserl(lO) pxxvi).

For a Itmgthy account of Husserl’s early development see Spiegelberg(l)
15
Vol. I; for a brief but very angled one see Pivcevic(I). The authoritative
version is Farber’s (3). The American connection not only attracted
16

gra ua e s u en , ut sen
em ck as disciples, e. g. Dorion Cairns
Marvin Farber. It also provided an escape route ior German emigres ‘

(Gurwitsch & Schutz).

See Husserl(l) on Kant; (7) and (8) on Descartes.

As a graduate student in Vienna, Husserl attended Brentano’s lectures.

See Kung (1).

Worked out between Vol. 11 of the Logical Investigations (1901), and about
1907 (The Idea c:i Phenomenology).

Unlike Heidegger or Sartre, Husserl had a tremendous respect for
(natural) SCience, which even his later doubts could not destroy. See e. g.

Husserl (10) pp3-4.

See Pivcevic (1) or Lyotard (I).

Husserl (4).

See Husserl (5) pp404-27; compare, e. g. Sartre (1) ppI4-31.

But see van Breda (1). At his death Husserlleft 45,000 pages of manuscript and 12,000 pages of transcriptions, on which four research assistants were working (including Landgrebe and Funk). These·archives were
smuggled out of Germany and are now housed at Louvain in Belgium.

Husserl (5) para. 22.

See Husserl (5), paras. 147-149.

28

The intentionality of consciqusness

criteria which are being applied in order for this
in Vienna. Brentano taught that consciousness always ‘intends’ (or is directed towards) some object.

object to be recognized as what it is. In short, we
This doctrine, which Brentano used to distinguish
will get at the essential idea (or meaning) of this
object. 25 And we can apply this process to any
between the physical and the psychical, 17 Husserl
object of thought whatsoever – real or not.

transformed into a metaphysical principle. ConThe first step in this method must be the ‘reducsciousness is always consciousness of something.1 8
tion’ of the object of consciousness to the phenoThis is a self -evident, apodictic truth. In it are
. mena out of which it is constituted: the phenomenoimplied two existential assertions: consciousness
logical reduction. 26 It is essential to the success of
exists, and objects of consciousness exist. Morethis that I suspend the Natural Attitude, and ‘bracket
over, in asserting it I assert that I exist as a conout’ the question of reality. The second step is to
sciousness of objects, and the ‘intentional’ objects
exist as objects for my consciousness. 19
compare this appearance of the object with others,
The realm of ideas, the proper field of philoin order to get at the essence of the idea which is
sophical SCience, was none other than consciousbeing applied. I must imagine the phenomena as
ness itself and all its objects. The doctrine of the
different and ask ‘Would the idea still apply? ‘. In
intentionality of consciousness shows 20 that we can
this way I can penetrate not only actual, but possible
have a priori, apodictic knowledge of some things
variations, and so establish with certainty the eswhich exist – namely, ideas.

sence of the idea. This step, then,’ reduces’ the
phenomena to the idea. We call it the ‘eidetic reduction’ and perform it by a process of ‘imaginative
Suspension of the Natural Attitude
variation’ . 27
At this point Husserl entered a caveat. Suppose we
The method
undertake a phiiosophical investigation into the idea
‘space’. That is quite different from actually investigating space – which i,s what the physicist properly
The phenomenological method which Husserl
does. Philosophy cannot yield knowledge about the
evolved between about 1901 and 1907 thus consists
empirical world: that is the job of science. It is
of the follOwing. Take any object of thought, abandon
because philosophy is only about ideas that it can be
all presuppositions about it, suspend the Natural
true a priori, irrespective of whether the empirical
Attitude, bracket the question of reality. Next perworld exists or not. As philosophers then, said
form the phenomenological reduction: describe the
Husserl, we must suspend our ‘natural attitude’ of
pure phenomena which appear in the stream of connaive belief in the real existence of the world and its sciousness as constituting that object. Next perform
objects;21 in order to get at the realm of pure ideas, the eidetic reduction: by a process of imaginative
we must put the question of reality ‘in brackets’.22
variation consider all possible sets of phenomena
which could constitute the object and so isolate its
essential features; this reveals what Husserl calls
The phenomenological reduction
the ‘essence’ of the idea which is being applied.

We have now established a priori apodictically certIf this theory of ideas had been Husserl’s chief conain knowledge about the essence of that idea. Repeat
tribution to philosophy he would have been largely
the procedure with object after object and gradually
(and rightly) forgotten ny now. It was what ca01e
we will build up a map of the essential relations and
next that was to have a wider and more powerful
structu,res within our whole system of ideas. The
impact than any other aspect of his lhinking: the
phenomenological method. 23 So far Russerl had only method can in principle be performed by any rational human being and if rigorously applied will give
a project – to investigate the essence of ideas – but
the same results – which are universally true. The
no means of realizing it.

whole process is possible because consciousness is,
Like many of his contemporaries (including
and always knows itself to be, intentional. 28
William James 24 ) Husserl thought of consciousness
as a stream. What appears in this stream, its simplest elements, we can describe as ‘phenomena’.

Pure consciousness
But the phenomena do not appear as a chaotic welter
– they are organized into patterns of (intentional)
There is, howEWer, much more to the intentionality
objects. Consciousness in fact is actively striving
of consciousness than this. So far we have attended
to make sense of the phenomena, to constitute (or
only to the (intentional) object which is given in the
synthesize) them into objects of thought. And the
conscious act. But each act reveals with equal cermeans which it has at its disposal is the stock of
tainty a consciousness in action, an active subject
ideas available to it.

which is grasping the object in a particular way
The implication of this is that we can use the
(perceiving, remembering, imagining it, etc.)
phenomenal stream as a means of getting at the
And just as we can investigate the object phenomenideas. If we can simply describe the phenomena as
ologically, so we can investigate the subject and its
they become constituted into a particular object of
activity. Just as before, we perform the phenomenthought, and compare with other cases where this
ological reduction upon a particular act of conSciousobject appears, then we can discover the essential
ness; but now, instead of asking ‘What makes this
17 Brentano (1).

18 Consciousness is said to be ‘intentional’: the thing of which it is conscious
is the ‘intentional object’ – which mayor may not be real.

’24
19 See Husserl (8), where he cl~irns that Descartes failed to realize that I
25
can be eqt.;ally certain of the existence of my thoughts (ideas) as of m~’self.

20 ‘For Husserl, all truth must ultimately be based upon just ‘seeing’ something to be so. His word is Anschauung (‘intuiting’).

21 Husscrl (5) para. 2, ch. I. Precisely what Husserl meant by the ‘Natul’al 26
Attitude’ changed in the later work.

27
22 Phcnomenology, Husserl repeatedly claimed, operates without any presuppositions. See M Farber (4).

23 The term !phenomenology’ was already around in the 18th century. More
recent usages derive from Kant’s phenomenon/noumenon distinction.

Husserl took the term from his immediate predecessors (see Spiegelberg 28
(1) Vol. I, not from Hegel. For a brief characterization of the difference

between Hegel’s and Husserl’s conceptions see Kockelmans (4) pp24-5.

On the relationship between Husserl and Hegel, see Lyotard (1) pp42-6.

For James’ influence on Husserl, see Spiegelberg (1) Vol.l pp1l1-1l7.

Husserl’ uses the slogan, ‘7u den Sachen selbst’ – to the things themselves,
meaning ‘Let’s get at the objects (both real and otherwise) as actually
constituted out of the phenomena: not as we just believe them to be without
further examination’.

Or phenomenological ‘epoche’.

The notion of the reduction was a constantly evolving one for Husserl which leads to some conf~sion. The phenomenological and eidetic reductions were initially the most Significant, to which he later added the
transcendental. But compare Husserl (8); para. I Ch. I; para. 2 Ch. 1; para.

3 Ch. 1, with Husserl (7) ppLVIII-LlX.

For a thoroughgoing account of all aspects of this method see Husserl (5)
passim.

object what it is? ” we ask ‘What makes this act an
act of (say) memory? ‘. And by a process of imaginative variation we can come to discover the essence
of remembering, imagining, perceiving ..etc. This
type of investigation into the subject side of a unitary
act of consciousness, Husserl calls ‘neotic’: as
opposed to the ‘noematic’ investigation of the object
side.

This investigation into the subject of consciousness is distinctly philosophical and not psychological
says Husserl, though inevitably it has implications
for empirical work. We have suspended all our
beliefs about reality and are merely investigating
the idea of (say) memory. In empirical psychology
one investigates how memory functions, how it
relates to other conscious acts etc. Such investigations are possible only because we already know
what it is to remember. It is the essence of the
prior idea of ‘remembering’ that philosophy investigates. The investigation will yield a priori apodictic
knowledge about the ‘pure’ subject, just as it can
about the ‘pure’ object, 29 because the intentionality
of eonsciousness reveals both subject and object
given together in every act.

