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Psychoanalysis as anti-hermeneutics

as anti┬Ěhermeneutics
Jean Laplanche

For Serge Leclaire

1. With Freud

The title of this paper may seem to the majority of
readers to bear a paradoxical, even provocative,
character. How can psychoanalysis – if only on the
basis of its foundational work, The Interpretation of
Dreams – not be directly connected to the
hermeneutic movement whose expansion begins at the
end of the eighteenth century, precisely in so far as it
is a theory, method and practice of interpretation? The
next step, easily taken, is to include psychoanalysis
within hermeneutics: psychoanalysis becomes a
particular case, a ‘regional hermeneutics’, which one
can either accept as worthy of consideration (as does
Ricoeur), or reject as arbitrary and ill-founded (as
would, for instance, Gadamer, Grondin, and many

of Freud by Ricoeur, to whom my main objection is

Many of Freud’s statements run counter to the inclusion of his work in hermeneutics. I have insisted, for
a long time, on the absolute priority given to method.

Before being identified as a clinical practice or a
theory, psychoanalysis is first defined as ‘a procedure
for the investigation of psychical processes, which are
otherwise hardly accessible’.2 This method is
constantly defined as analytical, associativedissociative; ‘free association’ (jreie Assoziation) or
‘freely occurring ideas’ (jreie Einfiille) are only the
means employed for the dissociation of ~ll proposed
meaning. An analytical method, then; one that is supposed to conform to the object it posits – the ‘representation’ termed ‘unconscious’. Because of the very
mode of our access to it, we are entitled to postulate
the absence, in this object, of any synthetic meaning.

Now, in a complementary manner, Freud ceaselessly turned out declarations opposed to any kind of

that, in his interpretation of Freud, he takes no
account of the methods of Freud himself. Today, I

synthesis. On the one hand, no synthesis was to be
found in the id, which was governed by coexistence

I have pursued a different track for a long time since 1968 1 – especially in opposition to the reading

will simply pose the problem thus: it seems self-

without coherence; on the other, the analyst had to be

evident, especially given recent developments in
hermeneutics, that there can be no interpretation without a translation code or key. Hermeneutics is defined

content with analysing, without proposing any kind
of ‘psychosynthesis’ to the patient. This question

as a reception, transposition or reading (of a text, a
destiny, a Dasein), a process of reading clearly based






comprehension. Psychoanalysis, for its part, would be
assimilated to such a reading, implying that it would

receives belated, important clarification in the 1937
article ‘Constructions in Analysis’. Freud no longer
denies the fact that analysis can lead to partial and
provisional constructions, as stops on a journey. The
latter are, moreover, only brief reconstructions of
historically well-defined chains of meaning. But the

immediately provide one or more codes.

My paper will argue against this apparently
obvious move. In the first section I will invoke Freud

place he assigned Konstruktion allows Freud to give

in support. In the second, I will propose the

taking one element at a time; that is, simply replacing

foundation of psychoanalytic anti-hermeneutics,
which I term the general theory of seduction.

a missing link in the associative-dissociative chain.

Any search for meaning, or comprehension, is sent

free passage to Deutung – interpretation – which is
defined, in opposition to reconstructive synthesis, as

Radical Philosophy

79 (SeptlOct



packing by this quasi-mechanistic, associationist definition. In this connection I would point out that Freud
makes use only of the term Deutung, whereas the
hermeneutists speak of Auslegung or Interpretation.

Although I am aware of the etymological roots of
deuten, 3 the Freudian Deutung seems to me rather to
bear the trace of the form deuten auf – to point out,
to isolate a separate element: that is, analysis again
and again.

Over and above these terminological questions, I
would otherwise stress the idea that psychoanalysis is
not the system of stereotypical interpretations to
which it is too often reduced by certain of its adepts,
to the great advantage of its detractors, who have
things made very easy for them.

