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Nietzsche’s Woman

Nietzsche’s Woman
The Poststructuralist Attempt
To Do Away with Women
Kelly Oliver
Since Derrida’s Spurs, Nietzsche has been posed as woman.

With his recent Postponements, David Farrell Krell pushes
Nietzsche further into Derrida’s ‘feminine operation’. Krell
claims that Derrida and Nietzsche save real women from dogmatic philosophy by writing with ‘the hand of woman’:

It is the male philosopher who believes in ‘woman’ and
‘truth’ alike, the male philosopher who, according to
both Nietzsche and Derrida, proves credulous, dogmatic, and mistaken. Writing now with the other hand,
as it were, both Nietzsche and Derrida record the plaint
of women against ‘the foolishness of the dogmatic
philosopher’ …2


Does Krell see himself, then, writing with the ‘other hand’ , the
hand of woman?3
Male philosophers dressing up like woman in order to
arouse their own masculine desires does nothing to save real
women from dogmatic male philosophy. Rather, inversely, their
‘operation’ saves philosophy from real women. Why do women
need to write philosophy, if men can do it for them? If men can
write with the hand of woman, philosophy has no need for
women. Feminist philosophy, then, also becomes the domain of

In addition, I am suspicious of the woman Nietzsche imitates/desires. I will argue that Nietzsche desires woman as
mother. He fears woman as anything else. Moreover, Nietzsche
does not desire to become woman, rather, he desires to possess
woman. Nietzsche’s desire, then, is not a feminine desire. It is
not the desire of a woman. Rather, it is a masculine desire (the
desire to possess through impregnation).

Reading Nietzsche’s published writings, along with re-reading Krell’s unpublished Nietzsche, I will attempt to answer the
question which Krell raises, but cannot answer: ‘Why is
Nietzsche’s transition to woman always postponed and agonizing?’4
It is because Nietzsche desires woman as a man-his desire
is masculine, not feminine-that he cannot become woman.

The woman whom Nietzsche desires is an ideal, fetishized
woman, never actualized, therefore, always frustrating.

Nietzsche’s ‘transition’, then, is always agonizing because not
only can’t he become woman but also he can’t have woman.

I will argue that Nietzsche’s agonizing desire can be read as
the manifestation of an unresolved oedipal complex:

Nietzsche’s desire is to kill his philosophical fathers, whom he
claims are impotent, and impregnate the ‘womb of being’, in
order to give birth to the Ubermensch. Nietzsche does not want
to be woman. Rather he wants to be man enough, ‘hard
enough’, to impregnate that which his fathers could not. He

wants to take over their potency. Yet this desire brings with it
the fear of punishment-the fear of castration.5
Although both Derrida and Krell mention Oedipus, and
Nietzsche’s fascination with Oedipus in The Birth of Tragedy,
neither sees the Oedipus in Nietzsche.6 Enamoured by
Nietzsche’s ‘skirts’, Krell skirts Nietzsche’s Oedipus. It is
Oedipus who can answer Krell’s riddle ‘why is woman always
postponed? ‘

Oedipus also answers Krell’s further question ‘what is the
relationship between woman and death for Nietzsche?’ The
oedipal desire for woman as mother demands the death of the
father. Nietzsche fears punishment for this murder. In addition
the ‘son’, the Ubermensch, whom he hopes to sire as a result of
his incestuous desire, demands his death. as the father. The
Ubermensch is beyond all philosophers, including Nietzsche.

As if Nietzsche’s desire, masculine desire, is not already
complex enough, he also suffers from perfonpance anxiety.

Perhaps he isn’t man enough to impregnate the ‘womb of
being’. Perhaps, like his fathers, he is impotent This complex
desire, the oedipal desire, can be read in Nietzsche’s published
writings and even in Krell’s Postponements.