The influence of the

~arly

phenomenology

This was the early conception of phenpmenology,
expounded and expanded in the lectures at Gtlttingen
that began to exert an influence both within philosophy and beyond it. This was phenomenology as
Heidegger 30 first knew it, the phenomenology which
attracted Alexander Koyre 31 and Roman Ingarden 32
to Gtlttingen, and drew even the independent
Scheler 33 to its fringes; the phenomenology which,
by the early twenties had begun to exert an influence
on psychiatrists like Minkowski and Straus. 34
Notions of cutting through a dualist epistemology
by suspending the question of reality, of reasserting
the place of the subjective within the dominant objectivism of science, of claiming for philosophy a
central and constructive place in the field of knowledge, of applying a rigorous method by returning
to everyday things and describing them as they
clearly were, 35 of uncovering fundamental structures of ideas and even of consciousness itseU – all
these were heady stuff to Husserl’s young followers.

Husserl’s development
But Husserl himself had hardly begun. In 1908,
when ‘The Idea of Phenomenology’ was completed,36
he still had 30 years of work before him – years
during which he daily added to the corpus of his
notes, jottings, drafts and redrafts of projected pub ..

lications – years during which his own ideas changed
continually and profoundly. 37 This evolution is
often difficult to trace, not just because of the mass

of material, but because of his whole style of writing – and even thinking. Husserl rarely rejected a
previous analysis or idea; but he repeatedly reworked analyses he felt to be ‘inadequate’. The
ideas had to be researched further to uncover
their deeper, more ‘radical’ layers of meaning.

The result was a continual re-interpretation of his
ever-expanding and never-defined jargon. Manuscripts were written and re-written, publication
delayed or postponed indefinitely; so the works published in his lifetime were few, and often referred
implicitly to what was unpublished. The dimensions
of possible confUSion, misunderstanding, and variant interpretation were immense. 38
The later conception of phenomenology
There is, then, no fixed conception at which we can
grasp and say ‘That is how Husserl finally thought
of phenomenology’. What follows is by way of a
rational reconstruction of how Husserl’s thinking
developed between 1908 and 1929 (when the Paris
Lectures were given and the Cartesian Meditations
written).

The most fundamental change was ontological.

In the early work the real was ‘bracketed’ as a way
of ‘postponing’ (but actually avoiding) the question
of ontology. At the same time, however, the
doctrine of Intentionality clearly asserted the existence of consciousness and its contents. It seems
that Husserl failed to realize that he was assuming
an ontological dualism by using the term ‘consciousness’. And if he overlooked this, it was because he
was in fact (naively) committed to the existence of
the objects whose reality he was pretending to suspend. 39 To his way of thinking, this suspension was
a device for postponing the difficult question of the
r.elationship between the intentional object and the
real object – the idea and the thing. But it had another effect: the realm of consciousness was claimed
as the proper sphere of philosophY-i the world was
left to the trusty men of science. 4u But this left
Husserl with the job of (eventually) providing a
metaphysic to account for the dualism. His reluctance to do this explains his sometimes mystifying
contortions about the status of the intentional object.

But by 1918 the men of science were no longer trustworthy. A 19th-century dream had died; and so had
one of Husserl’s sons. 41
The analysis of perception
Husserl’s ontological shift is most intelligible as a
development of his analysis of perception. Since
consciousness is intentional and has the capacity for
reflection, 42 phenomenology can investigate with
equal validity the conscious subject (or ego), any
act of consciousness (noesis), or any object of consciousness (noema).43 Primary amongst the acts

29 The phenomenological r·eduction supposedly ‘purifies’ every idea of· the
dross of reality. After suspending the natural attitude we encounter ‘pure
ideas’, ‘pure consciousness’, ‘pure ego’ etc.

tion of phenomenology.

30 Heidegger was already teaching at Freiburg when Husserl came in 1969;
3“”Spiegelberg (1) Vol. I pp75-88 att~mpts to characterize the constants in
he had been much influenced by the ‘Logical Investigations’ and, to a lesser his development.

extent, ‘Ideas’. A close relationship of friendship and professional collab- 3H The history of philosophy, of course, always involves this knsion between
oration developed. See Spiegelberg (I), Vo!. I, pp275-8.

historical accuracy. and interpretation which ~ives currcnt relevance to an
31 Surprisingly perhaps, in view of Koyre’s later interests (e. g. Koyre (1»;
idea. Devoid of any theory of historical development, some students oC
but, for his own acknowledgement of Husserl’s influence see Spiegelberg
Hu~serl became mere antiquarians expounding the ‘at(,J~lporal’ truths in the
(1) VoL I, p225. .

works of the master. Others, who were creative~y interpreting and extcnd32 The Polish phenomenologist, best known for his aesthetics. See
ing his ideas., nevertheless felt oblip;ed to claim that theirs was the true
Spiegelberg (I), Vol. I pp225-6; the special Ingarden issue of JBSP, VI, il,
Husser!. Still others took Husserl’s ideas and unashamedly transformed
May 1975: and his contributions to AH 1&11.

them. Ironically, Husserl himself had no way of accounting for his own
33 See Scheler (1) and (I), also Pivcevic (1). For his connection with Husserl
originality.

see Spiegelbert (1) Vo!. I Ch. 5. For an (unintentionally) amusing review of 39 See Th. de Boer (1,..

his work see JBSP, V, i, October 1974, pp212-8. Scheler had a strong
40 Compare this controversial interpretation with Husserl (4).

41 Killed in action, in the lirst#orld War.

influence on Schutz.

34 See May (I), pp.92-124: also Minkowski (1) and Straus (1) and (2).

42The reflexive nature of consciousness achieves a new prominence in the
later works: Husserl (7) ppI4-16; (8), VoI.UppI6-17.

35 What first grabbed Sartre about phenomenOlogy was being able to phl1osophize about a wine glass! ‘Nausea’ was the fictional application of this idea430n this ‘·three-sided concept’, expressed as ‘ego cogito cogitatum’. see
36 This series of lectures marks the turning point towards his later concepHusserl (7) p14 and Husserl (8) Vo!. 11 p14.

30

of consciousness are acts of perception, 44 and the
idea of perception as it arises out of the phenomena
of experience is as susceptible of investigation as
any other. Now, a phenomenological analysis of
what it means to perceive (rather than imagine,
remember, etc.) an object, reveals some interesting things. The perception of an object as object
.

involves a synthesis of phenomena through time.

.Since the object is typically three dimensional (e. g.

a cube) it can never reveal more than one face
squarely and two others ‘perspectivally’ at the same
instant. Therefore my idea of the solid object can
only be built up by synthesis out of a temporal
series. This synthesis will not only involve retention (immediate recollection), immediate Qresence,
and ‘protention’ (immediate expectation), 4″5 but will
necessarily include within the synthesis not only an
actual but also possible perceptions. That is, to
perceive this as a (real) cube, is to perceive it as
something I could stretch out my hand to touch,
whether or not I actually do this. Moreover, on the
subject side, even the most primitive act of perception reveals the ego as having not only the capacity
for synthesis, but also the possibility of action. 46
It is in the nature of the ego to have the world as a
space for action, and it is in the nature of the world
to be a space in which I act.

But weren it we supposed to have suspended the
question of reality? Weren’t we supposed to be confining ourselves to the descrip’tion of consciousness
and its contents? Yes, indeed, says Husserl, and
this is precisely what we have been doing. This was
no empirical investigation into pe~ception or perceptual objects; we were asking, ‘What does it ~
to perceive?’ As phenomenologists we were only
investigating the idea of perception. Of course we
discovered that perception necessarily refers to
the real; but we have carried out no empirical investigation into reality, and we have made no existential assertions except tnat of consciousness. We
have merely investigated the idea (or concept) ‘real’

– and why not, since that idea can be a.n object for
consciousness like any other.

Somehow Husserl seems to have maintained this
contradiction in his thinking for a long time; but
eventually he caved in. When he did so he was
accused of collapsing into utter idealism – a tag
which he accepted with the qualification that his was
‘transcendental’ idealism. The logic of this collapse
seems to have been as follows. When I distinguish
between the real and the unreal, what could I possibly be doing except applying my idea of ‘real’ to
the phenomena which appear? But, excepting the
notion of some suprahuman consciousness (which is
itself only an idea), there is no possible meaning
which ‘real’ could hflve, except that which it has
for (human) consciousness. The idea of a reality
inaccessible to human consciousness is simply
self-contradictory. Ergo, reality can be nothing
other than the idea which human consciousness has
of it. 47
Constitution v. creation
If Husserl drew this conclusion with reluctance, it 48
was because he was convinced that the real, objects,
physical things, are: and the way in which they are
44 For MerleaQ-Ponty this was a fundamentalmslgfit. Sce Merleau-P6ilty
4~
(2) and (4).

