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Revealing the Truth of Art

Revealing the Truth of Art
Andrew Bowie

Philosophical discussion of art in English tends not to aim its
sights particularly high, and some Anglo-Saxon philosophy has
effectively denied art any serious philosophical significance at
all. In this light a contemporary German book* which wishes to
argue for the truth of art over that of the natural sciences might
appear as a typical piece of German woolliness, or as a regression
to Romantic hyperbole. Neither view would, however, be valid;
hence my extended attention to the book here. In a philosophical
history of German aesthetics from Kant’s Critique ofJudgement,
via Schiller, Schelling, Novalis, Schlegel, Solger, to Tieck, Manfred
Frank, professor of philosophy in Ttibingen and author of major
works on, among other topics, hermeneutics and post-structuralism, reveals the importance of the history of aesthetics for
contemporary philosophy as a whole in ways often unfamiliar in
the English-speaking world. Frank’s arguments make a vital
contribution to the re-orientation in philosophy today that has
been apparent in the growth of interest in Nietzsche, Heidegger,
Adorno, and their successors.

Frank’s introduction to early-Romantic aesthetics challenges
the kind of analytical aesthetics which sees the philosophy of art
as just concerned with the clarification of statements about art.

The hermeneutic tradition to which Frank belongs regards such an
analytical approach as a secondary – and questionable – enterprise, in that a philosophy of art which has renounced engagement
with the problem of what art is, and which has no concern with the
fact that its own condition of possibility is the existence of art, may
have little claim to the title of philosophy at all. This does not,
however, mean that Frank ignores the language of aesthetic
judgements, which is the central concern of analytical philosophy
of art. He makes it clear from the outset that Kant’s discovery of
the relationship between the structure of the object and the form
of judgement, and thus of propositions, is of vital importance to
the question of aesthetics.

For Frank it is the break, central to Kant’s re-orientation of
epistemology, with the model of truth as adequatio, as an – inferior – mental re-presentation of a preceding ideal presence of the
object, which opens up the space for the modern revaluation ofthe
philosophical significance of art in the new discipline of aesthetics, as well as for the modem realisation of the importance of
language for philosophy. The link between these two aspects is
crucial, because it goes to the root of modern conceptions of truth.

The central issue in Kant is the activity of synthesis by the subject,
both in the propositional articulation of judgements and in the
constitution of objects of knowledge from sensuous data. Though
* Manfred Frank, Einfuhrung in die friihromantische Asthetik,
edition Suhrkamp 1563, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main,
1989, 466pp., DM 24 pb, 3 518 115634 pb
20

Kant does sometimes talk of truth as adequatio, in his account of
the ‘imagination’ (Vorstellungskraft), he is clear about the active
nature of the subject in the production of knowledge – a conception which is ultimately incompatible with the notion of knowledge as representation:

If objects only come about at all via synthetic acts of the
understanding, the understanding cannot be made into the
imitator of objects (p. 175).

Frank connects this to Heidegger’s demonstration that the
propositional articulation of a world as a totality of ‘facts’ has as
its prior condition the opening up of a world as that which can be
understood at all. This opening is an act of poiesis, and it is only
in the context of its having already taken place that propositional
truth within a collectively agreed science is possible.

In this view Paul Klee’ s dictum that ‘Art does not reproduce
the visible, it makes visible’ , which Frank takes as the motto for
much of his investigation, is not just a statement about art, but
about truth. For Heidegger what is articulated as knowledge in a
scientific proposition will depend on the prior disclosure of the
world as that of which truth can be said. The form of this
disclosure is seeing something as something, which is the condition of possibility of the truth or falsity of a proposition, and
creates the possibility of pretence or lying. As Heidegger shows
in The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics, to see a and b means that
we must have already pre-theoretically established a relationship
between a and b; we must have already grasped some of the
multiplicity we are confronted with as something. The existential
structure of ‘seeing-as ‘is prior to any specific cognitive act: ‘what
philosophy concerns itself with reveals itself at all only in and
from a transformation of human existence.’ Philosophical
knowledge is not, therefore, the grasping of pre-existing essences,
but rather the ‘comprehending opening-up (Aufschliessen) of
something in a determinately directed questioning’. 1 Being always already is; knowledge has to come into Being. Frank suggests how this links to Romantic aesthetics. The relationship of a
and b involves a productive act – nothing in a and b themselves
will produce it. As such, the constitution of the world as articulable
in propositional form is inseparable from the questions posed by
aesthetics for philosophy as a whole, if aesthetics is seen as
concerned with the way the world is disclosed as something to be
understood.