Nietzsche is tom between identifying with the father (in this
case the rationalist fathers of philosophy) while denying the
mother, and affirming the mother (the feminine) in order to do
away with the father (the masculine). This struggle, however,
and the way in which Nietzsche approaches the struggle, are
themselves masculine. Although the passages where Nietzsche
attacks traditional science, reason, and truth, far outweigh the
passages where he praises them, there are places where
Nietzsche explicitly identifies himself with the traditional
truth? For example, Nietzsche claims that:

… truths that are hard won, certain, enduring, and
therefore still of consequence for all further knowledge
are higher, to keep them is manly, and shows bravery,
simplicity, restraint.. Eventually, not only the individual, but all mankind will be elevated to this manliness, when men finally grow accustomed to the greater
esteem for durable, lasting knowledge. 8
Here Nietzsche identifies with the eternal ‘manly’ truth and
looks forward to the day when all of mankind is manly. Krell
refers to several unpublished notes where Zarathrustra tells
others, or is told, to become hard, to become manly.9
In addition to praising manliness, Nietzsche also explicitly
degrades the feminine. The list of Nietzsche’s disparaging
remarks about women is long and familiar. lo
What is more interesting in Nietzsche’s writings is his
desire for women-the desire misidentified by Krell-and his


dissociation from the masculine tradition. However, even in
these passages where Nietzsche praises/desires the feminine, it
becomes clear that his desire is always a masculine desire.

What Krell does not see is that Nietzsche’s praise of the
feminine is always articulated from the masculine stance.

Therefore, even when he attempts to dissociate himself from
his paternal predecessors, he does not succeed.

First, the struggle to overcome the tradition, to overthrow
the fathers, can be read as a masculine oedipal struggle.

Nietzsche· wants to overthrow his predecessors in order to take
their place and seize their power. He refutes their theories in
order to put his theory of the will to power in their place.

For Nietzsche, the tradition must be overcome (uberwinding). Even the self must be overcome (Selbstuberwindung).

Nietzsche’s language is the language of the conquerer, a masculine image of the hero. ll
Other images which Nietzsche uses to criticize the truth of
dogmatic male philosophy expose his alliance with that tradition. Nietzsche calls philosophl the will to truth as the impotence of the will to create. 1 He criticizes the ‘masculine’

will to truth, but he does so in the name of masculine anxiety:

the anxiety about impotence.

Nietzsche also refers to philosophy and religion as
‘castrated’: ‘to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each
and every effect, supposing we were capable of this-what
would that mean but to castrate the intellect’ 13
Nietzsche claims that philosophers’ ’emasculated leers wish
to be called “contemplation”.,14 Nietzsche criticizes the Christian treatment of sexual excitation, the consequence of which,
he says, is:

… not only the loss of an organ but the emasculation of
a man’s character-And the same applies to the
moralist’s madness and demands, instead of the restraining of the passions, their extirpation. Its conclusion is
always: only the castrated man is a good man. IS
For Nietzsche, detached objective truth is ‘castrated’ because it
is ‘impotent’to create and reproduce truth. With Christianity,
this objective truth becomes a matter of value which emasculates (the changing subjective experience ot) the body. The
metaphors of castration, impotence, and emasculation are masculinist metaphors which Nietzsche uses to critique the tradition. This is an example of Nietzsche’s tendency to usurp,
rather than undermine, the paternal position. He desires
creativity and procreation/reproduction which are free from the
limitations of objective truth. He desires feminine truth. Yet his
desire is a masculine desire. He desires the feminine in order to
prove his potency, his manliness.

Nietzsche’s language of dissociation from the masculine
tradition not only displays a fear of the loss of masculine
potency, but also a fear of feminine potency. Nietzsche fears
his desire for women. Like the ascetic priest, Nietzsche sublimates his sexual desire because it is dirty, (‘sinful’). Like the
ascetic priest, the only purpose of feminine potency which
Nietzsche will endorse is procreation: Only procreation is innocent; desire without procreation is sheer lechery. 16
Nietzsche’s disgust with philosophy results from what he conceives of as its purely lecherous lust for life. 17 Nietzsche
desires the feminine as mother and denies, postpones, the
feminine as lover.

Nietzsche repeatedly uses metaphors of biological
reproduction-‘womb of being’, ‘mother eternally pregnant’,
‘procreative life’-to describe the Dionysian force. 18
Nietzsche’s Dionysian type is the ‘eternally pregnant mother’.

She affirms herself continually by reproducing. The biological


metaphors which Nietzsche uses to describe the will to power
are metaphors of reproduction, procreation, motherhood.

The mystical vision of Dionysus, that eternal life which
flows indestructibly beneath the surface of fhenomena, is
figured as the ‘maternal womb of being,.1 Just as that
Dionysian prophet Zarathrustra cries out that the unexhausted
procreative will of life is the will to power,20 so ‘a voice that
rings authentic’ cries out, through Dionysian art and its tragic
symbolism, ‘be like me, the original mother, who constantly
creating, finds satisfaction in the turbulent flux of appearances.’21


…” . ‘….. ….. -‘…..