My argument will appear historical. My claim is
that in the decade following 1900, psychoanalysis
underwent a change which was as important as it was
disastrous, with the appearance of the reading codes
whose names are symbolism and typicality. Two of
the principal testimonies to the antecedent period and
its anti-hermeneutic methodology are the Studies on
Hysteria (1895) and The Interpretation of Dreams (in
its 1900 edition, before the addenda to later editions,
which were characterized precisely by the arrival of
reading codes). From the methodological point of view
it is interesting to follow the path of the cases in the
Studies, or again, the famous dream of Irma’s injection,
which functions as a paradigm in The Interpretation
of Dreams. Here Freud presents us with twenty pages
of association, of deciphering – but without any codes,
certainly without any one-to-one correspondences;
twenty pages of unbinding (Entbindung) operating on
the more or less coherent narrative of the dream. The
associative pathways are followed, the points of intersection are noted, but no synthesis is proposed. The
chapter ends with deceptive abruptness: ‘I have now
finished the interpretation of the dream … it becomes
obvious, the dream is the fulfilment of a wish. ‘4
Let us insist on this historical point: that in 1900
the analytical method is already complete; and that it
is not in any sense a translation, a comprehension or
a reading. The method consists in ‘de-translation’, on
the track of elements described as unconscious (at
this point Freud speaks of memories, or rather, of
reminiscences). To be sure, this is not to say that no
synthesis is produced; but it is a synthesis which is
purely spontaneous, and above all, individual: as in
chemistry, the analysed elements tend to recombine.

But there are no pre-established codes for a retranslation.


Certainly, this original moment of Freudian
method will soon be concealed. Very quickly, socalled psychoanalytic codes will come into play,
under two banners: the ‘symbolic’ and the ‘typical’.

The symbolic, linking the symbol and what it
symbolizes in a fixed manner, will only be developed
in the later editions of the Traumdeutung. Freud will
go so far as to talk in this respect of a ‘fundamental
language’. As regards the typical, it initially concerns
dreams whose manifest content corresponds to a
quasi-universal scenario. In fact these typical dreams
occupy only a minor place in 1900, which is considerably amplified thereafter: dreams of nakedness,
of exams, of the death of loved ones (which of course
lead to the ‘discovery’ of the Oedipus complex). Subsequently, the great schemas of the typical ensue the great ‘complexes’, foremost among them the
‘castration complex’. Later on, the mythology of the
two mighty instincts will surge, Life and Death. And
after Freud such grand organizational syntheses will
continue to proliferate – for instance, Melanie Klein’s
schema of the depressive position, or the function of
the Law and Castration in Lacan.

Let us pause at this moment, when the typical and
the symbolic first appear. Freud saw this as a fundamental discovery, perhaps the only real addition to
his doctrine. Moreover, the discovery concerned both
the level of content (which would be universalized)
and that of method. Alongside the step-by-step method
of individual free association, something called a
‘symbolic method’ was proposed: a sort of readingoff, or good translation. Symbolism versus association:

my question is, do these amount to parallel, or even
complementary methods, as Freud wished? Or are we
dealing rather with two antagonistic vectors, precisely
those of anti-hermeneutics and hermeneutics?

There is a clear opposition between the two: (1)
The symbolic method translates the manifest discourse
of the dream at first sight, preserving its coherence,
and, in the end, trusting in it; it transposes one
narrative into another. By constrast, the associative
method subjects the manifest narrative to dissociation
without giving it the least credence. (2) The two
methods are not in a cooperative relationship, because,
according to Freud, when symbolism speaks, associations are silent. Indeed, it is the obstacle constituted
by the so-called ‘mute elements’ which dictates the
use of symbolism. Freud lays emphasis on this, without trying to explain it. To make things clearer, I will
mention a dream, included in the 1900 edition – the
‘man with a hatchet’:

A … man who had been seriously ill for a year,
reported that when he was between eleven and
thirteen he had repeatedly dreamt (to the
accompaniment of severe anxiety) that a man with
a hatchet was pursuing him; he tried to run away,
but seemed to be paralysed and could not move
from the spot. 5
I do not intend to summarize the interpretation of this
dream, but merely to underline the paradox it presents.

Before 1900 Freud takes this narrative element by
element, without concerning himself with the scenario,
and according to the classical unbinding method. The
pathways of association eventually lead him to
infantile scenes, to the observation of a violent parental

Not for a moment does Freud read what would
immediately strike the contemporary ‘psychoanalyst’

on reading the manifest dream: ‘castration’, the typical
scenario of castration. Castration would, moreover,
easily fit in with the extreme anxiety accompanying
the dream. But at this stage Freud precisely does not
understand anxiety in terms of a threat from the outside world (castration), but as the result of the subject
being internally attacked by unconscious sexual drives.