45 See Husserl (2).

46 ‘It is the nature of the ego to exist in the form of real and possible aware~
ness. Its possibilities depend upon the various patterns of the ”I can”. ‘

Husserl (7) p25.

47 See Husserl (5) para. 55, where he makes but does not develop a distinction
between Reality (humanlY constituted) and Being (absolute).

is different from the way of being of consciousness.

The proof is in the touching. When I encounter an
object I do not create it – it is already there. It
appears, phenomenally, as something already there.

And yet there is this undoubted creative activity on
my part involved in the simple act of recognition.

There is, he believed, a way through this paradox:

and it rests on the distinction between creation of the
existent thing, and constitution of the object in consciousness. What happens is this. Before I come
along something is already there. I can in no way
say what is there – Simply because I haven’t yet
met it – but there is something. When I arrive I
encounter what is there: the something is (genuinely)
revealed to me in phenomena. It is now up to me to
organize these phenomena by the creative activity
of my consciousness, in accordance with the ideas
I have (and some of these ideas are so universal
and fundamental that they must be innate). In doing
this I ‘constitute’ an object out of the given phenomena. I did not create the something, but I did constitute the object. And in constituting the object I
gave it meaning, made of it an object for thought,
and located it within the total framework of my
world.

All we can say about the something which was there
before I happened upon it, is that it is ‘hyle’48 or
stuff. It was there, but nothing could be said about it
merely because it had not yet been encountered by
consciousness. Hyle is not a substance, a category
of things, nor a property: there is nothing which is
in principle inaccessible. ‘Hyle’ is merely a negative term by which we can refer to that which has not
yet been organised by consciousness. Like every
other idea, it has meaning only in relation to
consciousness.

Busserl interpreted his ontological shift not as a
volte-face, but as a deepening, a ‘radicalization’

of his earlier thought. It had been there all along,
he now realized, in the doctrine of intentional consciousness. This self -evident truth reveals both the
reciprocal relationship between, and the mutual
interdependence of, subject and object. Consciousness, the knowing subject or ego, is just that which
takes an obJect. The object is nothing else but what
appears to consciousness – and real objects can
only be a sub-category of intentional objects in
general. So bracketing, the pbenomenological
epoche, no. longer suspel’lds the question of reality:

what it does is suspend the natural attitude, the
naive ontology which only credits objects with
reality status, without realizing their dependence
upon consciousness. Only consciousness can constitute objects as real, or as anything else for that
matter.

In a sense, then, the real is subsumed within the
ideal, and the world is swallowed up in consciousness, without consciousness either creating or
being in any way responsible for the existence of
the bare stuff (hyle) of the world. But in a different
sense, it is equally true that the ideal is located in
the midst of the real, for consciousness is surrounded by the world and absorbed in acting (creatively)
upon it. 49
Husserl’s cOill<!-ge, from the Greek (Aristotle's) word for matter. The
term 'Hyletic data' is introduced in Husserl (5) para. 85 for the 'formless
materials' upon which the 'immaterial forms' of ideas are imposed. It
corresponds, after the phenomenological reduction, to what in the 'Naturalistic Attitude' are called 'sensory materials'.

H>lsserl is often interpreted as. having only subsumed ‘real’ under ‘ideal’.

He certainly stressed this side, since the brunt of his attack was directed
against a realism which objectified (and thereby dehumanized) consciousnes~, making it impossible to account for science as a human creation, and
leading ultimately to irrationalism. But the force of the ‘transcendental’

in his characterization of his idealism, is precisely to assert that COllsciousness is in the midst of the world. See Husserl (10) passim.

31

Transcendental phenomenology
Russerl’s later work can be seen as an attempt to
work out the different senses of this relationship
between consciousness and the world. The ontological shift (or ‘Transcendental Turn’) occasioned a
new terminology, some new concepts, a distinct
change of emphasis, and the emergence of new
themes. Russerl now talks about conSCiousness, or
more specifically the ego, as transcendental: it
trans~ends itself towards objects, an of which are
intentional, and some of which are real. Intentional
objects are now said to be transcendent, insofar as
they are necessarily other for consciousness. But
the objects constituted by a consciousness, particularly real objects, are not therefore private to
that consciousness but accessible to other conscious
nesses. Rather than talking about the ‘objective’

world we should investigate the ‘intersubjective
constitution of reality’, and we can use the term
‘monad’ to refer to the perspective of t~e individual
on that common reality. The common reality is a
world – the world, in fact – but not as conceived in
the false ontology of ‘objective’ science. The real
world is the world as we live it – the ‘Lebenswelt’

(the lived- or life-world). 50 But the Lebenswelt
is theoretically obscure 51 and needs to be articulated, because the phenomena of our experience are
~ystematically distorted by the false ontology (a
sort of estrangement, or alienation of man from
his own experience). The ‘reduc,tion’ to the phenomena of experience thus takes on a new meaning,
the awareness of which Russerl calls the ‘transcendental reduction’.

Contradictions
What we find emerging iri Russerl’s later work are
a number of themes which h~ found increasingly
difficult to reconcile with his earlier theory of ideas
Row to account for the undeniable historical development of a false ontology within a theory of ideas
as atemporal universal truths? (The problem of
historicity, tackled in ‘The Crisis’). How, starting
from the isolated consciousness as the only given,
to reach the social world and establish the autonomous existence of other people’? (The problem of
solipsism, in the ‘Cartesian Meditations’). And
how, starting from pre .. linguistic experience of
atomized phenomena, to constitute an object, and
ultimately the whole world of objects? (The problem
of constitution, in ‘Experience and Judgment’). And
throughout his work runs the tension of a desire to
appeal to reason, and the need to appeal to experience, as the ground of philosophy, without any
coherent theory of the relationship between the two.

The transcendental ego
So, let us return to the transcendental reduction;
let us acknowledge within the intentionality of consciousness that there is an ego which transcends
itself towards objects that are ‘other’ for it. And
let us assume with Husserl what he states but
rarely – the universality of the argument from his
own individual consciousness. 52 Thus a context of
public discourse is always implied; and when
Husserl says:

I cannot doubt
,
. the existence of .my
50

speaking for everyone.

In each case consciousness is my own. 53 But
we saw in the analysis of perception that the constitution even of simple objects implicitly refers to
a constituting ego. The same must be true for every
conscious act. The ego which transcends itself
towards the object appears in any and every act of
consciousness. Moreover, perception revealed the
ego, or constituting subject, as more than just
transcendental. It was temporal: it had in a sense
both memory and anticipation, without which no
synthesis of the object would have been possible.

The ego could entertain not only that which was no
longer present, but that which was not yet, and
might never be, present – in the synthesis of actual
and possible perceptions. The synthesis was also
trans-sensory, in that the object appeared not
merely as visual, but as touchable, having weight,
feeliI}g cold, able to cause a noise if, dropped etc.

etc. :54 all of which tells’ us something of the pregiven capacities of the transcendental ego. And
perception also revealed the ego as having the
possibility of action – since possible awareness
depended upon the ‘various patterns of the “I can”. ‘

The synthesis of the three-dimensional object
revealed it as having space, and the ego as having
the possibility of action (including movement) in the
same space. And so we could go on, considering
more complex perceptions, judgments, phantasies,
memories – of real physical objects, .of social
(i. e. intersubjective) non-physical objects, of
‘ideal’ objects (such as abstract concepts). For
what we have discovered here, claimed Russerl, is
a whole realm of transcendentally reduced phenomena waiting to be investigated. And that investigation can be oriented towards building up a picture
of the necessary structures either of the transcendental ego (on the subject side), or of the Lived
World (on the object side) – since the two are corelative.