‘Everything about Woman,’ says Nietzsche’s Zarathrustra,
is a ‘riddle’ solved by ‘preF,ancy ‘.22 Feminine love claims
Nietzsche is ‘maternal love’ . He desires maternal love, but he
fears the purely feminine power which creates independently of
man, without masculine fertilization.

Moreover, for Nietzsche, pregnancy implies chastity. He
cannot seem to imagine pregnancy as the result of bodily lust
He claims that it is natural for philosophers and artists to be
chaste since their creativity is a type of pregnancy.24 Obviously,
Nietzsche believes that pregnant women must be chaste. Our
consuming desire, says Nietzsche, is due to the loss of the
‘mythic womb,.25 Woman, for Nietzsche, is nothing other than
this mythic womb (empty space). The ‘womb of being’, the
origin of all force, is a myth, an origin which does not exist
Woman is layer after layer of masks with no face behind
them: ‘MASKS. There are women who have no inner life
wherever one looks for it, being nothing but masks.26 She is a
papier-mache balloon, an empty womb (until man impregnates

At this point Nietzsche exposes his frustrated desire for the
eternally fecund woman, whom he admits does not exist The
womb of being, as it turns out, is a ‘mythic womb’, an empty
womb. There is no woman; she is only masks.

Nietzsche, then, wants to use ‘woman’-his ideal of
woman as eternal mother-as a means to give birth to the
Ubermensch. He wants, in a sense, to ‘artificially inseminate’

this lost ‘mythic womb’ with a potency his predecessors
lacked. He longs for the womb where he can prove his virility
to his emasculated fathers. Yet, he fears any real contact with
women or sexual desire. Like the ascetic priest, he wants conception without the mess and desire of the body. Therefore,
while on the one hand Nietzsche desires the body and wants to
liberate the passions from the oppressive, masculine,
philosophical tradition, on the other hand, he fears his own

He fears the female body and the articulation of its desire.

‘Even now female voices are heard which-holy Aristophales!’, exclaims Nietzsche, ‘are frightening: they threaten
with medical explicitness what woman wants from man, first
and last Is it not in the worst taste when woman sets about becoming scientific in that way?,27
What philosophers (including Nietzsche) desire and yet
fear, says Nietzsche, is the ‘eternally feminine’.28 This fear is
what causes the postponement of woman. Nietzsche fears the
feminine power, just as he fears his own desire for that power.





He fears his incestuous desire which demands the death of the
paternal tradition.

The woman embraced in Nietzsche’s publ~shed writings is
the mother. Perhaps the woman embraced only in his private
notes is the lover.

It is the lover, the feminine sexual power, whom Nietzsche
postpones out of fear. He fears even the sexual nature of desire
for the mother. It is the sensuality, sexuality, of his desire which
is postponed. This sensuality is forbidden by the paternal tradition especially when it originates in incestuous fantasies.

In Postponements, Krell does not distinguish between
Nietzsche’s desire for woman as mother and woman as lover.

This is why he does not distinguish Nietzsche’s desire for the
eternally procreative mother and the sensual lover. He also
does not distinguish between Nietzsche’s desire to become
woman and this desire to possess woman. He does not understand Nietzsche’s postponement. The incestuousness of
Nietzsche’s desire, however, can be re-read into Krell’s

Krell begins his account of Nietzsche’s postponements with
the ‘Plaint of Ariadne’, which was originally ‘The Travail of
the Woman in Child birth. ,29 Krell points out that ‘The Travail
of the Woman in Child birth’ , or the ‘Plaint of Ariadne’, shows
up as ‘The Magician’ in the part IV of Zarathustra.3° Here,
says Krell, the gender of the speech changes. Here Ariadne’s
plaint is appropriated by a charlatan wizard whose fakery is
exposed by Zarathustra when he pummels the faker with a
stick. The movements of Nietzsche’s charlatan wizard are not
so dissimilar from Nietzsche’s own. Like the wizard who fakes
Ariadne’s lament, Nietzsche fakes woman’s lament.