The contrast between the transcience of scientific claims to
truth and the survival of great works of art underlies this conception. The truth of a scientific proposition, which identifies an
object via its difference from other objects, in propositional form,
illuminates this particular object of science within an interpretative horizon which the science cannot constitute in its own terms.

Radical Philosophy 58, Summer 1991

This does not mean that scientific propositions cannot be true,just
that they are articulated within this horizon. The horizon, as
history shows, does not remain the same: asserting scientific
truth, then, is not re-presenting true objects. Art also, according to
Frank, constitutes a form of truth which, like modem propositional
conceptions of truth, does not rely on adequation or representation. The two kinds of truth are evidently different. What sort of
truth is it in the case of art?

Frank’s book may surprise with its assertion of the truth of art,
though related conceptions have become more familiar since
Gadamer’s Truth and Method, and Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory,
entered discussion in the English-speaking world. The validity of
Frank’s assertion rests upon the demonstration that conceptual
thinking which is articulated in propositional form is dependent
on a more fundamental disclosure, of the kind which is most
evident in modernity in the form of art. Art in modernity is seen
by Frank as making things visible in ways which would otherwise
be hidden from the view of a philosophy increasingly fixated upon
the natural sciences.

Two evident objections to Frank’s proposition are (1) that
there is no consensus about beauty, let alone about what counts as
art, and (2) that art is conceptually indeterminate and, as such, has
no claim to truth value at all. The first objection presupposes that
there are more emphatic forms of necessary agreement available
to the sciences. Frank disputes this with reference to one of his
main philosophical precursors: ‘For Schleiermacher the aesthetic
situation has simply become epistemically general’ (p. 69) – all
judgements, of knowledge, ethics, and beauty have to be produced
in the praxis of intersubjective communication, the telos of which
lies in the attempt to reach a universal, non-coercive consensus.

Clearly his view is close here to that of Habermas, despite

Casper David Friedrich, Frau am Fenster, 1822
Radical Philosophy 58, Summer 1991

significant differences elsewhere. The very nature of judgement
thus entails an ethical imperative. In modernity there is no longer
an Archimedean point that philosophy could occupy in order to
furnish absolute cognitive certainty. There can be no such certainty that would not have to be arrived at in the process of
communication, a process which entails the irreducible individuality of the partners in communication. The aim of scientific
cognition is the elimination of this individuality, but this, as
Schleiermacher makes clear, is a regulative idea, involving an
endless task.

Frank’s position does not, though, entail the kind of abandoning of philosophy and truth familiar in the work of Richard Rorty.

For Frank, as for the Romantics, the very impetus of philosophy
derives from an absolute which cannot be known, if knowledge is
conceived of as the synthesising of intuitions by the understanding. It is precisely the limitations of scientific knowledge which
lead to the demand for a medium where those limitations give way
to some sense of what draws us beyond them. The inexhaustibility
of the interpretation of the work of art becomes an image of the
‘longing for the infinite’, in Schlegel’s phrase, which is not a
Romantic cliche, but a serious philosophical notion. Instead of art
being merely a lower form of truth, as it is for Hegel, who thinks
that philosophy itself reveals the infinite within the finite, thereby
incorporating the truth of the understanding and of art and religion
into itself, the ab-solute in Romantic aesthetics is absolved from
any possibility of being reflexively known and can only be
indirectly revealed in art. Because the results of free acts of the
imagination cannot be finally interpreted they point to a potential
infinity of sense in a way that products of the understanding do
not.

If this seems merely speCUlative or mystical, one only needs
to consider the failure of natural science to give an account of
music – the non-representational medium par excellence – that
makes any sense of it as music, rather than as sound waves,
frequencies, etc. A scientific account of music, or any other form
of art, analyses conceptually identifiable sensuous phenomena.

An aesthetic account is concerned with what cannot be thus
analysed, because it cannot be derived from what the phenomena
have in common with other such phenomena, but only from what
the particular phenomena mean. This entails creative initiatives
on the part of the recipients of art. Art involves, in Novalis’s
phrase, an ‘aesthetic imperative’ if it is to be constituted as art.

