Robert Bernasconiʼs article in RP 117 has harsh and important things to say about some philosophical heroes of the Enlightenment, especially Kant, and it deserves serious critical attention.  This response is not directly concerned with the central claims of the article but with a marginal, though still signiﬁcant, aspect: its treatment of Hegel. It will be argued that Bernasconi has overreached himself here and that Hegel should be moved out of the range of his criticism. To show this would in one way do Bernasconi a service, for it would allow what is truly integral to his case to stand out more clearly. It must be admitted, however, that, as is perhaps only to be expected, his dealings with Hegel cannot simply be excised without affecting the rest. They reﬂect back on the main project, suggesting grounds for viewing it with a certain reserve.
It seems all too easy to cite considerations that should have induced Bernasconi to be more discriminating in his targets. If, for instance, Kant, as he claims, failed ʻto express disapproval ofʼ, while Locke ʻacceptedʼ, black slavery, Hegelʼs considered verdict stands in sharp contrast.  It can be given in a formulation that is familiar to Bernasconi since he quotes it elsewhere: ʻreason must maintain that the slavery of the Negroes is a wholly unjust institution, one which contradicts true justice, both human and divine, and which is to be rejected.ʼ  This judgement might surely have sufﬁced of itself to give Bernasconi pause in claiming that the issues raised by ʻHegelʼs racismʼ are ʻultimately no differentʼ from those raised in the case of Kant.  The subject of anti-black racism needs, however, to be taken a little further since it is the primary focus of Bernasconiʼs article.
A starting point is provided by a reference to my book, Hegel on History. Bernasconi expresses surprise at ﬁnding me ʻdefend Hegel from the charge of racismʼ on the grounds that he was a ʻgeographical deterministʼ.  It would be pointless to dwell here on the fact that this is but one strand of the defence, not, as Bernasconi
Hegel’s racism? A response to Bernasconi
implies, the whole of it. The same is true of the fact that I do not actually use the term ʻgeographical deterministʼ of Hegel, preferring to speak of his ʻgeographical materialismʼ.  What is worth dwelling on is the fact that Hegelʼs geographical thesis is understood and applied by him with an impartiality that, so far from providing a cloak for racism, seems incompatible with it. The relevant claim is that in some regions of the globe, nature, in the form of terrain or, more especially, climate, presents too great an obstacle to the development of spirit. This is no less true of the ʻfrigidʼ than it is of the ʻtorridʼ zone: ʻThe frost which grips the inhabitants of Lapland and the ﬁery heat of Africa are forces of too powerful a nature for human beings to resist, or for spirit to achieve free movement.ʼ  Thus, these forces are too powerful for human beings in general – for white Europeans no less than for black Africans. It is, one might say, ironic that, as we now know, Africa was the birthplace of Hegelian spirit, of the distinctively human consciousness he interpreted through that concept, and remained its sole home for all but a small portion of its life on earth. Hegel would, however, have had no difﬁculty in showing this truth the respect he habitually accords the ﬁndings of science. Among many other indications there is the claim, hard to square with ʻgeographical determinismʼ, that the Greeks derived the materials for the development of their art and religion from, among other non-European sources, Egypt, while Egypt ʻprobably received its culture from Ethiopiaʼ.  On the strength of these observations Hegel might reasonably be regarded as a precursor of ʻBlack Athenaʼ. It is at the very least odd to ﬁnd a thinker who inclines in that direction accused of being an anti-black racist.
Hegelʼs account of the Greeks deserves a closer look, for it constitutes virtually a hymn to racial impurity. Thus, he insists that it is ʻsuperﬁcial and absurdʼ to suppose that their ʻbeautiful and truly free lifeʼ could arise as ʻthe development of a race [Gesch-lecht] keeping within the limits of blood relationship and friendshipʼ. On the contrary, the Greeks developed themselves from ʻa colluvies, a conﬂux of the most various nations [Nationen]ʼ, and the beginnings of their cultural development are connected with ʻthe advent of foreignersʼ in Greece.  The terminology is signiﬁcant here. In Hegelʼs standard usage a ʻnationʼ is a group united by common descent, in accord with the kind of fact of etymology to which he attaches great signiﬁcance, ʻthe derivation of the word natio from nasciʼ (to be born).  Thus, ʻnationʼ may be seen as cognate with, perhaps as a narrower speciﬁcation of, ʻraceʼ.