There are, however, some important conceptual
difficulties which need to be clarified. In reflecting
upon the transcendental ego (and making it thereby
an object of consciousness) we must recognise that
it can never be just another object, even in thought:

it is the inalienable subject. Other objects are
synthesised out of the phenomenal stream: a
particular pattern is plucked out of the ongoing
flow, which thus forms a background for it. But
there is no pattern to be plucked out of the ‘vividly
streaming present’ which will give us the idea of
‘I’: since every act and all patterns of phenomena
both belong to and reveal the transcendental ‘I’. 55
There are, however, distinctions we can make. We
a”‘re not, as philosophers, concerned with my actual
empirical ego which is in some sense comprised by
the totality of my experiences as they happen to
have occurred’. We are, however, concerned with
how my ego must necessarily be in order to have a
totality of experiences: what is it that makes all my
experiences mine i. e. synthesizes a ‘subject-pole’

in relation to which every synthetic ‘object-pole’

stands. And even prior to that, we must be concerned with the minimum experience of’!’, the
utterly pure ego, which is given in each individual
act of consciousness, whatever it be. For this
investigation we do not have to consider every act
Pt. this con~ciousRess – ~ act will do. Nor, when

n he extensive eve opment
this concep all app cat Oll ill psyc 0 ogy
lS In any case a more rrUluUI concepr.

and the social SCiences, seE: below. ‘Lebenswelt’ is translated both as
52See Cnrr (1).

lived- and as life-world. It is related to ‘Leib’ or lived body – a concept
53A crucial starting pOint for Heldegger, out of which he developed his condevc.loped in the as-yet-untranslated Vol.l I of. ‘Ideas’.

;cept of authenticity. c. f. Heiriegger (I) para. 9, pp67 -8.

51 Debate exists amongst phenomenologists whether the ‘Lebebswelt’ is the
54‘On the trans-sensory synthesis see Straus in May (1). On the phenomenocommon sense empirical world (Schutz). or tt.e world as our total concept-‘ logy of the auditory, Ihde (1).

ualization of the real (pad), I think that Husserl intended the latter, which 55,See Husserl (8), V.

~?

considering the synthesis of a subject between acts,
need we be concerned with every act, but merely
some.

The sphere of own-ness, and ‘the other’

Pre-predicative experience and the foundation of
self -evidence 59
From the individual act of consciousness we can
work outwards to the horizon of the lived world and
l
When we turn to our experience, when, instead of
explore the realms of intersubjectively constituted
talking about it, we actually begin to do phenomenreality. But in the other direction we can dig down
ological analysis, a striking fact is borne upon us.

. and explore the foundations of all’ judgment in the
Although in one sense all my experiences are mine,
immediate experience of the individual. What is the
I do not experience all the intentional objects which
basis of self -evidence? How is it that I can ever
appear .to my consciousness as mine . .In fact, in
simply see that something is so? – see that a
perception, most of what I perceive is not mine.

straight line is straight or that the colour before me
There is, then, a sphere of ‘own-ness’ to be investis red? This is not a question within empirical
igated. Clearly an important part, but only a part,
psychology (logically it must precede it), but a
of this sphere of own-ness, is my body. My experiquestion about the nature of experience. It is also
ence of my body must be investigated so that we
at the basis of any ‘genealogy’ of logic, 60 since its
can answer the questions ‘How is it that I experience
scope includes the self-evidence with which logical
my body as my own?’, and ‘What necessary structtruths present themselves to us.

ures can we discover in my bodily experience? ,56
A second question is, ‘How is it that I can ever
But the sphere of own-ness is more extensive than
know that a judgment is adequate to my experience?

the sphere of body, and lurking within it are neces- that a description, for example, accurately exsary structures waiting to be uncovered. Clearly it
presses my perception?’ Rigorous phenomenois opposed to a sphere of ‘otherness’; and in the
logical descripti oh , can begin to disentangle the
sphere of otherness we find an indisputable formacomplex knottings of experience and language at
tion of ideas surrounding that of ‘the other’ conthe roots of all thinking. We can, for example,
sciousness. It is beyond doubt that I experience
distinguish the level of pre-predicative experience
(prior to any ‘objective’ judgment) which itself
other consciousnesses as consciousnesses like my
involves the synthesis of passively given data
own, and that I must constitute the idea of the other
through time: this is the direct access we’ have to
from the phenomena of my own experience. Yet this
the lived-world before it is ‘veiled’ by. the idealizaseems paradoxical, for in constituting the idea of
tions of science. 61 These primitive syntl)eses we
the other I constitute it as essentially other to my
can locate in a realm of pre-predicative judgment,
consciousness, having an existence totally independent of my own. So how, on the basis of the phenombefore it is distorted by language.

ena which appear, am I able to do this? We must
But what is the necessary relationship between
carry the phenomenological analysis deeper to find
pre-predicative experience (and the judgments it
the answer. (Husserl of course is using not so
involves) and our formulations of it in thought – the
much the royal ‘we’ as the divine’!’. As I pointed
realm of predicative judgment and experience? As
out above, he discusses his individuality as the
soon as we enter this realm we must take account
universal type. )
of the intersubjective constitution of the real, and
the part that language plays in that. 62
The lived world
At the level of the individual act of consciousness
the transcendental reduction gives us a transcendental ego and a transcendent object. But at the level
of the totality of acts of a particular consciousness
it gives us the synthesized ‘self’ (on the subject
side), and the synthesized ‘Lebenswelt’ (on the object side). The individual act of perception constitutes an object out of a background of phenomena:

the object does not appear in isolation, but in relation to that background. 57 Successive acts of perception constitute a series of objects which appear
as related. In each case, that of the single act and
of the series, there is a ‘horizon’ within which the
appearance occurs. At its broadest, the horizon
for perceived objects is the horizon of the lived
world. The spheres of own-ness and otherness, of
reality and ideality, of the public and of the private,
are all structures of the lived world. The lived
world, Husserl concludes, is one of the richest
spheres for phenomenological investigation. There
are undoubtedly necessary structures to be uncovered – structures which must form the foundations of a new natural science, one located within a
more adequate ontology which recognises the lived
world as the necessary co-relate of the transcendental ego 58

, The Crisis’

All these themes – the transcendental ego, its relatioriship to the lived world and to others, the intersubjective constitution of reality, the foundation of
rationality in the pre-predicative experience of the
individual – all these continued to occupy Husserl
during the last decade of his life. But the theme’

which came to predominate and draw all the others
together was the theme of crisis. It was not something new in Husserl’s work, 63 but it took on new
meaning – historical and political meaning.

In 1934 Husserl was asked by the organizers of
the International Congress of Philosophy at Prague
to comment on ‘the mission of philosophy in our
time’. The Nazis were already in power in
Germany and beginning to flex their muscles.

Husserl shared the revulsion of many bourgeois
intellectuals to the new regime and the irrationalism it seemed to stand for: on top of which antisemitism was really beginning to bite. Husserl
wrote a letter to the congress, and a long essay
(never sent) which ‘led to deep problems in the
.philosophy of history which truly disturb me’. 64

59The theme of the posthumOUSly published ‘ExperIence and Judgment’.

60‘Experienee and Judgment’ is subtitled ‘towards a Genealogy of Loctc’.

Husserl’s conception of Logic was always very broad.

61Husserl (9) para. 10.

56 HusseH has ~micultles with bodily existence {LetSj. It IS Merleau-Ponty 62For anyone interested I ~ve a brief, uncompleted paper crittclzinc
with his concept of the ‘body-subject’, who has developed the best account
Russerl’s cock-eyed analysis. For good work on these themes stimulated
of it. For a critique of Husserl’s account informed by Merleau-Ponty’s
by Husserl see: Eley’s ‘Afterword’ in Husserl (9); M. Dufrenne ‘Lancuace
work see R. Schmitt (1).

md MetaphYSics’ in Lawrence & O’Connor (1); Gusdorf (1), Kwant (1), and
57 There is an obvious connection here with the contemporary Gestalt psycho- much of the later work of Merleau-Ponty – particularly (3) and (4). For the
real enthusiast there are severan unpublished and more or less unintelUlogy. The gestalt of figure and ground impressed both Sartre (5) and
Merleau-Ponty (2). For further psychological work on this see Gurwitsch
gible papers of my own.

(1).

63Nor in Germany, c. f. Splegelberg (1) Vol. I pp77-9.

58 See Husserl (1) p353; Kockelmans (4); and AH passim, particularly Vol. 11. 64Russerl (10) p. xvii.

33

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Help RP to break even – take out a
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cover.

On Kant’s definition of marriage in
The Metaphysic of Ethics
That pact for reciprocity in use
Of sexual organs and worldly possessions

Which marriage meant for him, in my submission
Urgently needs securing from abuse.

I gather certain partners have defaulted.

Allegedly the organs acting for them
Vanished when they decided to withdraw them.

Loopholes were found: something that must be halted.

Recourse to law would seem the only way
To get those organs duly confiscated.

Maybe the partners ought to be persuaded
To

~heck

again on what the contracts say.

If i:hey won’t do so, someone’s sure to send

The bailiffs in – a most unhappy end.