How, asks Krell, could anyone suggest that we take a stick
to beautiful Ariadne? He uses this argument to show that the
stick is punishment for fakery. Well, this may be so, but according to Nietzsche, even beautiful women want the stick: ‘Good
and bad women want a stick.,31
Even when Ariadne’s lament (the lament of the mother
giving birth) is not appropriated by an old wizard, it is appropriated by Dionysus. In response to Ariadne’s lament,
Dionysus tells her that ‘I am your labyrinth,.32 We are told that
‘A labyrinth human being never seeks the truth, but-whatever
he may try to tell us-always and only his Ariadne.,33 From
this, Krell concludes that woman is labyrinth. Every human
being, then, tells only his woman. Now Dionysus’ response becomes an appropriation: he tells Ariadne: ‘I am your labyrinth.

I am your woman.’ Dionysus, then, becomes the woman in
woman’Just as Krell’s Nietzsche becomes the woman in

Zarathustra’s imperative-‘become hard!’-addressed to
Ariadne after her lament, takes on a new meaning. Ariadne
must become hard for the sake of her woman, Dionysus, for the
sake of the woman in woman.

Krell argues that the Dionysian Dithyramb, ‘The
Nightsong,’ takes over the language of ‘The Plaint of Ariadne’.

Once again appropriating Ariadne’s lament, Dionysus exposes
his own desire for love, maternal love, when in ‘The
Nightsong’ he longs to ‘suck at breasts of light! ,35
lament is
appropriated by
Dionysus/Nietzsche, woman’s desire is figured only always in
terms of man’s desire. Woman becomes hard only as a displaced man for the sake of his woman.

The second postponement diagnosed by Krell is Corinna,
the mother of tragedy. (Notice that so far the women postponed
are mothers.) We meet Corinna in Nietzsche’s notes for the
never written tragedy about Empedocles. Corinna, claims
Krell, is a symbol of rebirth. 36 Corinna dies and Empedocles

restores her through the heat that remained around the middle
of her body.37 Krell’s suggestion that Corinna is the mother of
tragedy and a symbol of rebirth already transforms Nietzsche’s
desire for her into an oedipal desire. Also it is through the heat
in the middle of her body, the womb, which she is revived.

Woman, for Nietzsche, lives only through the activation and
reactivation of the womb. Nietzsche’s woman needs man to
give her life through her womb.

It is also important that Empedocles’ restoration is not
sexual. He does not desire Corinna except through her lifegiving womb. Dionysus, on the other hand, is infatuated with
Corinna, yet he runs away.38 So too, Nietzsche runs from his
erotic desires unless they are transferred to desires for procreation.

It is interesting that ‘Empedocles feels like a murderer,
deserving of unending punishment; he hopes for a rebirth of
penitential death. ,39 He feels like a murderer although he’s
(literally) killed no one. Could his guilt be for his incestuous
desire? The desire which demands the death of the father?

Krell’s next postponement is Pana. Krell introduces Pana
with a note fronm Nietzsche’s plans for Zarathustra: ‘I want to
celebrate reproduction and death as a festival’40 For
Zarathustra, Pana represents both death and reproduction.

Woman represents the life cycle: ‘Woman as nature’ .41 This
woman is not just any woman, she is the mother.

Pana, as Zarathustra’s woman, symbolizes both the birth of
the Ubermensch and the death of Zarathustra. Once again
Oedipus will solve the riddle of how woman is related to death.

In all of the various plans for Zarathustra’s death-the death
always postponed-Zarathustra dies for the sake of his union
with woman.

In part I, ‘On Free Death’, Zarathustra wants to die out of
live for the earth in order to ‘find rest in her who bore me’ .42
He wants a reunion with the mother who bore him. He wants to
climb back into the womb of the earth. Death is· the ultimate
union with the womb of being.

Krell argues that Zarathustra realizes that he must die in order for the Ubermensch to be born.43 Zarathustra wants
children with eternity; he wants to father the Ubermensch. 44 It
is Zarathustra who must become hard for the sake of the
Ubermensch.45 He must be man enough to impregnate the
original mother, the eternally -procreating womb of the earth.

Yet Zarathustra realizes that, as the father, he must die so that
his son can come into power.

This is why in all of the postponed plans for Zarathustra’s
death, it is his union with woman, the original mother, which
demands his death. Or, he dies among children for the sake of
the child who will result from his union with the original
mother. He dies for the sake of his son, the Ubermensch.46
Thus, Zarathustra/Nietzsche’s union with woman is postponed
for fear of death. Or perhaps he is afraid that he is not man
enough to sire the Ubermensch.