The important point for present purposes is that a ʻnationʼ has to be distinguished from a ʻpeopleʼ (Volk). A people is a ʻspiritual individualʼ, a community constituted through a distinctive form of spirit, that is, a distinctive form of consciousness and self-consciousness, ʻits self-consciousness in relation to its own truth, its essenceʼ, or what might broadly be termed its culture.  Hegel makes the relevant point by telling us that in so far as peoples are also nations, ʻtheir principle is a natural oneʼ.  Thus, we are in touch once more with an aspect of the distinction between nature and spirit, a distinction that belongs to the very architecture of his thought and has an especially crucial role in the philosophy of history. For history is precisely, in one aspect at least, the escape of spirit from nature, its overcoming of all natural determinants such as common descent or blood relationship. As is to be expected, it is peoples and not nations, spiritual and not natural entities, who are the vehicles of this process. Indeed, groups whose principle is a natural one, such as nations, tribes, castes and races, cannot as such ﬁgure as historical subjects. It follows that, for Hegel, there literally cannot be a racist interpretation of history. History is an object which can never be brought into focus through racist categories, and racism is incompatible with historical understanding.
Turning from Hegelʼs philosophy of history to his philosophy of right yields a smaller range of material combined with an even clearer enunciation of antiracist principle. The key idea is that in the modern state ʻA human being counts as such because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc.ʼ  It is, rather obviously, the case of the Jews that is most pertinent at present. In this passage, as elsewhere, Hegel is setting himself against the most powerful form of racism of his time and place. This manifested itself in, for instance, the fulminations of J.F. Fries against ʻthe Jewish casteʼ and in the movement to exclude the members of this ʻcasteʼ from civil and political rights. In the face of such tendencies, Hegel insists that ʻJews are primarily human beingsʼ, adding that the demand for their exclusion has ʻproved in practice the height of follyʼ while the way in which governments, and more particularly the Prussian government, have acted in this regard has proved ʻwise and honourableʼ. 
It is curious that Bernasconi, in his dealings with ʻHegelʼs racismʼ, allows him no credit for his stand as a principled opponent of anti-Semitism. The oddity is the greater if one contrasts his treatment with that of Heidegger. The issue at stake on each side of the contrast is that of the supposed connection between philosophy and racist views. Where Heidegger is concerned, Bernasconi is tentative and circumspect: ʻhis anti-Semitism, although undeniable, is not so easily associated with his philosophy, although an argument along these lines can be formulatedʼ.  In dealing with Hegel such judiciousness is cast aside, though an argument to connect his alleged racism with his philosophy would be at least as difﬁcult to formulate.
Bernasconi formulates no such argument while tending to proceed as if he had. It may possibly be symptomatic in this regard that he is content just to situate disparagingly, by prefacing with an astonished ʻit is even suggested thatʼ, the claim made in Hegel on History that Hegelian spirit provides an unrivalled theoretical basis for ʻthe fundamental equality of human beingsʼ.  There is, of course, no reason why he should engage in particular with my statement of the case for Hegelian spirit. Yet he surely needs to engage seriously with that case in some form. For, on the face of it, to speak of the fundamental equality of human beings is simply to spell out what that spirit plainly implies. It is, after all, the spirit whose ʻsubstance … is freedomʼ, a substance to be achieved only ʻthrough the freedom of each individualʼ since ʻwe know … that all human beings as such are free, that the human beings as human being is freeʼ.  To note this is to be brought in contact with what Bernasconi calls ʻmoral universalismʼ, an aspect of the legacy of the Enlightenment which Hegel accepted and took forward. Bernasconi constructs a vigorous, sceptical rhetoric around this doctrine, once again without providing an argument on the key question, its supposed inner link with racism. What he does instead is to focus on the seemingly related idea of Kantian ʻcosmopolitanismʼ and offer an argument against that. He then simply runs the two ideas indifferently together as a couplet, ʻmoral universalism or cosmopolitanismʼ. 