This imperative requires free subjects, who may or may not
follow the imperative. If it is the case that the products of science
and of art spring from a common source – the productive imagination – it is less absurd than it might at first seem to think that the
products of freedom have a higher status than the products that
deal with necessity and limitation. In the latter the object is
constituted via an unconscious objective necessity in the subject,
in the former by free consciousness. The access to new aspects of
that realm of necessity, of course, is itself dependent upon the
creative initiative of the scientist, which requires the structure of
seeing-as that was analysed above.

The crucial philosophical task for Frank is to understand the
nature of self-consciousness, a task in which aesthetics must play
a central role. Self-consciousness has been the key issue in his
work on such varied topics as time in German Romanticism,
Schelling’s Hege1-critique, Schleiermacher’ s hermeneutics, poststructuralism (see What is Neo-Structuralism?, Minnesota University Press), and the question of individuality. In all these works
Frank is able to show how inadequate reflection upon the question
of self-consciousness has led to a creeping scientism and objectivism, even in areas, like deconstruction, where one might least
expect it. Though Frank evidently does not think there can be
thought without language, he does wish to re-examine the dominant assumption, in both analytical and most recent Continental
21

traditions, that the real task of philosophy lies wholly in its
horizon of established linguistic and scientific communities will
approach to language. Analytical philosophy has tended, putting
always tend to conceal the infinite potential for articulation in
it somewhat parodically, to reduce the understanding of selfliving language. The unsaid is always more than the said.

consciousness to the ability of the subject to use the term’!,
It is, in this perspective, no coincidence that in the period being
correctly~ post-structuralism sees subjectivity as always already
considered by Frank the notion of music as a higher language than
subverted by its location in language; and Habermas sees
conceptual language becomes a philosophical issue. 2 The inacintersubjective communication as having taken over from refleccessibility of the absolute to reflexive thinking leads to the
tion on self-consciousness as the main paradigm of modem
attribution of philosophical significance to a non-representational
philosophy.

medium; and, in Schleiermacher in particular, to a realisation of
These positions, though, fail to see that there is a different way
the role of music, as rhythm, in language. In a related manner, it
of thinking about subjectivity, which does not implicitly or
leads also to the turn to irony. Any positive philosophical articuexplicitly reduce it to its reflection in the signifier, and which
lation of the absolute would have to lay claim to the Archimedean
therefore sustains an active role for the subject. Frank shows that
vantage-point that the inherent limitations of knowledge reveal as
reflection does not give a way of understanding self-consciousinaccessible: as such, for the Romantics, any positive statement
ness: how do we know ourselfby reflection of the other in lanmust ironically negate itself even as it is made. This does not,
guage, if we do not have some other already existing familiarity
though, lead to mere incoherence. As Schlegel says: ‘If the
with ourself? This familiarity cannot take the form of general
absolute truth were found, then the task of spirit would be
conceptual knowledge, as the subject which knows has to use
completed and it would have to cease to be, as it only exists in
itself to know itself. The identity of knower and known that is the
activity’ (cited p. 228). It leads, then, as Frank puts it, to:

condition of possibility of
the programme of
the undeniable fact of selfHegelianism without a
consciousness must therecrowning conclusion …

fore depend upon a ground
If there were no orientawhich cannot appear in the
tion towards a One
reflexive split of knower and
which was not relative,
known. Even Hegel’ s nowhen the various intertion of self-recognition in
pretations of it which
the other, which Habermas
have appeared in history
turns into an argument about
could not come into
intersubjective communicontradiction with each
cation, needs a criterion
other and thus also could
which enables me to see
not destroy each other
myself. The ground of this
(pp. 228-29).

ability is, therefore, unavailable to conceptual
Without the One there could
knowledge. Why, then,
be no dynamic dispute about
knowledge of the kind in
make it the absolute basis of
which the real history of
philosophy, as the thinkers
in the early Romantic tradiWissenschaft consists.

tion do? ‘Because’ – this is
There is such a dispute,
Schelling’s answer- ‘withthough: the question is how
out pre-supposing it the
it is to be understood. Much
relativity of our knowledge
recent philosophy, most obwould remain inexplicable’

viously the work of Jean(p. 157).