Bertolt Brecht
translated by John Willett from
Bertolt Brecht Poems 1913-1956
Part Two 1929-1938
London, Eyre Methuen, 1976, 154pp, £1. 95

34

In 1935 he gave two lectures, one in Vienna and
one in Prague, out of which grew his last, and unfinished, major work: ‘The Crisis of European
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology’. 65
The book, one of Husserl’s clearest and loo.st
technical, well repays careful study. 66 It is his
attempt to understand what had gone wrong, why
civilization as he knew it was threatened with
destruction. 67
The meaning of man
SCience,68 says Husserl, has forgotten its meaning
for life, and has thereby lost its humanity. 69 There
has been a ‘positivist reduction’ of the very idea of
science to mere factuality. It has been forgotten
that science is essentially a human project, and
that the knowledge it acquires isal ways relative to
human consciousness. Scientists have misunderstood both the nature of science and the nature of
(scientific) knowledge, with the result that they
have suppressed what it means to be human, both
in themselves and in others.

But this is no mere local difficulty amongst academics. We are talking here about a whole traditio~
a tradition stemming from the Gt;eeks, which is
utterly central in European civilization. It is a
tradition which embodies the ideals’ of truth and
rationality; which establishes the values by which
people live in a community. The tradition is itself
inter-subjectively constituted by the consciousnesses participating in it .. It is a teleolOgical
process, formulated and reformulated, passed on
from one generation to the next.

The mathematization of nature
Something went wrong in the tradition, which divorced knowledge and its acquisition from human
values, and from human purpose in acquiring it.

The Renaissance revived and breathed new life ihto
the Greek ideals, but shortly afterwards Galileo
took the first step which set modern science on
course both for its spectacular successes, and for
its terrible distortion of man. What Galileo did was
‘mathematize’ Nature. Whatever could be measured, quantified, and reducetl to mathematical
form was grist to the mill of science, but all else
ceased to be. The result was the idealization and
objectification of Nature, and the identification of
the real with this abstract idea. Being was reduced
to the being of the object, 70 and the subject (including the thinking scientist himself) disappeared
below the horizon of recognitiOll.

The failure of philosophers
Now this, thinks Husserl, is very remarkable,
because the abstract theory which has gained total
acceptance within our culture is one which is
totally at odds with the experience of each and
everyone of us. Each of us, including the SCientist,
knows himself to be a subject, a thinking consciousness: and if that were not the case there could be
no SCience, nor any knowledge at all. And yet the

subje_ct is denied the ontological status that is readily assigned to the object. Virtually the whole of
modern philosophy can be seen as an attempt to
explain this paradox: Descartes, Locke, Berkeley,
Hume and Kant, 71 were all of course aware of
what it meant to be human, and were therefore
driven to try and bridge the gap Qetween their lived
experience (in the Lebenswelt) and their theoretical
bMiefs (the .Naturalistic Attitude). But none of
them were radical enough in suspending their preconceptions: their insights and successes were
therefore only partial, locked within the Naturalistic Attitude and failing to comprehend the true
nature of subjectivity.

The fundamental contradiction of positivist
psychology
But the crisis of understanding reached its peak in
the ‘science’, of psychology: it was no accident that
psychology was both the last and the least successful of the sciences, for the very conception of positivist psychology was founded upon a contradiction.

The attempt to turn back the methods and the beliefs of the natural sciences upon the human psyche
was tne ultimate paradox, for it was an attempt to
objectify the subject. But the subject is. precisely
that which stands over against and in opposition to
the object; and the only meaning which object can
have is that which derives from the subject.

The end result of these failures – the failure to
comprehend the meaning of man as subjectivity,
the failure to understand science as a human project with a human meaning, the failure to reconcile
theoretical abstraction with practical experience,
and above all the failure of philosophy to fulfil its
task of upholding the ideal of truth by the application of human rationality to the lived world of
human experience – the result is Crisis. A crisis
in science, which has lost all foundation; a crisis
in our culture and therefore our societri which has
lost all standards of truth and reason; and a
crisis in the individual, whose system of beliefs
has collapsed because they are totally at odds with
his experience.

The answer for Husserl, of course,.lies in transcendental phenomenology. We must return to the
world of naive experience (the Lebenswelt), the
world of praxis, of (universal) pre-predicative
experience. We must, in the spirit of truth and
rationality, rigorously investigate the sources of
trad’ition and the idea of history. We must perform
the transcendental reduction, suspend the false
abstractions which the tradition has passed down
to us, and lay bare the foundations of the objective
in’ subjectivity. We must recognise the intersubjective constitution of reality by the community
of consciousnesses. And if we do all these things
we will transform consciousness and rediscover
the meaning of man.

Perhaps I can now assess the sense of Husserl’ s
idealism. His last work had virtually broken his
dearly held theory of ideas, pushed to infinity (as a

65 Attempted summaries include Gurmitsch (3) and Landgrebe (1).

‘existentialism’ since Sartre appropriated tile term) of Jaspers and
66 And when Northwestern University Press (or perhaps Beinemann) put it
Heidegger was enjoying a tremendous vOb’u<' in Germany, both in academic
between paper covers students might be able to afford it.

circles and beyond. Busserl, who regarded it (with some bitterness) as
67 The book is a major influence on the phenomenologicaI Marxists of Milan,
totally wrong-headed irratiollc’llism, nevertheless recognized that it spoke
directly to the individual about his situati’.ln in a world that was becoming
and the Telos group in the States. It probably influenced Merleau-Ponty
more than other philosophical work: in April 1939 he went to the newlyincreasi:tgly difficult to cope with. Amongst othertllings, the ‘Crisis’ is
found~ Husserl Archives at Louvain especially to read the unpublished
Husserl’s counterblast: att.ackingboth Existenzphiiosophie and most other
sections on psychology and the lif<'-world. Its impact extends from his
currently held 'philosophies' (Marxism not inClud<'d)hand presenting h1l
earliest works (1) and (2) to his last – see Working Notes in Merleau. phenomenology as not only the true, but also the rea y relevant one.

Ponty (5).

70Wbich is a central thesis of Heid~gger’s ‘Being and Time’ (see Heidegger
68 ‘1. e. systematic knowledge. Husserl uses the term ‘Wissenschalt’ ~ch
~ (1) Intro 2). – though he dated tha mistake much earlier – with Plato!

includes the ‘Geisteswissenschalten’ or human sciences.

71These are the philosophers who are given serious mention in the Crisis.

69 In the ‘Crisis’ Husserl frequently uses the ~ord ‘Dasein’ (human eXistence).72Husserl strongly attacks ‘irrativnallsm’, which in philosophJ mean&
This is probably due to the influence of Heidegger for whom the term is
Heidegger, Jaspers and co., and in society meallli the Nazis'” all tbeJ
central. In the ’30s the Existenzphilosophie (which should !!.Q!. be tr”tlnslated .u,nd for.

35

teleological ideal) the discovery of atemporal truth,
and confronted the problem of history head on. He
had worked through the philosophical tradition as
far as Kant, but never got to grips with the Hegelian dialectic. He was certainly not a materialist,
and therefore could give no rational answer to the
question of why the history of ideas had developed
as it had: ‘Galileo made a mistake’ is the best he
could do. It was left to philosophers who knew their
Hegel and Marx to carry further this development
in Husserl’s thinking.

The influence of the later Husserl
Husserl threw out sparks like a catherine wheel,
and started fires in all directions. ‘Major phenomenologists’ – like Ingarden, Heidegger,
Binswanger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Schutz, Paci
– all share a common debt to Husserl, but not a
great deal else. Not only do they differ in their conceptions of phenomenology, but even in the methods
they employ and call ‘phenomenological’. 73 There
is, however, a clear philosophical tradition which
develops from Husserl, through the early Heidegger
to Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and beyond. 74 It runs
together with Hegelianism, and subsequently Marxism – and there are good reasons why this should
be so. But Husserl’ s phenomenology, particularly
in its later form, has exercised a large influence
beyond the academic discipline of philosophy, and
it is to those developments that I shall now turn.

Phenomenological psychology/psychiatry
Already in the 20s ‘phenomenological’ influence was
beginning to be felt in psychiatry and psychology. It
acquired considerable momentum in the 30s, drawing inspiration not only from Husserl, but also
from Scheler, Jaspers, 75 and particularly
Heidegger. A central figure in this development
was the psychoanalyst Ludwig Binswanger, since
it was he who made the philosophical shift most
articulately and cashed it out in some brilliant
casework. 76
The informing idea of this whole development was
the notion of the Lebenswelt as a structured whole
which could be uncovered by painstaking phenomenological description. But this structure could only be
discovered by treating the patient as a fellowsubject, and not objectifying him as Freudian analysis did. 77 The philosophical shift came with the
realization that this undercut the status of psychiatry and psychology as ‘objective’ sciences and required their refoundation within a philosophy which
could give an adequate account both of the subject
and of the intersubjective constitution of reality.