To summarize my examination: this is a dream
which would have to be considered typical, and read
thanks to the key ‘castration’. But Freud deliberately
avoids the latter notion. And on the other hand, he
does not register the so-called silence of associations,
supposed to strike the subject when his dream is
governed by symbolism. To conclude, then: reading
through symbolism and typicality does not stimulate
the associative method. When one is present, the other
is absent, and vice versa.

All this leads to the formulation of a hypothesis: it
is symbolism which silences association. And to go
further: synthesis – encoded thought – is on the side
of repression. In the analysis of the ‘man with a
hatchet’, it is because Freud refuses to discover
castration, as synthetic scenario or ‘complex’, that he
is able to pursue the analytical method.

The discovery of castration was, however, to be
pursued in the history of psychoanalysis – to the point,
perhaps, of completely invading it and occluding
everything else. The major turning point is the analysis
of ‘Little Hans’ from 1906 to 1909. My ironic name
for the theory constructed at this stage is ‘the theory
of Hans and Sigmund’. It is Hans who implements the
fable that is ‘sexual theories of children’. Sigmund
adopts it, tidies it up, and gradually begins to claim
that it is universal. I will say a few words about this
theory which was supposedly to become a psychoanalytical theory.

What is a theory for? To master an enigma, which
the adult world offers to the child. At the outset, this
enigma is not sexual difference, but the difference
between genders. 6 The baby does not perceive an
anatomical differentiation; but he very quickly notices
that the human species is divided into two kinds or
genders [genres], according to habits, appearance,
behaviour, function, and so on. There must be, behind
this, an enigmatic, masked difference immediately
presented by the adult as a message to decipher. The
theory of castration would account for this enigma,
by symbolizing it in a coded system. This code is
founded on anatomy, and functions as a binary myth,
┬▒. To sum it up: in the beginning, all humans had a
penis; then some had it cut off, not others; but these
others remain threatened with such a fate. Incidentally, this is a theoretical inversion of biological
theory, where the initial sex is feminine, only
becoming masculine due to a supplementary hormone.

It is a phantasmagoric and contingent theory. Even
by 1915, Freud will still consider it as being far from
universal. For their part, ethnologists, even psychoanalysts such as Roheim and Bettelheim, will show
that there are far richer and more complex ways of
symbolizing the difference between genders.

It was not until much later that Freud was to
proclaim the universality of the ‘castration complex’,
with all the difficulties its applicatiolP- entailed,
especially in the case of girls. Only with Lacan will
this universality be posited as an a priori – and this in
the name of a metaphysical turn which desexualizes
everything: castration becomes the signifier of human
finitude, a finitude which we must all assume; and this
becomes the goal of psychoanalysis …

To stress the ethnological contingency of the myth
of Hans and Sigmund is not to play down its
importance. It introduces what I have termed a phallic
logic, a binary logic of ‘plus’ and ‘minus’. The oftpraised assumption of castration is not some grandiose
amor fati; it is directly linked to the expansion of
binarism, the foundation of the modern occidental
world. But despite the irresistible conquest of the
world by binarism, it is worth recalling that this
expansion remains contingent, in relation to so many
civilizations whose founding myths are not binary but
plural – accepting ambivalence instead of staking
everything on difference.

To conclude this quick Freudian and anti-Freudian
tour, I will insist once again on the fact that the
original discovery of Freud is that of a method. An
unprecedented method, it is linked to something
equally unprecedented, the foundation of the psycho-


analytic situation. For where in the world, before
psychoanalysis or beyond it, was one permitted and
invited to say everything, up to and including the
most secret thoughts of carnage, racism or rape? It is
a strictly individual method, favouring an individual’s
way of connecting things, element by element,
through ‘associations’, to the detriment of all selfconstruction and self-theorization. The method is
ana-lytic in the true sense of the term, associativedissociative, unbinding. One might call it ‘deconstructive’ – and the term Ruckbildung is certainly there in
Freud – if the word had not subsequently been
monopolized, adapted by a philosophy elsewhere.