Fran~ois Lyotard, has tried
For the Romantics acto abandon any sense that
cess to that ground of selfthere is such a One, in faRose Finn-Kelcey, Bureau de Change, 1987. Installation
vour of the idea that we must
consciousness lies in art. It
is in the sense that the arcome to terms with irreconticulated scraping of horse hair on cat gut strung over a resonating
cilable differences between kinds of validity claims. As Frank
box, within the framework of a system of musical practice and
shows, however, such a position cannot be sustained, as even to
potential, has more claims on our attention than the physics of establish irreconcilable difference requires a disputed ground
which must be the same for the notion of difference to be
1826, that we can become aware that Beethoven’s late quartets
comprehensible.

may have a claim to truth which natural science has not. The
quartets ‘show more than can be grasped by the conceptual labour
This One, ‘Being’, the absolute, cannot, however, as Hegel
tried to show, be dissolved into the movement of reflection by its
of interpretation’ (p.174). Unless we are toretum to a pre-Kantian
position, objectivity can only be constituted by the compelling
necessary going over into the other of itself; essence, knowledge,
aspects of the way the world presents itself to us as active
Being is, as the late Schelling puts it, unvordenklich, there before
intelligent beings, not as the truth of the world in itself. Once
it can be thought, such that ‘the beginning of thinking is not yet
philosophy pays attention to the living activity of consciousness,
thinking’ , and thinking cannot return to itself as it does in Hegel’ s
it must face the consequences of a view of language which journey of Geist. Instead we are forced into modem temporality,
inherently resists being fixed. (Frank shows here how many of the
where self-consciousness can never return to a ground it would
aspects of post-structuralism which have been so influential in
know as its own. The truth of Romantic philosophy, Frank
recent years can be given a more convincing philosophical
contends, was obliterated along with the breakdown of Hegel’s
grounding, and have a much longer history than is often seen.)
attempt to demonstrate the ultimate presence of the absolute in
The ways of making the world comprehensible that are the
thinking, thereby distorting our perspective on the philosophy of
22

Radical Philosophy 58, Summer 1991

modernity. The ‘post-modem’ world of fragments and difference of knower and known, upon a separation on the basis of the one
is, therefore, philosophically more convincingly represented by Being which is prior to this separation and is the condition of its
the early Romantics, as the philosophers of modernity par ex- possibility.

cellence. The Romantics realise that the sense of our world can
The awareness of the necessity of this absolute foundation for
always only lie in the future, and it is the task of art to come to philosophy leads to the sense in which art, because it forces us into
terms with this. Novalis: ‘If the character of a given problem is its infinite interpretation, may be a more adequate way of underinsolubility, then we solve it if we represent its insolubility’ (cited standing the absolute than philosophy. At this level the debate
p. 271). The perceived failure of art, as seen by philosophies between relativism and objectivism has to be seen as part of a
critical of art, to give a positive representation of the truth, larger issue. Art’s very use of finite materials to show something
becomes what makes art reveal a
which is not those materials is akey
deeper truth than the temporary
to the nature of modem self-consolutions of the sciences.

sciousness, for which the sense of
Because they begin from such a
the lack of any positive absolute is
different conception of the history
fundamental. Rembrandt’s selfof modem philosophy, Frank’s arportraits are not art because of the
guments about Romantic aesthetpigments and canvas used; indeed,
ics can shed new light for Englishnor are they art because they represpeaking readers on the increassent Rembrandt. The truth they aringly arid debate about relativism.

ticulate cannot ever be fully said,
Given the changing character of
and happens in productive engagement with the work, which must
knowledge, the temptation is to see
move beyond the work’s sensuous
all knowledge as contextually relamaterials to its meanings. Frank
tive, giving rise to the standard objection that the knowledge of conshows the implications of this most
effectively in a discussion of
textual relativity cannot itself be
Solger’s remarks, in his account of
contextually relative. However, the
irony, on the irreducibility of being
opponents of relativism, let alone
to consciousness, which is worth
its defenders, rarely examine the
citing at length.