Readers may recognise here themes which Sartre
took up in his ‘existential psychoanalysis,78 and
which outcropped in Britain through the work of
Laing and Cooper. 79 Binswanger himself found in
Heide er’s anal sis of human existence Dasein-

analytik) the philosophical framework for his own
theoretical analyses of actual patients (Daseinsanalyse). 80
American psychiatry, which had been softened up
by the ‘existentialist’ writings of Erich Fromm, 81
discovered this European school in the late 50s notably with the publication of Rollo May’s excellent
anth ology ‘Existence’. 8~
In psychology (insofar as it is distinguishable),
phenomenology has been rather less filtered
through the ‘existential’ philosophies of Heidegger
and Sartre. Husserl’ s transcendental ego with its
essential structures of temporality, spatiality,
directionality etc, stimulated researches such as
those of Straus (1), who, as an emigre to America,
persisted in raising his voice against the dominant
behaviourism. His repeated theme is the inability
of psychology to account for the psychologist:

again ‘objective’ psychology has no place for a subject. Gurwitsch~ another emigre and student of
Husserl’s, was simultaneously extendinfJhis researches into the field of consciousness; and
Plessner’s work on human expression was also
stimulating interest. 84 These influences ran together with the post-existentialist writings of
Rogers and Maslow on the ‘person’ and interpersonal relations to become by the early ’60s
what could loosely be called a phenomenological
current in American psychology. 85 But the greatest
philosophical influence on psychology has probably
been that of Merleau-Ponty, who with his extensive
knowledge of the subject, could speak directly to
psychologists desperately looking for a way out of a
crumbling behaviourism. 86

Phenomomenology since Husserl
Returning to the development of the central ph110sophical tradition in phenomenology, the publication
of Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ in 1927, inaugurated an ‘existential’ phase which re-cast Husserl’s
transcendental ego/transcendent world distinction
into human existence/world (Heidegger) or pour
soil en-soi (Sartre) and concerned itself with analysing the essential structures of the individual
human being. Heidegger, after his penetrating and
very influential first work, ran himself into a blind
alley the logical end of which should have been to
keep his philosophical mouth shut. 93 But neither
Sartre, nor Merleau-Ponty, were able to avoid for
long the problems left by Husserl – problems of
the relationship between individuals, of the intersubjective constitution of reality, of the subjective
to the objective, of the individual to the collective,
and the overwhelming problem of history. Both of
them drew inspiration from Hegel (as did Heidegger:

both of them sought answers in Marxism. Of the
different conclusions they drew I shall say nothing
here, but instead will turn to what I see as a more
romisjng development towards the solution of these

73 c . . the accounts 0 p enomenological method in, for example, Heidegger
Uvism which is politically as mystifying as the objectivism which they
(1) pp49-63; Merlcau-Ponty (2) pp. vii-xxi; and Schutz (1) pp3·15.

attack. The direct philosophical influence on these writers was, of course,
74 In postwar France phenom;:nology entered the mainstream of philosophy:

Sartre, see Laing & Cooper (2).

see e. g. Ricoeur (1)-(4), or Derrida (1).

80Binswanger (1) goes far beyond Heidegger in developing an account of
75 Karl Jaspers started his career as a medical practitioner before he turned authentic interpersonal relationships based on love and friendship. See also
to philosophy. Already in his ‘General Psychopathy’ (1913) he included a
Boss (1) and Caruso (1).

section on ‘phenomenology’ interpreting it as a method of using the experi- 81 See, for example, E. Fromm (1) and (2).

ential data of the patient (i. e. while, from the Husserlian point of view,
82May (1) contains a good account of the development of the phenomenological
remaining firmly locked within the perspective of the Natural Attitude).

and existential movements in psychiatry up to 1958.

83Gurwitsch (1) and (2).

See Jaspers (1) pp55-6; also May (1) pp97-99.

84ft. Plessner is a Swiss some of whose work has been available in English
76 His major work, Binswanger (1), is still untranslated. Needleman’s
.ince 1964, see Plessner (1) and (2).

collection of his papers (Binswanger (2), and the case studies in May (1)
have made his influence felt in the States. I can refer anyone lIlterested to ·85See articles by MacLeod and Rogers in Wann (1); also Rogers (1) and
various articles in German.

Maslow (1). Anyone interested in the transmission of ideas might like to
’17 See Binswanger (2).

note the influence of Polanyi on this school. On a different tack, see Zaner
’18 Sartre (4), IV, Ch. 2.

(I),
’79 See particularly Laing (1), which analyses schizophrenia in terms of
86Merleau-Ponty (1) and (2). See also Sartre’s early ‘psychological’ works
(1), (2) and (3).

‘Ontological insecurity’ and thereby questions the ontological status of
‘reality’. Lacking any means of accounting for the intersubjective constitu- 93’For an excellent and critical exPosition of the logic (1 Heidegger’s
tion of the lived world, (both) Laing and Cooper relapse into an utter reladevelopment see A. Koyre (I).

36

Phenomenological Marxism

do is use the phenomenological method for evaluating and reviSing the adequacy of his received ideas.

The central thesis of this school is roughly as
Philosophy as praxis
follows. What phenomenology lacks is an adequate
What the individual can do, so can a group of philoaccount of historical development, and of why social
sophers, and a group of marxists. The role of the
reality is constituted as it is. What Marxi’sm “lacks
philosopher in society is preciseJy that of the mediis an adequate account of consciousness and the
role of ideas in mediating the historical process.

. at or – the critic and author of the ideas by which
S’Ociety comprehends reality, and by means of which
Within Marxism Lukacs (1) had attacked the problem before relapsing into dogmatism, and
the possibilities of action are determined.

As Husserl realized of the scientific tradition,
Marcuse (1) had (briefly) realized the possible
and Marx of his own life-work, the production of
complementarity of phenomenology and Marxism.

But there are good objective (political) reasons
ideas is itself a form of which which plays an essenwhy marxists shelved the problem until the late
tial role in the historical process. 95 Where bour’50s. When it was re-opened, the fact had to be
geoiS intellectuals like Husserl and Heidegger come
adrift is in failing to see work as an essential part
faced that orthodox marxism had become a dogma
of being human and their own work as comprehended
divorced from the social reality it was supposed to
in the society which supports them. Theoretical
explain, and Marxism as a living and developing
innovation by intellectuals is a specialized form of
body of theory had all but perished. Karl Korsch
work which should properly be oriented towards
(1), Lukacs and others had to be exhumed firstly
to explain why this had happened, and secondly to
praxis. Under capitalism the products of intellectstart a new theoretical advance. And central to any
uals will be appropriated, objectified, bought and
explanation was the whole problem of historical
sold as commodities, made into something alien to
p~ocess – of how social reality generates ideas,
their producers, and apparently put beyond human
control. 96 What Husserl rightly recognizes as
ideas generate social reality. Thus at the very
-having occurred in the development of scientific
heart of the malaise of marxism was the problem
of the intersubjective constitution of ideas (including thought is no more than a special case of what has
happened to the products of all workers under capthose of Marxism)’ on the basis of the experienced
italism. Only by means of a proper appreciation of
world – i. e. precisely what the phenomenologists
this fact can philosophy – and indeed all scientific
were on about.

thinking – incorporate within itself the critical
But phenomenology and marxism could not simply
a wareness of its own status which will prevent its
be put together in some neat and complementary
appropriation, and reserve to it the power of
synthesis, phenomenology supplying the account of
effective action towards change (1. e. revolutionary
the individual and marxism that of the social. Each
praxis).

of them claimed to be total philosophies – a fundaThe main centre of phenomenological Marxism
mental contradiction which could be resolved only
as I have outlined it is Italy, and in particular the
on the one side or the other. 94 But phenomenology
University of Milan. 97 The emergence of the magahad failed, and would necessarily continue to fail,
to generate the social and historical out of its start- zine Telos (in the wake of the ’68 student revolts)
ing point in the individual consciousness as absolute. as the official publication of the graduate school at
Buffal098 marked an important bridgehead in the
The individual cannot possibly generate reality but
states for this brand of phenomenological Marxism.

only ideas about it, and those idea s themselves
Rather than attempting to trace the various intermust essentially have social and historical location.

actions
between these usually separate philosophies,
The historical development of ideas within a tradior even the progress of the Italian synthesis, I
tion would be fundamentally unintelligible if considered as an independent realm (Husserl’s inability refer readers to the bibliography.

to explain the course of the scientific revolu~ion):

In place of a conclusion
it could only be understood in relation to the (changI shall make no attempt to sum up what I have said
ing) reality which it attempted to explain.

either about Husserl or the phenomenological
An undogmatic marxism, however, starting from
the social reality as· experienced by its participants, movement. If I have managed to impress upon
readers that here is a whole alternative philosophwould be large enough to comprehend within itself
ical tradition, at least as rich, and varied and as
an account of both the individual and the historical
alive as anything the English-speaking world can
geneSis of ideas. As opposed to Husserl’s pure
lay claim to, I shall have achieved my main purconsciousness, which is now seen to be a theoretipose. If you have read (or skipped) this far, I hope
cal abstraction divorced from the phenomena of
you will have found something en route interesting
experience (and therefore to be condemned on
enough to go into further. The (over? 1abundance of
purely phenomenological grounds), the historical
footnotes should have given you some indication of
individual can never be absolute: he is born and
where to look. The bibliography which follows is
raised into a situation, a language, and a system of
intended to aid you further.