The refusal of synthesis, before being a virtual
moral rule for Freud (the refusal of suggestion, the
refusal of imposing his own ideas, even psychoanalytic ones), is a methodological abstention. Its
profound maxim is that where one follows the path
of synthesis, one silences the unconscious. Now, this
discovery is masked, concealed, by the return of
synthesis, of ‘reading’, of hermeneutics. The latter
first takes the name of typicality and symbolism, soon
spreading out into the great ‘complexes’. Thus we
end up with all the supposedly psychoanalytic myths
which encumber us.

It is not that there is no question, with complexes
and myths, of discoveries which are partly psychoanalytic. But these discoveries are wrongly situated:

obscuring the unconscious in psychoanalytic theory,
just as they obscure it in the human being. They are
transformed into something which can be used by the
human being to master enigmas.

2. The problem of hermeneutics
within the framework of the
general theory of seduction
Some preliminary remarks.

1. The preceding clarification, however radical it
may be vis-a-vis a conception of psychoanalysis as a
putative hermeneutics, remains ‘regional’: confined to
a particular sector of human knowledge. The aspiration
to the universal and the fundamental cannot be based
only on a sanitization of Freudian psychoanalysis,
from a methodological viewpoint. Its only possible
foundation is a theory of the human being; evidently
developed on the basis of Freudian discoveries, but
also of their concealment.

2. The elaboration of what I term the ‘general
theory of seduction’ has taken precisely this path: the
rediscovery of the ‘seduction theory’ Freud formulates around 1895; and the detailed exploration of its
concealment around 1897. What is rather hastily called


‘the abandonment of the seduction theory’ cannot be
thought in terms which remain limited to a simple
empirical confrontation with the facts, from which
theory would emerge defeated. This Freudian theory
contained a germ of truth, but one which was insufficiently elaborated, and consequently marked by
weaknesses, failures to realize its general import and
to focus on what was essential. This is not the place
to repeat the process of elucidation which has led me
to its generalization, in the epistemological sense of
the term.

3. These concomitant concealments – that of the
seduction theory, and that of the individual method,
in favour of a return of hermeneutic reading via
symbolism, typicality and complexes – must obviously
be profoundly linked. I will not be able to explore
their links here, but they can easily be identified.

4. In presenting the general theory of seduction, I
would rather talk of translation than reading, interpretation or comprehension. There are many reasons
for this.

In the first place, we always set out from a
meaning which is expressed, expressed to someone
else – from a message. This message is expressed in
a ‘language’, if one gives this term its general sense
of semiological system (and not the restricted sense
of verbal language). It seems to me, furthermore, that
the hermeneutic movement, in rewriting its history
during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth
centuries (and it does so ceaselessly), too often
neglects another history, which is however closely
linked to that of interpretation – the history of translation and its theory (as charted by Antoine Berman
in L’ epreuve de l’ etranger7 ). The knotting together of
translation and hermeneutics is doubtless obvious in
a Schleiermacher. It remains to be seen whether
reading and interpretation constitute a category
broader than that of translation, or whether, rather,
they could be subsumed by a general theory of translation. Lastly, I privilege the notion of translation
because it is well suited to the development of what I
call the ‘translation model’, in a theory of the
reception of the other’s message, which is also a
theory of repression. Hermeneutics, translation,
theorization – these are different facets of the same
activity: the reception of the other’s message.

I thus come back to the general problem of
hermeneutics, to state, within the framework of the
general theory of seduction, a fundamental proposition: the only genuine, originary hermeneutist is the
human being. Every human being. In this, I am in
part approaching a Heideggerian perspective: at the

fundamental level, hermeneutics cannot be imported
from the outside, like a specialized discipline. It can
only be a hermeneutics of the human condition,
practised by the human individual. But my thesis will
be elucidated in a way which is profoundly different:

(1) The object of the proto-comprehension or
proto-translation is not a situation but a message.

How, in fact, could a situation become the object of a
translation? There is no interrogation of the human
condition which is not propelled by the message of
the other. The great, fundamental questions – Where
do we come from? Where are we bound? What does
gender mean? etc. – only reach the individual as
questions posed by the other. Which individual?

Which other?

(2) The agent of this proto-translation is not an
adult man, situated here and now, a cogito or a Dasein.

Heideggerianism, along with the entirety of hermeneutical thought, bears the seal of reflexive thinking what I term Ptolemaic thinking, which is the mode of
thought par excellence of the adult closed in upon
himself. Originary translation is, then, performed by
the child, the nursling baby. And let us add, for good
measure: the baby that has no unconscious.