This procedure would be unsatisfactory even if the argument against cosmopolitanism were more per-suasive. All it essentially relies on, however, to establish the link with racism is a supposed biographical fact about Kant. The ʻhypothesisʼ is that his cosmopolitanism ʻmade his racism even more pronounced because the racial inferiority he already recognized now struck him as an offence against all humanity, an offence against this very cosmopolitanismʼ.  What is needed, however, is a theoretical argument about concepts, not an appeal to individual psychology. The problem would scarcely be worth noting were it not for the example set for Bernasconi by Hegelʼs stance on the same issue. For Hegel distinguishes between the two Enlightenment doctrines now in question, and in retaining the one while rejecting the other suggests at least the germ of a rational ground for his preference. He does so, signiﬁcantly, in the section of the Philosophy of Right cited earlier, in close proximity to its celebration of the inclusiveness of the modern state. What is suggested there is that cosmopolitanism represents a fake, merely abstract, universalism, a ʻﬁxed positionʼ of false homogeneity that abstracts, in particular, from ʻthe concrete life of the stateʼ with its variety of peoples and their deﬁning spirits.  Bernasconi might have found in this at least a model for the kind of argument against cosmopolitanism he requires.
A different kind of point should be made by way of conclusion. It is prompted by the wholly admirable sense that pervades Bernasconiʼs writing of the practical signiﬁcance of ideas, and, more speciﬁcally, by the contrast he alludes to between the real world of racist injustice and oppression and that of contemporary discourse about racism.  In part the point consists simply in questioning the wisdom in this context of a strategy of damning the Enlightenment even in its highest ﬂights of moral universalism. The mention of Heidegger should be enough to suggest that the precedents here are not encouraging, and that a Hegelian balance and realism in this area might serve the cause of antiracism better. The point may be put in a more general form. This involves the view that, however hard to articulate, there is an indispensable distinction of some kind to be acknowledged between what belongs to the structure of a philosophy and what does not, between contingent facts about the lives and opinions of some Enlightenment thinkers and what is of the essence of Enlightenment philosophy. Bernasconiʼs work is a salutary reminder of the complexity of such a distinction, speciﬁcally of the dangers of relying on it for a facile airbrushing of the great ﬁgures of the past. It also suggests, however, the dangers of an answering facility on the other side.
The distinction in question is needed because, without it, disreputable opinions or even incidental remarks, instead of being judged to be incompatible with the logic of a philosopherʼs position, a sad decline from her best insights, are liable to engulf the whole. Our antiracist critique will then end up proving far too much. The test it proposes is one that Hegel will certainly not pass, not least in view of what I have called the ʻobnoxious and shockingʼ character of his aspersions on non-European peoples, with their residue of ʻcultural prejudice, complacency and arroganceʼ.  Neither, however, just to consider the spectrum of his nineteenth-century successors, will Marx, Mill or Nietzsche. Indeed, it is doubtful whether many European thinkers whose opinions and attitudes were formed before, say, the 1970s would emerge unscathed. The entire canon of Western philosophy from Aristotle to Wittgenstein is likely to stand convicted. This is to render the history of philosophy in a paranoid style that seems to mirror, at least in its monocular obsessiveness, the fantasies of the racists.
This outcome may be tolerable for the historians themselves, conﬁrming them in their role as the valets to whom, in Hegelʼs epigram, no man is a hero. They may even enjoy the frisson of making their own, and our, ﬂesh crawl with frightful stories, secure in the inner conviction that, ensconced in the liberal academy, they cannot themselves fall victim to the evils they so readily conjure up. For the actual victims of racism, however, the implications are different. Such an intellectual construct cannot possibly empower but rather serves to crush them under the weight of history. Those whom it empowers can only be the racists, conveying to them the assurance that the entire tradition of Western philosophy is, whatever surface protestations it may make, really on their side. The whiff of a kind of treason of the clerks hangs in the air here. A proper sense of clerkly responsibility would require them instead to deny racism the least shred of intellectual legitimacy or credibility and exhibit it as the vicious stupidity and unreason it is. In that task Hegel should, as this discussion has tried to show, be recognized as a resourceful ally.
1. ^ Robert Bernasconi, ʻWill the Real Kant Please Stand Up:
The Challenge of Enlightenment Racism to the Study of the History of Philosophyʼ, Radical Philosophy 117, January/February 2003, pp. 13–22.
2. ^ Ibid., pp. 15, 16.
3. ^ G.W.F. Hegel, ʻPrefatory Lectures on the Philosophy of Lawʼ, trans. Alan S. Brudner, Clio, vol. 8, no. 1, 1978, p. 68. See Robert Bernasconi, ʻHegel at the Court of the Ashantiʼ, in Stuart Barnett, ed., Hegel after Derrida, Routledge, London and New York, 1998, p. 58.