idea of the absolute which is the
necessary condition of any arguBeing as ‘in itself completely
ment about relativism. Richard
One’ can for precisely this reaBemstein, for instance, claims that
son never be known in its es’Absolutism ‘” is no longer a live
sence, because it, as it were,
option’.3 Without an absolute,
never leaves a gap or a split
though, the term ‘relativism’ is
through which consciousness
meaningless. This does not mean
could penetrate to it [Solger].1t
they are opposites. In the terms
is different with consciousness:

outlined so far, relativism involves
as it in part becomes an other to
‘reflection’: each moment of
itself it admittedly grasps itself,
knowledge is dependent upon what
but only is to the extent to which
it grasps itself. Its being is relait is not, upon relations between
tive to knowing; it is only
beings. The absolute cannot be deconditionally (bedingterweise)
pendent, and cannot be characterreal. For just this reason it is
ised by reflection.

temporal; for being temporal
In Frank’s terms, the choice in
means precisely having its bethe philosophy of modernity is reing not in itself but in an other;
ally between Hegel and the Roand that in turn means: never
mantics. In Hegel the relativity of
existing ‘all at once’, but in
the knowledge produced by the undifferent moments. Consciousderstanding, where each thing beness, which is primordially decomes known via what it is not, is
prived of being, projects itself
overcome when the totality of the
into its future as a being which
relations of knowledge abolishes
will be reached there; but being
itself in the absolute, in the realisaflees again into the future and
tion that the whole process is the
draws a new (one is tempted to
truth. Everything is relative to evesay with Heidegger) project of
rything else: the self-negation of
existence (Daseins-Entwurf)
each particular thing, which results
Helen Chadwick,The Philosopher’s Fear of Flesh, 1989
after it, and so on (p. 325).

from its failure to be complete in
itself, is overcome in the articulation of an absolute interdepend- The importance of the question of relativism for Romanticism
ence, which ultimately entails the identity of thought and being.

lies, then, not in the facile opposition of relativism and objectivFor the Romantics this revelation of ultimate identity cannot ism as ways of considering particular sciences, but rather in its
positively result from the demonstration of the relativity of all revealing essential aspects of our self-conscious life in modernity.

particular beings. The absolute for them is the necessary ground This approach to philosophy may turn out to be more fruitful than
of the relativity of knowledge, but cannot be known as such, be- the concentration upon one narrow sector of epistemology which
cause the very structure of knowledge depends upon the relation generally underlies the existing debate over relativism.

Radical Philosophy 58, Summer 1991

23

Objectivists who set out to establish the incontrovertible
certainty of scientific knowledge, based however sophisticatedly
on the idea of an objective true world, seem still to think that those
who have embarked on their quest can avoid the necessity of
reflecting upon themselves, who are, after all, the necessary
correlate of any object. How can one have the notion of an
objective world, if it does not entail an other for which it is
objective? Objectivists fail to see that the very notions of objectivity, or realism, however much they may now be couched in the
language of propositions and singular terms, already locate them
within a structure of reflection, of knower and known, and bring
with them the kind of difficulties suggested above. The desire
ultimately to ground scientific knowledge would entail direct
access to an absolute which is the prior condition or the ultimate
telos of reflexive knowledge: objectivism has to claim it already
knows what knowledge is. One is tempted, therefore, to suggest
that the only consistent course for objectivists is to be Hegelians,
bizarre as this might sound. On the other hand, seen from the
Romantic perspective, relativists who are aware ofthe reflexivity
of knowledge tend, even as they are denying objectivity to
knowledge, to invoke a disguised but necessarily knowable
absolute, such as the will-to-power, ideology, the Western
episteme, historical conjuncture, in order to validate the denial of
objectivity by revealing the real ground of objectivity.

The Romantic position suggests a way beyond these bad
alternatives – I am aware, of course, that the complexities of this
issue are far greater than I have made them. The Romantic
absolute is a reminder of our inherent fallibility, but it also
sustains the reasons for believing there can be value in our
dividedness, a reason for the rigorous and coherent pursuit of
knowledge in the widest sense. The experience of art, in which it
is not the piece of painted canvas, the fleeting vibrations of the
atmosphere, the words of the poem, but the fact that it is what they
are not that is significant, points for Frank to the
speculative state of affairs which can be clearly formulated
in words: that there can be no intuition (Anschauung) of
the Highest, but that it does not simply mean for this reason
that (as complacent common-sense would like impatiently
to conclude) it does not exist at all. It exists as that which,
in the divisions and fragmentations in our world of the
understanding, yet creates that unity, without which contradiction and difference could not be shown as such (p.

340) (My emphasis).