The last of Krell’s Postponements, Calina, displaces
Medusa and re-places Ariadne. Although Krell had made
several references to Medusa in his first three chapters, the first
line of Calina’s chapter is ‘Medusa’s chapter will have to
wait’ .47 Since Calina’s chapter is the last in the book, it seems
that Medusa’s chapter will have to wait indefinitely. Perhaps
she is Krell’s own postponement Why does he shy away from
Medusa? Is Medusa Nietzsche’s only woman who cannot be
turned into mother? Is she the woman who would rather lose
her head than succumb to man? The woman who cannot be
possessed? Feminine creativity which does not depend on
man’s fertilization?

At one point Krell claims that he does not want Nietzsche’s

destiny as his own.48 Yet only the hand of woman, the writing
hand, he exclaims, can loosen the grip of that destiny.49 What is
Nietzsche’s destiny which KreU wants to avoid? Writing with
the hand of woman or postponing woman? In any case, it is
Medusa who forces KreU’s hand. She is the feminine power
still cut off from the writing hand. So instead of Medusa, we
get Calina.

Calina stands in for Medusa as the woman who cannot be
forced. sO While it might be true that Calina cannot be forced, I
suspect that Calina is no woman (although not because she
cannot be forced). Moreover, because ‘she’ cannot be forced,
‘she’ is to be feared.

We meet Calina in the plans for Zarathustra: ‘Calina,
brown-red, everything too acrid nearby in high summer.

Ghostly (my current danger!),Sl First, in this note there is nothing to suggest that Calina is a woman. Calina sounds like a
place, a desert. Especially given the next note: ‘Sipo Matador…

Nothing there that would not poison, allure, gnaw, overthrow,
transvalue.’S2 Sipo Matador, says Krell, is identified in Beyond
Good and Evil as a poisonous Javanese plant 53 Calina sounds
like a desert full of tempting poisons.

If Calina is a woman, she is a desert, a barren womb. She is
the greatest danger-the woman who cannot be possessed
through pregnancy. Although alluring, she is not fertile. That is
why she is a threat to Zarathustra’s manliness. How can he sire
the Ubermensch if the womb of being is barren?

Even this barren woman who cannot be possessed is safer
than the fertile woman who will not be possessed. Calina’s independence from man is not her own doing. If she is emancipated, she is one of the emancipated women who Nietzsche
claims lack the wherewithal to have children. 54 Is the assumption that if these women were fertile, they wouldn’t be free?

Only the ‘incomplete’ woman, Calina, can escape man’s
force. ss The final postponement, Calina, to whom KreU gives
thanks in his preface, is not the woman Krell takes her for.

Krell does not, however, claim to know Calina.

‘Somewhere,’ he says, ‘someone sees clearly and distinctly
with Maenadic sharp sightedness-who or what Calina is …

We ourselves will be patient, trusting in science. We will not
mislay our umbrella, wiU not lose our leg. ,56 Here Krell, like
Nietzsche, prefers to remain protected by the paternal umbrella
‘we’, by the paternal science, than risk ‘losing our leg’, the
paternal leg. Looking once again through Oedipus, Krell’s association with the paternal scientific tradition, and fear of
losing ‘our leg’, can be read as a castration fear. It is the fear of
castration, of impotence, that drives Krell, along with
Nietzsche, to return to the paternal identification. In fact, here
Krell invokes the paternal tradition against Nietzsche, who for
him poses as woman. Krell does not want Nietzsche’s destiny,
that is, his identification with woman. Rather, Krell prefers to
stay under the safety of the paternal umbrella, science. In a
sense, then, out of fear of losing ‘our (paternal) leg’, Krell
denies his connection to woman (Nietzsche).

Krell does not share Nietzsche’s desire for woman, yet he
wants to maintain, revitalize, Nietzsche’s ‘other hand’, the
hand of woman:


I do not want Nietzsche’s destiny as my own. Would
prefer to lose him. Yet only the hand of woman, the
writing hand, the hand back to which the trace of thread
always leads us, can loosen the grip of that destiny.


Derrida believes that Nietzsche possesses such a
hand, So do I. Must it wither?