4. ^ Bernasconi, ʻWill the Real Kant Please Stand Upʼ, p. 21 n15.
5. ^ Ibid., p. 22, n38.
6. ^ Joseph McCarney, Hegel on History, Routledge, London and New York, 2000, p. 144.
7. ^ G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction, trans. H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, pp. 154, 155, translation slightly modiﬁed.
8. ^ G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree, Dover, New York, 1956, pp. 237, 201.
9. ^ Ibid., pp. 226–7. For the original text, see G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, ed. E.
Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel, Theorie Werkausgabe, vol. 12, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, pp. 278–80.
10. ^ Hegel, Lectures, p. 56.
11. ^ Ibid., p. 96, translation modiﬁed. For the original text, see G.W.F. Hegel, Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, ed.
J. Hoffmeister, Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1955, p. 114.
12. ^ Hegel, Lectures, p. 55, translation modiﬁed; Die Vernunft, p. 64.
13. ^ G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 240.
14. ^ Ibid., pp. 295–6.
15. ^ Bernasconi, ʻWill the Real Kant Please Stand Upʼ, pp. 13–14.
16. ^ Ibid. p. 22 n38.
17. ^ Hegel, Lectures, pp. 54–5, translation modiﬁed.
18. ^ Bernasconi, ʻWill the Real Kant Please Stand Upʼ, p. 20.
19. ^ Ibid., pp. 18–19.
20. ^ Hegel, Elements, p. 240.
21. ^ Bernasconi, ʻWill the Real Kant Please Stand Upʼ, p. 18.
22. ^ McCarney, Hegel, pp. 142, 151.
Hegel’s racism A reply to McCarney
Some of Joseph McCarneyʼs criticisms of my ʻWill the Real Kant Please Stand Upʼ arise only because he misidentiﬁes the issue I discuss there. As I explain in my opening paragraph, I wrote the essay to call into question the way philosophers today address – or often fail to address in a serious way – the racism of some of the most exalted ﬁgures of the history of Western philosophy. I make it clear that the aim of the essay is not to establish the racism of those ﬁgures, although I do rehearse some of the evidence for the convenience of readers not familiar with my earlier essays on the subject. It is our racism, not theirs, that my essay primarily addresses. Or, more precisely, I am concerned with the institutional racism of a discipline that has developed subtle strategies to play down the racism of Locke, Kant and Hegel, among others, with the inevitable consequence that, for example, in the United States philosophers are disproportionately white. So if, as McCarney puts it, I tend to proceed as if I had formulated an argument linking Hegelʼs ʻallegedʼ(!) racism with his philosophy, this is because I have done so elsewhere, as I explain in note
However, even if my essay in Radical Philosophy does not focus on Hegelʼs racism, I am happy to take this opportunity to defend what I have said elsewhere about it, not least because McCarneyʼs response to ʻWill the Real Kant Please Stand Upʼ exempliﬁes many of the tendencies I want to expose. McCarney objects to my statement in note 15 that the issues raised by Hegelʼs racism are ʻultimately no differentʼ from those raised in the case of Kant, but he misses the target when he attempts to counter this claim by showing that Hegel, unlike Locke and Kant, explicitly opposed slavery.  The paragraph to which that note is attached is not about slavery, but about the tendency of analytic philosophers to ignore historical evidence when they interpret philosophical works from past eras. My point is not that Kantʼs racism is the same as Hegelʼs, but that their racism, however different, raises the same set of issues for us today, not least because philosophers tend to use the same strategies to avoid addressing their racism.
One of the most common of these strategies is to ignore the speciﬁcs of the historical context, while at the same time proclaiming, without appeal to historical evidence, a ʻchild-of-his-timeʼ defence. There is, in other words, lip service to history, but no attempt to follow through on it. McCarney himself is not immune to this tendency. On McCarneyʼs account, Hegelʼs superiority over Locke and Kant is established be sustained and has been perpetuated only because historians of philosophy have not done their homework. That McCarney explicitly persists in the image of a Hegel who follows the best scientiﬁc evidence, when I have shown the contrary, is troubling.