_
ideas which is re- iven for him. But what he can

are P. Piccone and P. A. Rovatti. There is a w£’~lth of matf;r.ial inltaliar.,
including the 101ll!-e:>tabHshed jour:l::.l ‘Aut… Aut’.

SUNY at Bufial,) ;las ~l’:tm a Geutr!! for phenomei1ol~y (I think because of
Marvin Farber), sint’e at least 1940 when the journal ‘PhilosOiJhy and
Phenomenological Hesearch’ began to appear from there, drawing heayUy
on the work of recent !’urorican refugees. Rather rapidly that magazine
becam4! just another Amp.rican Philosophy journal with only a penchant lor
articles 011 phenomenoIOl-“Y. ‘Telos’ has developed quite differently starting
with a (‘leat bias towards Italian I’hcllomenol~ic-a] Marxism (thcugh irlitially tr.Jiling some DIor.;! orthodox C:is.:idcnts :l!ong). first (h””r:p~ !1J(l
ltallan and then (SillC8 its shift of location) the’ phenomellol.x~~C<ll – ~)~COIDinl! much nlOn: clearly a journal pr matxist t~(.'I.'l'Y.·
Bibliography continued from p36
M. VAJDA (1) Marxism,' ExIstentialism, Phenomenolqq, lfelos 7.Spr~I'1
R. A, ROVATTI (1) M.flr<'use and 'The Crisis of European Sciences, Tclos 2
Abbreviations:

(2) A Phenomenolo”‘ical AnalYsis of Marxism, Telos 5
AH – Analecta Husserliana (Yearbook, published by D, Reidel, Dordrecht)
(3) Critical Theory and Phenomenology, Telos 15, Spring 1973 PPR – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
TRAN DUC THAO (1) M.. rxismc et Phenomenologie, Revue Internationale.1946 JBSP – Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology

94 Cru ely, one coul say that in this dilemma Sartre chose marxism and
Merleau-Ponty chose phenomenolOgy,
95 For an elaboration of this theme of the intellectual as appropriated worker.

see P. piccone ~3) or his introduction to Paci (1).

.

96 For a beautiful (and naive) reaction to this, see the statement on copyright
in Telos 3: ‘Since ideas should neither be sold nor bought, none of the
included material is copyrighted and can be used ior any purpose whatsoever by anyone’. By UIC 7th issue this was replaced ‘.:>y: ‘Sir.ce ideas should
be neither sold nor uought all of this material is copyrighted. PermiSSion
to reprint can be reaciily obtained from the editor’, Plus ca change?

97 Enzo Paci is the leadill!:,; ll~ht. Prominent successors publishim,’ in En~!lish

~’7.

Bibliography
E. HUES!mL
(1) L2t;.U;illJnvostJ(·ations (2 vols) (19008.: 1901) RnuUedge 8.: Kegan Paul, E170
8f,9pp. 11,e !Jonk ·…·hicil made Husserl’s reputation, and marked the devel,.p
menl (~)articul;:,rly in Vo!. 2) of the early conc(:ption of phe,!lomemJlu!,;y.

Itel:-,braces logical theory in the widest sense, including analyses of acts
of mean in!!, expression, abstraction, attention etc.

(2) The phenomenology of Internal Time-Cr.nsciousness (1905/28) Nijhoft,
1964, 188pp. Based on lectures glven 1904/5, with some later amendments. lnvestigatin!! the structure of consciousness, Husserl finds that it
is temporality (with its fundamental ‘categories’ of retention and protentiun
which gives form to perception, phantasy, imagination, memory and recollection. A crucial influence on Heidegger, who edited the lectures for
publication in 1928.

.

(3) The Idea of PhenomenolO!!y (1907/50) Nijhoff, 1964, 60pp.

Based on 5 lectures given in 1907. The first summary statement of phenomenology as philosophy: the naturalistic attitude, phenomenological and
eidetic reductions and constitution all expounded. Marks the tranSition
from the earlier to the later conception and heralds the ontological shift.

(4) Philosophy as a Rigorous Science (1910) in: Q. Lauer, ‘Phenomenology and
the Crisis of Philosophy’, Harper & ROW, 1965
Article which claims that phenomenology is SCientifiC, but should not be
confused with factual/empirical science on the one hand, or ‘philosophy of
life’ on the other. On the latter point, it was World War I that started
Husscrl on the descent from the ivory tower.

(5) ~ (Vol. 1 (1913): A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, AlIen
& Unwin, 1931, 465pp. The second major work, and during Husserl’s life·
time the most influential. A systematic, detailed and often difficult exposition of the later conception, before the ‘transcendental turn’. If any work
founded the phenomenological movement, this is it. Volumes 2 and 3 were
not published until 1952, and are still untranslated.

(6) Formal and Transcendental Logic (1928/9) Nijhoff, 1969.

After a long silence, the dry attempt to distil the results of his researches
with logiC, now conceived as ‘the universal life of consciousness’. Not
formal in the mathematical sense. The important notion of ‘genetic constitution’ of ideas is introduced.

(7) The Paris Lectures (1929) Nijhoff, 1970, 39pp,
The two lectures given at the Sorbonne in 1929 under the title ‘Introduction
to Transcendental Phenomenology’. The best brief introduction to Husserl’ ~
mature conception of phenomenology. Covers an amazing amount of ground
clearly and concisely. (The English edition has a good introductory essay
by P. Koestenbaum).

.

(8) ~.!l~ditations: an introduction to phenomenology (1929/31) Nijhoff,
1960, 157pp. (Not much to do with Descartes). A considerable expansion
of the Paris Lectures, with near paragraph by paragraph correlation. The
most complete account of ‘transcendental’ phenomenology. Meditations 4
and 5 deal with the ego, solipSism, the other and ·intersubjectivity.

(9) ~l.lli!.ce and Judgment: investigations in a genealogy of logic (1930/39)
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, 429pp. Analyses ofprelinguistic experience, predicative thinking and abstract conceptualization: it attempts to
ground all cognition, including logical truth, in the lived world.

(10) The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenolo : an
introduction to phenomenulogical philosophy (1934/7 Northwestern P,
1970, 265pp + appendices. The most stimulating of all Husserl’s works,
and since his death probably the most influential. Deals with the history of
the western tradition in philosophy and in science: their loss of human significance, and their necessary refoundation in the inter-subjectively constituted life-world. Extensive discussion of the foundations of philosophy.

(11) Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity – the ‘Vienna Lecture’

(published as appendix to the English edition of the Crisis) (1935) 30pp.

A statement of Husserl’s beliefs about European culture, its contemporary
‘crisis’, and the proper role of philosophy.

Fhenomenology: General
Th. de BOER (1) The M~aning of Husserl’s Idealism in the Light of his
Development, AH* vol. 11 pp322-32
H. L. van BREDA (1) Husserl’s lnedita, AH vol. 11 pp149-59
F. BRENTANO (1) Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint
D. CARR (1) The Fifth Meditation and Husserl’s Cartpsianism PPR* 34, 1
(sept. 73) pp14-35
J. DERRIDA (1) Speech an” Phenomena, and other essays on Husserl’ s Theory
of Signs, Norlhwestern UP, 1973
.

R. O. ELVETON (ed) (1) The Phenomenology of Husserl: selected critical
readings, Quadrangle, 1970
M. FARBER (1) The Aims of Phenomenology, Harper, 1966
(ed) (2) Philosophi~al Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl,
Harvard, 1940
(3) ‘fhe Foundation of Phenomenolo[..,),
(4) On the Ideal of a Presuppositionless Philosophy; in Farber (2)
and Kockelmans (4).