Nietzsche, I argue, does not write with the hand of woman. To
give Nietzsche woman’s writing hand, insures that women can
never write. Women’s writing, then, remains superfluous to the
masculine tradition.

It is not, however, merely the political implications for real
women writing philosophy which demand that we reject Krell’s
thesis. The textual evidence also demands that we reject Krell’s

What we have learned about Nietzsche’s frustrated desire
for woman is that the articulation of his desire, the motive behind his desire, the fear of his desire, and his desire itself, are
all masculine. His desire, then, is merely a reflection of the
patriarchal construction of man’s desire for woman.

Although Nietzsche figures his desire for the Dionysian
language with feminine images (original mother, womb of
being, eternally procreating, mythic womb, eternally feminine),
he figures his rejection of traditional truth using masculine images (impotence, castration, emasculation). What becomes obvious is that Nietzsche’s motive for seeking the feminine, as
well as abandoning· the masculine, is the same: he wants power
over both. Nietzsche wants to master the feminine; he wants to
impregnate the womb of being in order to show up his impotent philosophical fathers.

Nietzsche explicitly associates images of the master with
the Dionysian force, even as he identifies this force with the
original mother. The original mother, as it turns out, is associated with masculine power. It becomes clear from his
writings that Nietzsche is afraid of feminine power. He is afraid
of the womb of being. Ultimately, Nietzsche sees the feminine
power as a threat to his position of power-patriarchy’s traditional fear.


Nietzsche’s desire itself is masculine. His desire can be read
as the result of an unresolved oedipal complex. Nietzsche
wants to impregnate the original mother and kill the
philosophical fathers. He wants to claim his fathers’ power
over the ‘mythic womb of being’. Nietzsche wants to fill the
womb of being in a way, he claims, that his castrated fathers
cannot He wants complete power of this elusive womb.

Nietzsche does not, as both Derrida and Krell suggest, want
to become woman. Rather, Nietzsche wants to possess woman.

Nietzsche does not, as both Derrida and K.reU· suggest, write
with the hand of woman. Krell’s claim that he does can only
serve to silence women.

First, if Nietzsche is woman, he is only woman as lustless
mother. This fetishized ideal woman silences all other women,
real women. Nietzsche fetishizes ‘woman’ by constructing this
ideal of woman as eternally pregnant. Nietzsche’s construction
of woman does not allow for differences among individual
women. Moreover, it does not allow for women to express
themselves in any way other than pregnancy. ‘Woman,’ in
Nietzsche’s scenario, is expressed by articulating the inarticulate womb. This constricting construction of the voice of the
ideal ‘woman’ suppresses the voices of real women who may
have something else to articulate.

Second, if man can write as woman, then there is no need to
read women’s writing. By exposing Nietzsche as a ‘fake
woman’ we can begin, on a very limited level, to silence men

in order to suppress the voices of women, we open a space for
women to articulate themselves. Nietzsche’s fetishism of
woman, and Krell’s fetishism of Nietzsche as woman, should
be taken as limited examples of the pervasive and pernicious
patriarchal construction of woman.

‘Big books are big sins,’ says Krell, ‘but big books about
Nietzsche are a far more pernicious affair: they are breaches of
good taste. ,58 Big claims that two male philosophers (Derrida
and Nietzsche) can save women from philosophy are at least
breaches of good taste, but the claim that a man (Nietzsche)
writes with the hand of woman is far more than pernicious: it is
politically dangerous.












Jacques Derrida, SpurslEperons, The University of Chicago
Press: Chicago, 1979, p. 57.

David FarreIl KreIl, PostponemenJs, Indiana University Press:

Bloomington, 1986, p. 10; see also p. 85.

Ibid., p. 85. Krell claims that ‘Derrida believes that Nietzsche
possesses such a hand [the hand of woman’. So do I.’ Does Krell
mean that ‘Derrida believes and So do I,’ or ‘Nietzsche possesses
such a hand and so do I’?

Ibid., p. 23.

Freud suggests that the oedipal complex is resolved both by identifying with the father and fearing the father. According to Freud,
it is castration by the father which the boys fears as punishment
for his incestuous desire.

Nietzsche, The Birth ofTragedy, see especially section 9.

See, e.g., Nietzsche, Dawn, sections 427, 550; Human all too
Human, sections 3, 244, 252, 257; The Will to Power, section

Nietzsche, Human all too Human, section 3, p. 15, ‘On First and
Last Things’, trans. by Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann,
University of Nebraska Press, 1984.