With this last remark I run the risk of causing adepts
of any philosophy of the subject permanently to shut
their ears. ‘To have an unconscious’: what on earth
can this naive psychological realism mean? Does one
have an unconscious like a bag of nuts or a bundle of
twigs?8 But even worse, in their eyes, would be to
centre things on the baby, or on the adult-baby
situation. And if in fact our access to it can only be
external, through a reconstruction based on memories
or empirical observations, how is this return to childhood to escape the charge that its nature is ontic, purely
worldly, and that therefore it is to be challenged as
‘fundamental situation’? Simple Cartesian doubt would
do the job!

Without wishing to go into my justification here, I
will set down its principle: the situation of originary
translation links up, as if from the inside, with the
unique experience inaugurated by Freud: the analytical
situation. What bears witness to childhood ‘seduction’

is analytic ‘seduction’, which we call ‘transference’.9
The originary situation (reactivated in the analytical
treatment) is thus not – I am there, in place, and I
interpret; but rather – the other addresses me, in an
enigmatic way, and I (the baby, the analysand)

A few comments, then, on these ‘enigmatic
messages’ which the adult addresses to the child. I
describe them as ‘enigmatic’ in a very precise sense –

not to designate them as mysterious, hard to get at, or
inexplicable. But in a sense which is double, to the
extent that the adult for his or her part ‘has’ an unconscious, which is especially stirred up by the relation
to the small child which he or she once was. These
messages are most often non-verbal – acts of care,
mimicry, gestures; but sometimes verbal, too.

Messages which I describe as ‘compromise formations’ [compromis] in that they do not only transmit
their manifest meaning, but are also made into
compromises by unconscious signifiers. This is exactly
the same compromise formation which Freud showed
at work in bungled actions, slips of the tongue
(Versprechen), of the pen (Verschreiben), etc. They
are enigmatic for the receiver only because they are
enigmatic for the sender of the message.

I see no better model for the reception of those
addresses (Anreden) than that of translation. Translation functions according to more or less elementary
codes, furnished initially by the cultural world, but
also by physiology or even anatomy. 10 What is more
– and this is crucial – only one side of the originary
translation is clarity, elucidation and mastery; it also
has a negative side, for translation is always at the
same time a failure of translation – that is, repression,
the constitution of the unconscious from what translation deposits as waste. 11
What, then, would a psychoanalytic .practice of
hermeneutics be? The application of a new code to
an old one, SUbjecting the manifest to ‘rereading’, can
only amount to the redoubling of repression. My
critique is not directed, principally, at so-called
anagogic or Jungian interpretation; it is too easy a
target, whose critique could become an alibi for more
subtle forms of hermeneutics, which even the master
himself, Freud, came to support.

However, beneath the flood of supposedly psychoanalytic, secondary theorizations, the method and the
analytic situation remain there, rock-like, to remind
us of the heterogeneity of the unconscious to all systems. What does this method do? Motivated by the
field of the transference and the reactivation of the
relation to the enigma (that posed by the psychoanalyst), it de-translates, by association-dissociation
and by Deutung, the manifest translations. On its
journey, it often stumbles across layers of old translation, which it makes sure to reconstruct; always,
though, pushing on further ahead the tracking of unconscious residues.

Let us recall the use of the metaphor ‘key’ in
hermeneutics. And let us also recall Freud’s examination and critique of the classic and popular interpreta-


tion of dreams with ‘keys to dreams’. This is: that the
key which opens, also – and above all – closes. The
psychoanalytic method, in its originary moment, works
not with keys but with screwdrivers. It dismantles
locks, rather than opening them. Only thus, by breaking and entering, does it attempt to get at the terrible
and laughable treasure of unconscious signifiers.

The only hermeneutist is the child, then the analysand. We do not have to make him into a Freudian,
Kleinian or Lacanian hermeneutist. He will manage
quite well enough on his own when it comes to
hermeneutics, in his incorrigible yearning for
synthesis, despite all the efforts of analysis.

I will conclude with a rapid consideration of the status
of theory in psychoanalysis. It seems indispensable
here to distinguish two levels, clearly designated by
the titles of two of Freud’s works: ‘The Sexual
Theories of Children’ and ‘Three Essays on the
Theory of Sexuality’.