The purpose of the stories Hegel fabricated about Africans was to support his contention that they were not yet ready for freedom. He manufactured a case against Africans to support his claim that slavery had improved blacks. It is always possible that McCarney thinks that this has nothing to do with Hegelʼs philosophy, and, while I am inclined to think that this is hardly a marginal question for a philosopher for whom freedom is such a central concept, I concede that, for a certain style of philosophizing, it is a matter of course to eliminate what is subsequently regarded as embarrassing. This is another of those strategies that in ʻWill the Real Kant Please Stand Upʼ I identify as a way of playing down a philosopherʼs racism. To be sure, from that perspective, which has already turned its back on the historical philosopher, there is no clear criterion by which to decide what is or is not integral. So, rather than debate the importance of this case, let me introduce another which is even harder to dismiss and which again runs directly counter to McCarneyʼs interpretation.
McCarney understands Hegel to have said that ʻgroups whose principle is a natural one, such as nations, tribes, castes and races, cannot ﬁgure as historical subjectsʼ. My problem is not with that claim as such, but with McCarneyʼs suggestion that it follows that for Hegel ʻthere literally cannot be a racist interpretation of historyʼ. But it is not enough to notice that, for Hegel, the subjects of history are peoples. It is also relevant that he believes that only certain races produce peoples. Indeed, not all races even divide into speciﬁc national spirits.  Furthermore, in my essay ʻWith What Must the Philosophy of History Begin?ʼ, I explain that this was why Hegel judged that history proper begins only with the Caucasian race.  As I cite this essay in the same note, note 15, to which McCarney takes such exception, I would have expected him, in his response to my essay, to address the textual evidence that Hegel uses race as a category to exclude all but Caucasians from being historical subjects in the full sense. Even if McCarney was unaware of the clear textual evidence that I have marshalled in support of this interpretation, I would have thought that the notorious exclusion of Africa proper from world history would have alerted him to it. But this is not part of McCarneyʼs Hegel. McCarney writes: ʻFor history is precisely, in one aspect at least, on the basis that he alone explicitly attacked the African slave trade. But it is entirely illegitimate for McCarney to juxtapose the different treatments of slavery in Locke, Kant and Hegel, as if they were contemporaries. Hegelʼs rejection of chattel slavery does not have the same meaning that it would have had, had it been written in a different period. When Hegel denounced slavery, the decisive questions, at least among Europeans, were less whether slavery should be abolished and more how and when it should be abolished and whether this episode in European history should be allowed to undermine its sense of its own moral superiority. In fact, Hegel was clear both that chattel slavery should be abandoned only gradually and that the enslavement of blacks should be regarded in retrospect as a necessary moment in the transition towards a higher stage of development.  In my view, this places Hegel on the wrong side of the debate to which he was actually contributing, a debate of genuine political signiﬁcance at the time he was writing.
Things only get worse when we turn to Hegelʼs use of the travel literature of his day in order to establish his portrait of Africans in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History. In Hegel on History, McCarney defends Hegel by blaming his sources, even while showing himself to be willing to concede that the ʻhistrionic temptations of the lecture theatreʼ may have led him to select ʻthe most lurid and blood-curdling of the tales available to himʼ.  But in ʻHegel at the Court of the Ashantiʼ, which I cite in note 15, I show that Hegel cannot be portrayed as a victim of his sources. Hegelʼs portrait of blacks as cannibals was not simply a stereotype that Hegel unthinkingly repeated. I demonstrate, I believe for the ﬁrst time, that the stories Hegel told his students about Africans were his own invention, in so far as he took published accounts and exaggerated the details. For example, whereas Hegelʼs source records that the king of Ashanti crushed the bones of his dead mother in rum and water, he reported that the bones were washed in blood.  Hegel also included other stories, especially about cannibalism and mindless massacres, that either are without any known source or are greatly exaggerated. McCarney has read my essay on Hegelʼs distortion of his sources: he refers to it indirectly in his response but he does not take the opportunity either to answer my argument or to modify his defence. Indeed, it does not even lead him to pause when he presents us with a Hegel who respects the ﬁndings of science. The idea that Hegelʼs racist portrayal of Africa can be excused because it simply followed the best knowledge of the day cannot the escape of spirit from nature, its overcoming of all natural determinants such as common descent or blood relationship.ʼ Contrast that with what Hegel himself wrote: ʻeach particular principle of a people is also subject to natural determiningʼ.  In Hegel on History McCarney writes that ʻa ﬁrmer theoretical basis for the fundamental equality of human beings than Hegelian spirit provides can scarcely be conceivedʼ.  I would suggest that a ﬁrmer theoretical basis might have been found had Hegel had a different account of natureʼs relation to spirit than the one he actually had.