A. GURWlTSCH (3) The Last Work of Edmund Husserl, PPR 16, 1955/6,
pp380-99
M. HEIDEGGER (l) £(‘In,” and Tint.!, BlackwcIl, 1967
VON !HVE (1) ~~Iean !Ic-ditations, JBSP* I, iii, Oct. 70
J. J. KOCKELMANS (l)A -Yirsllntruduction to Hueserl’s Phenomenology,
Dusquesne, 1967
(cd) (2) Ehcnomennlo~y, Anchor, 1967
(3) Pi:enomenol0L’)’ and Physical SCience, Dusquesne, 1966
and T. J. KISIEL (eds) (4) Phenomenology and the Natural
~~ Northwestern UP, 1970
.

A. KOYRE (1) ~Ition philosophique de Martin Heidegger in ‘Etudes
d’histoire de la pensee philosophique’, Gallimard, 1961
G. KUNG (1) The World as Noema and as F:,’Ierent, JBSP Ill, i, Jan. 72
L. LANDGREBE (1) The World ilS a Phenornen()logical Problem, PPR 1,
1940 pp38-58
Q. LA UER (1) p-henomenology’ its Cenesis and Prospect, Harper, 1965
N. LA WRENCE and D. O’CONNOR (eas) Readings in Existential Phenomenology
Prentice-Hall, 1967
J-F. LYOTARD (1) La Phenomenologie, Presses Universitaires de France,
1967
M. MERLEAU-PONTY (1) ThE’ Structure of Behaviour. Methuen, 1965
(2) Phenomenology of Perception, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1962
(3) lmti.rect Langual’e and the voices of Silence in
‘Signs’, Northwestern UP, 1964
(4) The Primacy of Perception, Northwestern UP, 1964
(5) The Yi”ible :lIld :!J.:.Jm·lsib~, NOl’thwestern UP, 196e

38

J. H. MO~ANTY (1) ‘.Lifr ‘.vorlj· and’ A. Priori’ if, Eusserl’s Later Thought
AH vol. III pp46-65
E. PIVCEVIC (1) Husserl and Phenomenology, Hutchinson, 1970
P. RICOEUR (1) Freedom and Nature: the Voluntary and the Involunt:lry,
Northwestern UP, 1966
(2) Finitude and Guilt, Gateuray, 1965
(3) Husserl· an Analysis of his Phenomenology, Northwestern
UP, 1967 (4) The Problem of the Will and Philosophical Discourse, in
J. M. Edie (1) pp273-289
J-P. SAR’TRE (1) Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, Methuen, 1971
(2) The Psycholo”Y of the Imagination, Citadel, 1966
(3) ImaginatiQ!l, University of Michigan Press, 1962
(4) Being and Nothi~, Methuen, 1969
(5) Existentialism and Humanism, Methuen, 1948
M. SCHELER (1) The Nature of Sympathy, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970
(2) Ressentiment, Free Press Glencoe, 1961
R. SCHMITT (1) On Knowin 17 One’s Own~, AH vol. I
F. J. SMITH (ed) (1) Phenomenology in Perspective, Nijhoff, 1970
H. SPIEGELBERG (1) The Phenomenolol!iC:ll l’4ovement (2 vals) Nijhoff, 1965
(2) Qn…C;ome Human Qses of Phenomenolo.””y in Smith (1)
D. STEWART and A. MICHUNAS (1) Exploring Phenomenology, American
Library Association, 1974
R. M. ZANER (1) The Way of Phenomenology, Pegasus, 1970

Phenomenological psychology and psychiatry
L. BINSWANGER (1) Grundformen und Erkenntnis Menschlichen Daseins,
Reinhardt, MUnchen, 1964
(2) Being-in-the-World. ed. J. Needleman, Basic Books,1963
M. BOSS (1) Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, Basic Books, 1963
I. CARUSO (1) Existential Psychology, Darton, Lcngman & Todd,1964
E. FROMM (1) The Sane Society, Routledge, 1956
(2) Fear of Freedom, R’-,utledge, 1960
A. GURWITSCH (1) The Field of Conscio’lsness, Dusquesne, 1964
(2) ~udies in P:lenomenology and Psychology,
Northwestern UP, 1966
G. GUSDORF (1) On Speaking, Northwestern UP
K. JASPERS (1) General Psychopathology (1923) University of Manchester
Press, 1963
J. J. KOCKELMANS (4) The Phenomenological Psychology of Edmund Husser!,
Dusquesne, 1967
R. C. KWANT (1) The Phenomenology of Expression, Dusquesne, 1969
R. D. LAING (1) The Diviqed Self, Penguin
and D. G. COOPER (1) Reason & Violence: a Decade of Sartre’s
Philosophy 1950-1960, Tavistock, 1964
A. H. MA SLOW (1) Toward a Psvchology of Being, Van Nostrand,1962
E. MINKOWSKI (1) Lived time, Northwestern UP
P.. MAY (ed) Existence. Basic Books, 1958
H. PLESSNER (1) Laughing and Crying, Northwestern UP, 1970
(2) On Hum:}n Expression in Review of Existential Psychology
& Psychiatry, 4,1964, pp37-46
C. R. ROGERS (1) On Becoming a Person, Houghton Mifflin, 1961
E. STRAUS (J) Phenomenological Psychology, Tavistock
and M. GRIFFIN (eds) Phenomenology of Will and Action,
Dusquesne,1967
T. W. WANN (ed) (1) Behaviorism and Phenomenology, University of Chicago
Press, 1964
R. M. :lANER (2) The Problem of Embodiment NijhoIf 1964
(3) Towards a Phenomenology or’thg Se.U: in F. J. Smith (1)
Phl~lC)JlJenological

sol’ial science

P. L. BEHGER and T. LUCKMANN (1) The Social Construction of Heality,
Allen Lane, 1967
J. M. EDIE et al (eds) (1) Patterns of the Life-World, Northwestern UP, 1970
(2) Phenomenology in the UnHl’d States: an Account of
its Growth, JBSP, 5, Hi, Oct 74
M. NATANSON (1) Literature Philosophy and the Social SCiences, Nijhoff, 1968
(ed) (2) Phenomenology and SOcial Reality, Nijhoff, 1970
(3) The Nature of Social Man, in J. M. Edie (1), pp248-70
J. O’NEILL (1) Modes of Individualism 1933
G. PSATHAS (ed) (1) Phenomenological Sociology: Issues and Applications,
Wiley, 1973
A. SCHUT1 (1) Phenomenology of the Social World, Heinemann, 1972
(2) Collected Papers, 3 vols, Nijhoff, 1962-6
(ed. T. Luckmann) (3) Studies of the Life-World, Heincmann, 1974
(4) On Phenomenology and Social Relationt’!, Univ. Chicago Pr, 1970
S. STRASSER (1) Phenomenology and the Human Scienc~ Dusquesne
Phenomenological Marxism
S. FEDERICI (1) Yiet Cong Philosophy: Tran Due Thao, Telos 6, r’all 1970
K. KORSCH (1) Marxism and Philosophy, NLB,1970
K: KOSIC (ffDialectk of the Concrete Totality, Telos 2, Fall 196’8
(2) The Concrete Totality, Telos 4, Fall 1969
(3) Reason and History, Telos 3, Spring 1969
(4) Our Present CriSis, Telos 13, Fall 1972
W, LEISS (1) Husserl’s CrisiS, Telos 8
G. LUKACS (1) History and Class Consciollsness Merlin, 1971
W. McBRIDE (1) Marxism and Phenomenology, JBSP Vol. 6, i, Jan 1975
H. MARCUSE (1) ContribuLion to a Phenomenolo{‘Y of Historical Materialism
(1928), Tclos 4, Fall 1969
(2) On Science and Phenomenology, in R. Cohen and M. Wartofski
(ed) ‘Boston Studies in the Philosophy of SCience, 1965
M. MERLEAU-PONTY (6) Adventures of the DialC’ctic, Heinemann, 1974
E. PACI (1) The Function of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man,
Northwestern UP, 1972
(2) The Phenomenological Encyclopaedia.and the Telos of Humanity,
Telos 2, Fall 1968
(3) Towards a New Ph(‘1omenology, Telos 5, Spring 1970
(4) Dialectic of the Concrete and of the Abstract, Telos 3, Spring 1969
(5) History and Phenomenology in Hegel’s Thought, Telos 8,
Summer 1971
(6) The Lebenswelt as Ground and as Leib in Husserl: Somatology,
Psychology Sociology in J. M. Edie (1) pp123-138
P. PlC CONE (1) (and A. DELTlNI) Marcuse’s Heideggerian Marxism,
Telos 6,1970
(2) Reading ‘The CrisiS’ Telos 8
(3) PhenomerlOlogical Marxii;m~teios 9″
(4) Lukacs’s ‘History and Class Consciousness’ Half ~entury
~, Telos 4, lo’al11969·

continued on p37

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