Krell, op. cif., PostponemenJs, p. 24, 27, 58, 77. On page 64,
Krell quotes a note in which Zarathustra tells the cat maidens:

‘weep no more Pallid Dudu! Be a man, Suleika!’

See e.g., Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom, IT, sections 63-77. Beyond
Good and Evil, Zarathustra, The Will to Power, Human all too
Human; ‘Wanderer and his Shadow’, section 16; ‘Woman and
Child’, sections 383-437; ‘Miscellaneous Maxims and Opinions’,
sections 272,273,274,276-283,286,292.

For passages in which Nietzsche praises war and conquering, see
Human all too Human, section 477; The Will to Power, sections
53, 125, 975; Beyond Good and Evil, section 200. Also in On the
Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche argues in favour of the master

Nietzsche, The Will to Power, section 585; see also On the
Genealogy of Morals, section 7.

Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, rn, section 12, p. 119,
Kaufmann trans., Vmtage Books, New York, 1969.

Nietzsche. Zarathustra, IT, ‘On Immaculate Perception’, p. 235,
in Kaufmann (ed. and trans.), The Portable Nietzsche, Viking
Press, New York, 1972.

Nietzsche, The Will to Power, section 343, p. 207, Kaufmann and
Hollingdale (trans.), Vintage Books, New York, 1968.

Nietzsche, Zarathustra, n, ‘On Immaculate Perception’ .

Ibid., ‘On Immaculate Perception’.

For a critique of Nietzsche’s use of biological metaphors of
reproduction in order to describe the Dionysian force, see 01liver, ‘Woman as Truth in Nietzsche’s Writing’, Social Theory
and Practice, Vol. 10, Smnmer 1984, pp. 185-200.






Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, section 16.

Nietzsche, Zarathustra, part IT, ‘On Self-Overcoming’.

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, section 16.

Nietzsche, Zarathustra, part I, ‘On Little Old and Young
Women’, in Kaufman’s The Portable Nietzsche; see also On the
Genealogy of Morals, rn, section 8.

Nietzsche, Human all too Human, ‘Woman and Child’, No. 392,
p. 197, Marion Faber (trans.); see also No. 421.

Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, rn, section 8.

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, section 28.

Nietzsche, Human all too Human, ‘Woman and Child’, section
405, p. 198, Marion Faber (trans.).

Beyond Good and Evil, Ill, section 232, p. 163, trans. by
Kaufmann, Random House Publishers, 1966.

The Case ofWagner, ‘A Musicians Problem’, section 3; see also
Beyond Good and Evil, author’s preface.

Krell, op. cif., p. 19.

Ibid., p. 15.

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, ‘Epigrams and Interludes’, no.

147, Kaufmann (trans.), Vmtage Books, New York, 1966.

Nietzsche writes the Italian ‘Buona femmina e mala femmina
vuol bastone.’

Krell, op. cif., p. 19.

Ibid., p. 26.

Ibid., p. 30.

Ibid., p. 26.

Ibid., pp. 45-6. KreIl also argues that Corinna becomes a symbol
of recurrence.

Ibid., pp. 45, 86.

Ibid., pp. 50, 86.

Ibid., p. 49.

Ibid., p. 54.

Ibid., pp. 45, 46. Here KreIl quotes the notes for the tragedy on

Ibid., p. 42.

Ibid., pp. 65, 54.

Ibid., p. 56.

Ibid., pp. 59, 64.

Ibid., pp. 60, 61, 62, 67. Cf. Zarathustra, IT, ‘On the Land of
Education’: ‘In my children I want to make up for being the child
of my fathers.’ In Kaufmann’s The Portable Nietzsche, p. 233.

Ibid., p. 72.

Ibid., p. 85
Ibid., p. 85.

Ibid., p. 84.

Ibid., p. 80.

Ibid., p. 79.

Ibid., p. 79.

Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, section 5.

Krell, op. cif., pp. 25, 84.

Ibid., p. 81. Cf. p. 77 where Krell cites a note about dancing girls
who have ‘lost a leg’. The reference to the umbrella is, of course,
to Derrida’s Spurs. Derrida considers a note where Nietzsche
writes ‘I have forgotten my umbrella’ (Spurs, p. 123).

Ibid., p. 85.

Ibid., Preface, p. ix.


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