Instead of debating my textual arguments about Hegelʼs racism, McCarney fantasizes about a Hegel who ʻmight reasonably be regarded as a precursor of “Black Athena”ʼ. This assertion is made on the strength of Hegelʼs observation that the Greeks derived the development of their art and religion from, among other non-European sources, Egypt, while Egypt ʻprobably received its culture from Ethiopiaʼ.  However, it should be recalled that one of Martin Bernalʼs major claims in the ﬁrst volume of Black Athena is that the thesis of an Egyptian source for Greek culture, the ʻAncient Modelʼ, was ﬁrst seriously challenged between 1815 and 1830, especially by Karl Otfried Müller in the 1820s.  Hegel was writing at a time when the idea that Egyptian art and religion was one of the sources of Greek art and religion was still very much alive. I am therefore at a loss to know what McCarney means when he describes Hegel speciﬁcally as a ʻprecursorʼ of this view. What is clear is that Hegel was having trouble reconciling the widely shared admiration of his day for things Egyptian with the growing tendency to try to correlate the hierarchy of civilizations with a hierarchy of races, given that the ancient Egyptians were at that time widely thought of as black. The African component of Egypt is very much in evidence in Hegelʼs discussion, even while he insisted that Egypt did not belong to Africa proper.
Locke, Kant and Hegel did not simply reﬂect the prejudices of their time. They reinvented those prejudices by giving racism new forms. Locke played a role in formulating the principle that masters have absolute power and authority over the Negro slaves at a time when the form of North American slavery was far from having been decided. Kant was the ﬁrst to offer a scientiﬁc deﬁnition of race, and he himself appealed to this idea of race in order to legitimate prejudices against race mixing. Hegel was a precursor of the mid-nineteenth-century tendency to construct philosophies of history organized around the concept of race, such as we ﬁnd in Robert Knox and Gobineau. The fact that Locke, Kant and Hegel also played a role in formulating emancipatory ideas constitutes the problem I am concerned with. It does not make it disappear. This is because the annunciation of ﬁne principles – the philosopherʼs stock in trade – is no guarantee that one is not at the same time undermining or negating those principles.
I do not see that as an indirect result of my work in this area ʻthe actual victims of racismʼ will be crushed by racists newly empowered to learn that the entire tradition of Western philosophy is on their side. Nor do I share the vision McCarneyʼs ﬁnal paragraph conjures up, according to which attention to racism within the Western philosophical canon will lead scholars to adopt a paranoid approach to the history of philosophy that will result in them becoming ʻsecure in the inner conviction that, ensconced in the liberal academy, they cannot fall victim to the evils they so readily conjure upʼ. I do not share that vision because philosophers for the most part seem already to have that inner conviction about themselves, while ignoring the institutional racism of their discipline. I thought it was clear that I presented the failings of Locke, Kant and Hegel to encourage us to think harder about our own philosophical procedures, not in order to generate self-satisfaction. I am sorry that McCarney did not accept my invitation.
1. ^ Robert Bernasconi, ʻWill the Real Kant Please Stand Upʼ, Radical Philosophy 117, January/February 2003, p. 21.
2. ^ G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister, Felix Meiner,
Hamburg, 1955, p. 226. trans. H.B. Nisbet, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, p. 184.
3. ^ Joseph McCarney, Hegel on History, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 143.
4. ^ Robert Bernasconi, ʻHegel at the Court of the Ashantiʼ, in Stuart Barnett, ed., Hegel after Derrida, Routledge,
London, 1998, p. 46.
5. ^ G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III, Theorie Werkausgabe 10, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1970, p. 65; trans. William Wallace, Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971, p. 47.
6. ^ Robert Bernasconi, ʻWith What Must the Philosophy of World History Begin? On the Racial Basis of Hegelʼs Eurocentrismʼ, Nineteenth Century Contexts 22, 2000, pp. 183–4. I address an argument that is remarkably similar to McCarneyʼs at pp. 187–8.
7. ^ G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, p. 187; trans. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, p. 152, translation modiﬁed.
8. ^ McCarney, Hegel on History, p. 145.
9. ^ G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Theorie Werkausgabe 12, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1970, p. 248; trans. J. Sibree, The Philosophy of History, Dover, New York, 1956, p. 201.
10. ^ Martin Bernal, Black Athena, Volume 1, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1987, p. 31.