The first level, which I will call for convenience
Level I, is that of the theories discovered in the human being by psychoanalysis. These are ideologies,
myths, cultural formations which, as such, can be
neither refuted nor endorsed by psychoanalysis. They
are what critics of psychoanalysis most often choose
to attack – and not without justification, because the
majority of psychoanalysts have made them their own
theories. It is rather like claiming to refute ethnology
by demonstrating the phantasmagoric and contingent
nature of some American Indian myth … My reference to ethnology is itself, moreover, not contingent:

psychoanalytic ‘discoveries’ concerning mythical
theories tie in at numerous points with ethnological
discoveries. As for the function of these theories, we
place ourselves broadly in agreement with a LeviStrauss, when he says that they ‘diminish intellectual,
and if need be, existential, anxiety’ .12 We would only
add that this existential anxiety is correlative to the
attack by the message of the other: first, the human
adult other (der Andere) and then the other thing
inside us (das Andere: the unconscious).

I would place in opposition to this Level I a Level
11, that of specifically psychoanalytic theory, also
called metapsychology. Like all theory, it can only be
constructed in an attempt to account for an experience:

in the first instance, the experience of the treatment
(its situation, its method, and its object). It is the theory
of repression, of the genesis of the unconscious, of its
manifestations, of its nature. Psychoanalytic theory,
as it is described at Level 11, can claim to be open to
refutation and falsification. The fact that it does not


make use of models from physics or mathematics does
not exempt it from submitting to the trials of reason
and a confrontation with experience.

However different, even heterogeneous, these two
levels of theory are, there exists between them an
essential practical link: the theory at Level 11 aims to
account for an experience and a praxis, and, conversely, it offers to guide that praxis. Now, one of
the goals of Theory 11 is to give an account of the
function of Theory I (myths and ideologies) in the
human being, and especially in the process of
repression. In this sense, and if the treatment offers to
undo repression, at least partially, its maxim can only
be: hands off to any interference of ‘psychoanalytic’

theories – or, rather, ideologies – in analytical practice. Hands off, in the treatment, to hermeneutics, to
our hermeneutics! This is a regulatory watchword
which can only be observed asymptotically; and
whose alternative formulation could be the ‘refusal of
knowledge’ (Versagung des Wissens) on the part of
the analyst.

9-10 August 1994

Translated by Luke Thurston

1. ‘Interpreter [avec] Freud’, reprinted in Jean Laplanche,
La Revolution copernicienne inachevee, Aubier, Paris,
1992. Cf. also ‘La Psychanalyse entre determinisrrie et
hermeneutique’, in ibid.

2. “‘Psychoanalysis” and “Theory of the Libido”’, Gesammelte Werke (18 vols), London, 1940-52 [GW], Vol.

XIII, p. 211.

3. ‘To show coram populo’: the same root as deutsch.

4. GW, Vol. 11-111, p. 123. We have repeatedly stressed
this expression, which Freud stubbornly clung to: ‘the
dream is the fulfilment of a wish’ – and not: the dream
expresses a wish. [For Strachey’ s version of the passage
Laplanche is referring to, see The Standard Edition of
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud,
Hogarth Press, London, 1953-66 [SE], Vol. IV-V, pp.

120-21. Translator.]
5. SE, Vol. IV-V, p. 584; GW, Vol. 11-111, p. 590.

6. [The French word genre means both ‘kind’or ‘sort’ in
general, and ‘gender’ in particular. Translator]
7. Gallimard, Paris, 1984.

8. ‘Und vielesl Wie auf den Schultern einel Last von
Scheitem istl Zu behalten.’ [And much like a burden of
firewood on one’s shoulders is to be kept.] Holderlin,
Mnemosyne, Stuttgarter Ausgabe, 2, 1, Klostermann, p.


9. Cf. ‘Du transfert: sa provocation par l’analyste’, in La
Revolution copernicienne inachevee, pp. 417-37.

10. Cf. above, pp. 8-9: the enigma of genders is translated
according to the ‘castrating’ code, which is at once
anatomical and cultural.

11. Cf. ‘Court traite de l’inconscient’, in Nouvelle Revue
de Psychanalyse, no. 48, 1993, pp. 69-96.

12. La Potiere jalouse, Pion, Paris, 1985, p. 227.

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