This speculative fact points also to the precarious but necessary
unity of ourselves as self-conscious beings, which we cannot
conceptually explain, but without which such fundamental experiences as loss, difference, temporality, ignorance become inexplicable. To the psychoanalytical mind this unity may sound like
a wish for regression to the imaginary, where the pain of division
is repressed in the refusal to acknowledge the reality of the other.

However, such a view fails to grasp the philosophical significance
of the aesthetic, which is that it seeks ways of understanding the
fact of the unity which is the necessary condition of all divisions.

This does not deny those divisions, but insists that they can only
be significant if we have some access to unity. The importance of
Frank’s work lies in the way he has shown, in opposition to most
contemporary philosophy, that it is in the question of selfconsciousness that our approaches to these issues should be
sought.

I have so far given a very positive account of Frank’s position,
mainly because I find much of it convincing. It is clear to me,
however, that, despite its persuasiveness, Frank’s position must
make us feel uneasy. The sense that contemporary artistic production is far from such high-flown conceptions is hard to escape, and
Frank himself rarely uses contemporary art as an example. The
24

gap between what his philosophy says about the significance of
art and what contemporary art seems to mean in present-day
society is considerable and cannot be ignored. We need a more
developed response to the question as to why most contemporary
art seems increasingly distant from what philosophy can articulate about the significance of art. The temptation of a disillusioned
Hegelianism, in which great art is coming to an end. not because
the absolute can be articulated better in philosophy, but because
what the sciences can do is both rigorous and effective in a way
philosophy no longer is, and more important than the merely
imaginary realm of art, cannot be lightly dismissed. At one level
Hegel himself was maintaining that art in modernity does not
have, as it may have done in Athens, the power to constitute the
basis of a polity; and it would be hard to make a serious claim that
it could. If art is the locus of revelation of new meaning, then we
need to have more convincing ways of suggesting that it can really
still open up new aspects of the major issues of our time. The need
to engage again with Adorno is evident here.

There are two approaches to understanding this issue which
point to the basic choice in contemporary aesthetics, and, indeed,
to basic choices in contemporary philosophy. One approach is to
accept the relative insignificance of art, and to clarify what
significance aesthetics judgements still might have, as opposed to
scientific and legal or ethical judgements. Whilst not denying the
importance of this first alternative in some contexts, the other
approach is to suggest that the apparent relative insignificance of
art is in fact the sign of a deep malaise, in which our very
conceptions of truth are implicated, and those effects are visible,
for example, in the ecological crisis and the destruction of the
diversity of cultures by the success of Western capitalism.

The problem with the idea of such a malaise lies in its
vagueness. A sense of this malaise is evidently at the root of the
increased attention paid in recent years to Nietzsche, Heidegger,
Adorno, and post-structuralism. It is clear, though, that we need
to do far more work to understand the relationships between the
conceptions of truth at issue here. Is the root of the malaise
‘Western metaphysics’, ‘instrumental reason’, ‘truth’ itself? The
common target seems to be an objectifying, scientistic approach
to questions of truth. The debate concerning the relationship
between truth as disclosure and truth as the assertion of what is the
case has not, though, really begun in most areas of Englishspeaking philosophy, despite the fact that its implications are at
the root of most confrontations between analytical and Continental philosophers, as well as between post-structuralists and their
opponents. Frank has done vital work in demonstrating the
importance of this issue and in providing access to conceptual
resources which have tended to be forgotten. In Frank’s perspective the post -modem abandonment of any emphatic sense of truth,
in the name of the avoidance of metaphysical closure, can itself
turn into a worse kind of closure, in that it removes any serious
sense as to why the issues demand our attention at all. The mere
proliferation of difference can quickly lead to a sense that meaning is really indifferent, rather than to a deepening of the possibilities of meaning. Frank’s position leaves open the hope that the
individual meanings articulated in art may yet give us ways of
seeing possibilities for truth which much of the dominant Western
philosophical tradition has tended to obscure. The continued
existence of such possibilities may be the best we can hope for.

Notes
Martin Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, Frankfurt am Main, 1983, p. 423.

2

See my Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant ta Nietzsche
(Manchester University Press, 1990) on this topic, as well as on
other issues in this essay.

3

Richard Bemstein, Beyand Objectivism and Relativism, Oxford,
1983, p. 12.

Radical Philosophy 58, Summer 1991

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